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‗The Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe, which in significant part began in 2000 with the appropriation 
of white owned commercial farms, is political, economic and  psycho-social, and has 
resulted in major upheavals and catastrophic changes to Zimbabwean society.  The 
researcher investigates from an autobiographical and speculative point of view what it 
means to live in and after such a crisis by considering the experiences of loss, mourning 
and melancholia as they relate to the kind of exilic existence experienced by many 
Zimbabweans as a result of ‗the Crisis‘.  This kind of exile has been called ―internal‖ and 
―external‖ (2007) exile by the Zimbabwean poet Chenjerai Hove, by which he means that 
those still living in the country under the Mugabe regime are living in conditions of exile 
emotionally, psychically and psychologically just as those in the diaspora, numbering 
three million or a quarter of the population, are living in conditions of physical and 
geographic exile.  The researcher uses ‗the Crisis‘ as a site of inquiry into considerations 
of individual and collective responsibility as a possible response to the emotional, 
geographic, and existential rupture caused by crisis.    
This study, which is partly autobiographical, but also historical and political, takes 
a speculative and conceptual approach to understanding effects of ‗the Crisis‘.  The 
hybridized methods of writing as inquiry (Richardson, 2000), speculative essay as 
philosophical inquiry (Schubert, 1991), and autobiography as a form of narrative 
research, allow the researcher to articulate, meditate and speculate on questions regarding 
loss, temporality, mourning, melancholia and nostalgia, community, and responsibility 
from a position of personal interpretation, while accepting that those interpretations are 
fractured, partial and biased.   
The study proposes responsibility as one possible response to ‗the Crisis‘ and 
suggests five claims of responsibility as avenues to open up considerations of how one 
possibly could respond to such formative experiences.  The five claims are: return, 
melancholia and reflective nostalgia (Boym, 2001), art, learning, and community.  These 
claims are drawn directly in relation to the researcher‘s interpretations of ‗The Crisis‘ and 
so are not meant to be seen as normative but rather as suggestive.  The recent scholarship 
that has been produced in response to ‗the Crisis‘ has predominantly focused on logistical 
and practical concerns; this researcher establishes that psycho-social considerations of 
how one experiences crisis and could live with/in it are of equal importance to the 
scholarship of ‗the Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe.
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‗The Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe, which is political, psycho-social, and economic, has 
resulted in major upheavals and catastrophic changes to Zimbabwean society.  As I write 
in early 2011, my home country is dramatically different from what it was eleven years 
ago.  In many ways it is no longer recognizable.  The lives of most Zimbabweans have 
been disrupted by emigration and exile, crippled by economic imprisonment, or 
devastated by violence and atrocity.  The trajectory of our lives has been interrupted and 
many now flounder in the gap between what went before and what has come after.  The 
home we knew in a literal and figurative sense is not the home we now inhabit, whether 
we live there still or not.   
While it is difficult to exactly date the start of ‗the Crisis‘, generally it is thought 
to have begun around 1999 with the emergence of Zimbabwe‘s first viable opposition 
party, the Movement for Democratic Change.  Sensing the threat to its power, Zanu-PF, 
the ruling party since Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, orchestrated the chaotic 
and violent appropriation of white-owned commercial farms in 2000.  Without revenue 
from commercial agriculture, which provided the most significant portion of the 
country‘s GDP, as well as various other economically irresponsible acts, the country 
suffered historically high levels of hyperinflation, which eventually resulted in the 




drastically impacted and as life became increasingly unbearable, citizens started voting 
‗with their feet‘ and left the country for the diaspora.   
‗The Crisis‘ is on-going.  In this study, I theorize the idea that the time I am 
considering is after the ruptures caused by ‗the Crisis‘ but such ruptures are so dramatic 
that they change the trajectories lived by nations, people, and communities.  In this way, 
there is no after as the aftermath is never over or finished.  I also wish to stress, however, 
that ‗the Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe literally isn‘t over and so I feel that there is a sense of 
urgency to the work.  These are not merely theoretical speculations on time and loss and 
crisis; these are urgent and topical speculations on time and loss and crisis.  Therefore, 
when I speak of speculating on what it means to live after ‗the Crisis‘, I do not mean to 
suggest that the crisis is over, but rather that the afterwards is active and continual and as 
much a part of ‗the Crisis‘ as any of the actual events that caused ‗the Crisis‘.    
In this study, I investigate what it means to live within and through and after such 
a crisis by considering the experiences of loss and mourning and melancholia as they 
relate to the kind of exilic existence experienced by many Zimbabweans as a result of 
‗the Crisis‘.  This kind of exile has been called both ―internal‖ and ―external‖ (2007) 
exile by the Zimbabwean poet Chenjerai Hove, by which he means that those still living 
in the country under the Mugabe regime, can be in a state of exile just as much as the 
three million Zimbabweans who have left and now live in the diaspora.     
Diaspora is described as the collective experience to the exile‘s individual 
experience. ―Diaspora,‖ which means, "to scatter about, to disperse," historically 
describes the ―the exile of the Jews from their historic homeland and their dispersion 




defined by William Safran (1991), are: the communal memory of the homeland; feelings 
of (self-imposed?) alienation in the host country; belief in the possibility of an eventual 
return home; a collective commitment to the restoration of the homeland; and continued 
relations, in some form, with the homeland (p. 83 – 84).  As a means to think about the 
tensions and ambivalences experienced by many of those living in exile in the diaspora, I 
here focus on a specific event that occurred in London in June 2009 involving a group of 
Zimbabwean exiles. This analysis simultaneously allows me to raise questions that are 
more directly related to notions of responsibility and the Zimbabwean situation, and is a 
means of framing the final chapter in which I propose five claims of responsibility as 
possible responses to the Zimbabwean context and experiences of political crises at large.  
In this way, I use ‗the Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe as a site of inquiry into questions of 
responsibility as they relate to what happens after the rupture caused by political, 
economic and psycho-social catastrophe. 
The root of my concern began and resides with the question: How does one live 
with/in and after such a crisis?  (In other more poetic words, Mrs. Curren, J. M. Coetzee‘s 
protagonist from his novel Age of Iron (1990), speaks of trying ―to keep a soul alive in 
times not hospitable to the soul‖ (Coetzee, p. 130).)  In response to this, I propose 
particular conceptions of responsibility.  Thomas Keenan writes in Fables of 
Responsibility: Aberrations and Predicaments in Ethics and Politics (1997) that 
responsibility arises precisely when we don‘t know how we ought to act: ―It is when we 
do not know exactly what we should do, when the effects and conditions of our actions 
can no longer be calculated, and, when we have nowhere else to turn, not even back onto 




proliferation of corruption, ‗informalisation‘ of the economy, violent abuse of power, 
kleptocracy, corrosion of the rule of law, and blatant disregard for human rights have 
ruptured in part or in whole the norms, standards and codes of conduct through which we 
normally live our lives.  Responsibility, as I first theorize and then claim, could be a 
possible response to this crisis.  I propose five claims of responsibility, which are: return, 
melancholia and reflective nostalgia (Boym, 2001), art, learning, and community.  These 
claims are drawn directly in relation to my interpretations of ‗The Crisis‘ and so are not 
meant to be seen as normative but rather suggestive of various avenues that could be used 
to open up considerations of how one could respond to such formative experiences.   
The recent outpouring of scholarship with regard ‗the Crisis‘ has predominantly 
focused on logistical and practical concerns; I believe that psycho-social concerns related 
to how one experiences crisis and could try to live with/in and after it are of equal 
importance to the scholarship of ‗the Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe.  In so arguing, I draw from a 
wide range of theory that would be broadly classified as or situated within the 
Humanities, writ large.  I am an English literature teacher by profession and you will see 
the influence of literature on my thinking and writing.  Being a teacher I am also 
interested in questions of learning, but in the context of this dissertation, I am interested 
in learning in its broader sense in that we learn from our contexts and environments and 
experiences and relationships as much as we learn, if not more so, from our books and 
teachers.  Therefore I try throughout this dissertation to think about what has and could 
be learnt from this experience of crisis.  I therefore regard this dissertation as 
interdisciplinary in nature in that it requires a broad reading within a range of expertise 




2007) in its design, research methodologies, and its eclectic but pertinent use of a range 
of readings that I bring to bear on the topic.         
‗The Crisis‘ has ruptured our sense of linear temporality in that the progression of 
our lives has been disrupted and many of us are not living the lives we thought we‘d be 
living.  (―Our‖ refers to the collective of Zimbabwean born people who live or have lived 
in the country within the last ten to fifteen years and are not connected to or part of Zanu-
PF‘s regime.)  It is for this reason that I structure the study around notions that attempt to 
represent markers of time that stress a sense of coming after, of ―belatedness‖ (p. 468) as 
Judith Butler (2003) describes it.  The trope of the journey is important to the literature of 
exile (offhand, one need only think of Homer‘s The Odyssey and Dante‘s The Divine 
Comedy).  In light of this, I also see the structure of this study as mapping the journey of 
my interpretations of certain experiences of ‗the Crisis‘.   
T. S. Eliot, in the Four Quartets, writes persuasively of journeying.  In ―Dry 
Salvages‖, we voyagers are told to ―Fare forward‖; we ―are not those who saw the harbor 
/ Receding, or those who will disembark‖, rather ―Here between the hither and the farther 
shore / While time is withdrawn‖ we must ―consider the future / And the past with an 
equal mind‖ (Eliot, 1936, p. 197).  Guided by Eliot, I consider what has gone before and 
what has come and could still come afterwards.  This journey begins in the second 
chapter, Afterbirth, in which I recount my interpretation of various historians‘ and social 
theorists‘ interpretations of a history of my home country.  The chapter serves to situate 
and contextualize the current crisis.  From there, the journey moves me on to Chapter III, 
After words, which starts just after the catastrophe with the naming of the event and goes 




chapter I draw on an eclectic array of thinkers and writers to delve into the historical, 
political and psychic dimensions of the effects of ‗the Crisis‘.  In Chapter IV, Afterlife, I 
take loss with me as I move on to think about the psycho-social effects of the conditions 
of ―internal‖ and ―external‖ exile (Hove, 2007).  I draw predominantly from Sigmund 
Freud‘s (1957) theories of mourning and melancholia (1917), as well as Judith Butler‘s 
(2003; 2004) work on loss, mourning and the precariousness of life and Edward Said‘s 
(2000) meditation on the condition of exile.  Exile leads me to the diaspora in Chapter V, 
Aftermath, where I am guided by James Clifford (1994) and William Safran (1991) and 
again by Judith Butler (2003; 2004), who help me to think about the experiences of those 
living in the diaspora.  Lastly, I arrive at Chapter VI, Afterwards, which offers a proposal 
of five possible claims of responsibility in response to ‗the Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe.  In this 
chapter, I am guided by Butler (2003; 2004; 2005; 2010) and Gayatri Spivak (1998) in 
thinking about responsibility.     
    
Motivation 
 
 One of the results of ‗the Crisis‘ has been an ―extraordinary exodus‖ 
(McGregor, 2010, pg. 3) of up to a quarter of the population, or 3 million people, 
(McGregor, 2010, pg. 3) who have left the country for South Africa and other 
neighboring African countries; the U.K and some other European countries; the United 
States and Canada; and Australia and New Zealand.  As Jonathan Crush and Daniel 
Tevera state in the introduction to their edited collection of essays on the mass migration 




or fail altogether, the predictable response of ordinary people is to get out, as soon as they 
can, to wherever they can go‖ (Crush & Tevera, 2010, p. 1).  The region that makes up 
Zimbabwe has a long history of migration and population movements.  These movements 
were predominantly movements of in-migration; it is Zimbabwe‘s recent and rapid 
transformation that in contrast ―is particularly stark and dramatic‖ (Crush and Tevera, 
2010, p. 22) as it is only in the last two decades of massive and chaotic decline that the 
country has become a place of almost exclusive out-migration (Crush & Tevera, 2010, p. 
2).   
‗Crisis-driven‘ migration, the experts call it, but to others it is known more 
poetically by the name ―exile‖.  Those who have left are positioned and position 
themselves under a variety of identities—immigrants (both legal and illegal), asylum-
seekers, exiles (both self-imposed and forced), migrants—differently mediated by class, 
education, race, gender, and sexuality.  Many of these people collectively make up the 
Zimbabwean diaspora.  It must also be stated that some, for various reasons involving 
choice, class, situation and experience, would not consider themselves part of the 
diaspora.  I, for example, do not consider myself a ‗diasporan‘ for the reason that I never 
considered my move to study in the States a permanent move.  This justification can be 
contested though as many who left Zimbabwe and do consider themselves part of the 
diaspora would not think of their leaving as being permanent either.  I came to study only 
in part motivated by the dire situation in the country but I always intended to return.  
Again, I hear you ask, how is that different from others in the diaspora?  I suppose the 
simplest way to describe the distinction as I see it, is that it is very likely that I would 




situations certainly added to my justifications of why I should go when I did but I 
maintain that the desire to study would have been felt had the country been stable.  
 ―One of the most notable features of the recent exodus is the entry of the term 
‗diaspora‘ into Zimbabwean popular discourse, both as a self ascription on the part of 
those living beyond the country‘s borders and as a label for Zimbabweans abroad‖ 
(Hammar, McGregor, Landau, 2010, p. 265).  Joanne McGregor makes the point in the 
introduction to Zimbabwe’s New Diaspora: Displacement and the Cultural Politics of 
Survival (2010) that the idea of a community of ‗diasporans‘ and the proliferation of the 
term itself (in all three national languages: madiaspora in Shona, or amadiaspora in 
Ndebele) has only been a part of popular discourse since 2000 (p. 6).  This is, McGregor 
explains, ―a novel development as the 1970s generation of Zimbabwean political exiles 
and students who moved to other African countries and Britain during the protracted 
struggle for independence did not use the term diaspora to describe themselves or their 
relationship with home‖ (McGregor, 2010, p. 6).  McGregor believes that the term 
‗diaspora‘ makes the binaries that divide ‗economic migrants‘ from ‗political refugees‘ 
irrelevant, instead it describes a group who share a connection to a distant homeland.  In 
this way, ―diasporic campaigns can incorporate labour migrants, professionals and others 
who left primarily to meet socio-economic goals alongside political exiles (though, as 
conditions deteriorated in Zimbabwe from 2000, there is a sense in which everyone 
experienced their move as forced)‖ (McGregor, 2010, p. 10). The term ―diasporan‖ is 
also used by Zimbabweans to position themselves and each other according to who is 




Many of those who have remained in the country live in a condition that the 
Zimbabwean poet-in-exile Chenjerai Hove calls ―internal exile‖ (2007).  Those who 
remain and are not part of or connected to the political elite and the patronage system 
suffer a state of ―internal exile‖ as a result of a spectrum of deliberate and overt state-
authorized abuses, such as internal displacements due to political violence; politically 
motivated expulsions from and appropriations of homes, businesses and livelihoods; 
abject poverty as a result of the collapse of the economy and hyperinflation; and 
systematic and politically-motivated intimidation and fear-mongering.  These experiences 
too are differently mediated by class, gender, race, sexuality, and political affiliation.  
The condition of ―internal exile‖ (Hove, 2007) though is also as a result of more indirect 
and psycho-social means in that your home can cease to feel like the home you once 
knew, and it can also cease to feel like what a home should feel like.  This displacement 
can come about when your concept of ‗home‘ is disrupted because the country doesn‘t 
recognize you as you wish to be recognized and because the country you live in is no 
longer recognizable as the same country you grew up in.   
In ―A Journey Without Maps‖ (2007), Chenjerai Hove, who fled Zimbabwe in 
2001 in fear for his life, recounts an incident, when still living in the country, which made 
him realize that he was in a state of ―internal exile.‖ Increasingly considered an ‗enemy 
of the state‘ for speaking out about Zanu-PF‘s political abuses of power, Hove found his 
movements and activities curtailed by increasingly draconian laws.  When a local high 
school was studying his seminal 1986 anti-colonial novel Bones, he agreed to come in 
and talk to the students, having been asked to do so by their teacher who was an old 




by an irate school director who wanted to know what Hove was doing in his school 
without his permission and without government clearance.  Hove responded, ―But Sir, 
how can I need clearance to come and talk to my local school about my book? It is my 
novel which should have sought government clearance" (2007).  The Headmaster, deeply 
offended and in no doubt afraid of government backlash, suspended the teacher, who 
during suspension found new employment and never went back to teaching.  
‗Exile‘ denotes banishment from a particular place, usually one‘s home.  In 
ancient times, it was a form of severe punishment metered out by the state against the 
individual, who must go on to live displaced from home for a significant period of time, 
if not forever.  Hove‘s example of ―internal exile‖ speaks to this idea of banishment as 
being a form of punishment and as a result he and his colleague must live a state of 
displacement.  The concept of displacement can provide a revealing lens through which 
to explore different aspects of the Zimbabwe crisis and in this particular case ―internal 
exile‖.  Hammar, McGregor and Landau (2010) in their introductory essay, ―Displacing 
Zimbabwe: Crisis and Construction in Southern Africa‖ to the June 2010 Special Issue of 
Journal of Southern African Studies, see ―displacement‖ as a metaphor which is  
broad and evocative in many ways and can thus act as a revealing prism 
through which to understand the personal, political, and cultural 
transformations brought about by crisis conditions.  Through its 
implication of ‗matter out of place‘, the term displacement allows 
existential meanings to be discussed in combination with and in relation 




Hove‘s experience in the classroom of his colleague is such an example of being ‗out of 
place‘.  His novel Bones is part of Zimbabwe‘s literary canon; it has been and will 
continue to be studied in many schools for many years to come.  In this sense his novel is 
securely ‗in place‘ but he is not.  He has been banished from that place because he is 
considered an ‗enemy of the state‘ and unpatriotic because he refuses to support the 
ruling party.  He, the state declares, no longer belongs; he has been dispossessed of his 
home.  That is his condition of ―internal exile‖ (Hove, 2007).   
My experiences of the events of Operation Murambatsvina provide a further 
example and clarification of the condition of ―internal exile‖ (Hove, 2007) and 
displacement.  From 2003 till 2006, I was a teacher of Cambridge ‗A‘ Level English 
Literature, an advanced and intensive two year course for students in their last two years 
of high school, at a private, all girls‘ school in Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe.  
During these particularly tumultuous times, we teachers struggled to retain the high 
standard of education that Zimbabwe is known for while hyperinflation eroded the worth 
of our currency; power and water cuts periodically forced us to send our pupils home; the 
police temporarily closed our school and arrested our headmistress on trumped-up 
charges of profiteering; and opposition-organized industrial action kept our students from 
their classrooms.  These dark, dark times seemed to culminate in the winter of 2005 when 
Mugabe‘s government decided to destroy the homes of hundreds of thousands of people 
living in the shanty towns and informal settlements in and around all the major urban 
areas.  It was called Operation Murambatsvina, which means ‗clean out the filth‘.  People 
woke to a winter morning (―the winter of broken promises‖ (Gappah, 2009, p. 42)) and 




with them, and then watched as their homes were demolished or burnt to the ground.  In 
my classroom, on the other side of town in the Northern suburbs, we were studying 
Ngugi wa Thiongo‘s novel, A Grain of Wheat, which is set in Kenya and tells a story of 
the fight for independence and the cost of freedom.  I remember standing in my 
classroom, in front of my students, wondering what point there was in sitting around and 
reading books.  And I felt, not the first time, that words were not enough.  I remember my 
students looking at me and wanting me to say something, to put it in context, to help 
them understand how their government could do such a terrible thing.  How could I 
explain it to them when I couldn‘t even explain it to myself?   
 Murambatsvina carried on for several weeks.  In the middle of winter, all these 
people were left with nothing more than what they could salvage from the rubble and 
carry with them.  Part of the government‘s policy also involved getting rid of the informal 
sector.  With, at that time, only 20% of the population formally employed, the rest relied 
on informal employment—selling flowers and vegetables on the side of the road, or 
firewood, or handmade crafts.  The police roved the cities and arrested anyone involved 
in informal sector trading.  700 000 people were left homeless and/or lost their means of 
employment (McGregor, 2010, pg. 7).  Murambatsvina is another example, more literal 
perhaps, of ―internal exile‖.  These hundreds of thousands of people were banished from 
their homes; they were dispossessed of their belongings, livelihoods and houses because 
the government deemed them ‗out of place‘.   
 Hammar, McGregor and Landau (2010) see displacement and dispossession as 
being intimately related to statecraft and redefinitions of nation, citizenship and 




as ―the tsunami‖ (the South Asian Tsunami had occurred five months earlier) as whole 
settlements and communities were ‗washed‘ away and everything was destroyed, except 
that this destruction was not wrought by the random naturalness of an earthquake 
offshore and resulting wave (of historic and horrific proportions), this was caused by 
these people‘s own government.  (As Said reminds us in Reflections on Exile, in this case 
of ―internal exile‖, ―exile is irremediably secular and unbearably historical… it is 
produced by human beings for other human beings‖ (2001, p. 174).)  And while 
displacement is undeniably destructive and traumatic in so many ways, these processes 
also always have beneficiaries who create new configurations and practices of power and 
accumulation.  Mass displacement, such as Murambatsvina, an example of ―internal 
exile‖, as well as the ―extraordinary exodus‖ from Zimbabwe to the diaspora, an example 
of ―external exile‖, is characterized, Hammar, McGregor and Landau, (2010) believe, by 
simultaneous ―mobility and confinement; dispossession and accumulation; 
impoverishment and wealth; destruction and transformation; loss and liberation‖ and it is 
these awkward juxtapositions that ―help us see beyond simplified versions of cause-and-
effect, and beyond static dichotomies or linear trajectories of victors and victims‖ (p. 
267).    
In my classroom, I remained wordless on the subject of Murambatsvina: you can 
be arrested in Zimbabwe for saying the wrong thing to the wrong person.  Literally 
speechless but also forbidden to speak, I would ask myself, how can I prepare my 
students to face the many faces of the world? Or, rather, how can I prepare them to face 
this world?  And what does the teaching of English have to do with all of this?  It is one 




entails; it is an entirely different thing to take it on in such conflicted ethical and hostile 
socio-economic and political times.  Would it not make more sense, I wondered, to close 
our books and put down our pens, rise up out of our chairs and take to the streets in 
protest?  Because how do you learn ‗official school knowledge‘ with this going on 
around you?  
  After several years of graduate schooling in New York, attempting to navigate my 
way around this and similar questions, I realized that the first question I must ask is not 
how do you learn ‗official‘ school knowledge in such a context but rather how do you 
learn to live with this going on around you?  And how do you live and learn?  Gayatri 
Spivak in an essay entitled, ―Cultural Talks in the Hot Peace‖ in Cosmopolitics: Thinking 
and Feeling Beyond the Nation (1998) writes, ―we must learn to learn‖ (p. 343) and to 
ask ethical questions of political situations because ―history is larger than personal 
goodwill, and we must learn to be responsible as we must study to be political‖ (p. 337).1  
 In this study, then, I‘m interested in considering some of the effects of ‗the Crisis‘ 
from political, historical, and psycho-social perspectives as they relate to Hove‘s two 
states of exile.  I will also consider my understandings of the concept of responsibility in 
the context of proposing a possible response to ‗the Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe.  My research 
questions are:       
 
 
                                                 
1
 I am most persuaded by Spivak‘s call to ―learn to learn‖ and especially by the stress she puts on the 
ethical stance of responsibility in the face of history and politics. I will return to these issues in depth in 





1. What happens when I use Chenjerai Hove‘s concept of ―internal and external 
exile‖ to consider: 
a). my interpretations of the political and historical factors that have lead 
to the current ‗Zimbabwean Crisis‘; 
b). my interpretations of my own experiences with/in ‗the Crisis‘; 
c). the theorized, documented and generalized psycho-social effects of the 
experiences of exile and diaspora.  
2. What happens when I grapple with conceptions of responsibility as they relate to 




As a result of various aspects of ‗the Crisis‘, many of us Zimbabweans have 
experienced a dramatic shift in the trajectory of our lives.  The story we were originally 
living has become obsolete, that plot is no longer viable because our grand narrative of 
‗Home‘ has been over-shadowed by doubt and uncertainty.  The home we knew in a 
literal and figurative sense is not the home we now inhabit, whether we live there still or 
not.  I have experienced this crisis, in part, as a time when my life story was drastically 
altered.  I have wondered: What happens when the story you‘re living changes direction?  
What happens to the characters in that story?  If we make sense of our reality by 
constructing narratives of our past experiences (Ellis & Bochner, 2000; Krog, 1999), 
even knowing that these are constructed and framed by available discourses and prevalent 




narrative into the life not yet lived, how do we reconcile ourselves to a dramatic rupture 
to that narrative sequence?  If things you took for granted were no longer certain, how do 
you move forward into that void?  ―All these are crushing questions,‖ George Eliot writes 
in Middlemarch (1971/2) about Dorothea Casaubon‘s awakening to the depressing 
realization that the man she has married is not at all who she thought he was, ―but 
whatever else remained the same, the light had changed, and you cannot find the pearly 
dawn at noonday‖ (1994, p. 195).  There are no easy answers to such ―crushing 
questions‖ (Eliot, 1994, p. 195) but through this study I will attempt to represent, 
negotiate and conceptualize (while simultaneously troubling these attempts) my 
experiences and understandings of this ―noonday‖ (Eliot, 1994, p. 195).  Using a 
hybridized form of ―writing as a method of inquiry‖ (Richardson, 2000, p. 923), I employ 
the speculative essay as a form of philosophical inquiry (Schubert, 1991) as well as 
autobiography to write ―evocative narratives‖ (Ellis & Bochner, 2000, p. 744) as a form 
of narrative research, which are positioned as Afterwords at the end of each chapter.    
 Laurel Richardson explains that writing is a method of inquiry because it is ―a 
way of ‗knowing‘—a method of discovery and analysis‖; a method that ―provides a 
research practice through which we can investigate how we construct the world, 
ourselves and others‖ (2000, p. 923).  Accepting that ―no textual staging is ever innocent‖ 
(Richardson, 2000, p. 925) and that ―having partial, local, historical knowledge is still 
knowledge‖ (p. 928), I use my own experiences and interpretations of certain aspects of 
‗the Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe as a site for speculation about the experience of exile, the 
existence of the diaspora and the stance of responsibility in the face of such crises.  This 




philosophical and conceptual approach to some of the ―crushing questions‖ (Eliot, 1994, 
p. 195) posed in relation to ‗the Crisis‘.      
 William Schubert, in ―Philosophical Inquiry: The Speculative Essay‖ (1991), 
characterizes the essay as ―a form of rhetoric embodying speculative or personal 
knowledge‖ (p. 61).  Drawing from a 1982 study that looked at the most influential 
essays on curriculum theory, Schubert analyses the results from the position that ―the 
philosophical essay is a form of inquiry‖ (p. 63) and concludes that these seminal essays 
share an important characteristic, which is an ―analytic, interpretive, and/or critical 
literary style rather than rigorous data-based or other highly rule-bound systematic form 
of inquiry‖ (1991, p. 63).  The philosophical essay, he explains, allows for ―integrative, 
imaginative, and speculative leaps of interpretation that are still soundly grounded in a 
variety of other research traditions‖ (p. 64), which in my study is a form of narrative 
research, as espoused by Laurel Richardson‘s (2000) notion of ―writing as a form of 
inquiry‖ (p. 923).  The essay‘s strength, Schubert explains, lies in the fact that it defies 
classification.  By definition, it is ―almost any kind of writing‖ (1991, p. 65), but this 
variety is its strength in that rather than being classified by length and formal structure, 
the essay is ―a search for a way to reflect about an issue of significance to the writer‖ 
(1991, p. 65).  For Schubert, the essay is ―a record of the author speculating or 
theorizing‖ much like how ―writing as a method of inquiry‖ (2000, p. 923) is for 
Richardson an attempt to find something out, to learn something that was not known 
before the writing (2000, p. 924).  The essay portrays the author‘s way of reflecting on a 
topic: ―it is, thus, a form of philosophical inquiry put into writing‖ (Schubert, 1991, p. 




Schubert maintains that no formula can teach such a method; instead it evolves 
―within a given context and moment of history in the lived experience of the writer and 
the issue being discussed‖ (1991, p. 65), which is not to say that there are no standards 
for the form.  Schubert outlines these standards as: ―prerequisite connoisseurship‖, 
―referential adequacy‖, and ―structural corroboration‖ (1991, p. 66).   
Considering the personal nature of the speculative essay, an obvious prerequisite 
is that the writer be a connoisseur of the topic.  The reader must get a sense that the writer 
knows the topic well and there must be no doubt about the writer‘s expertise on and 
experience with the subject discussed.  Richardson, as a poststructualist thinker, would 
argue that ―expertise‖ and ―experience‖ are never self-evident or innocent; they are rather 
interpretations influenced by the various discourses that are available at any given time.  I 
would agree that we cannot take connoisseurship at face value.  Being a connoisseur must 
not be thought of as being similar to the humanist‘s notion of the expert, unemotional and 
unbiased, dolling out ‗expertise‘ from a position of unquestioned security.  The 
attainment of the title ‗connoisseur‘ implies that a great deal of personal endeavor went 
into knowing as much as possible about one‘s topic of speculation and in this way it 
implies passion and keen interest.  It is these understandings of ‗connoisseur‘ to which I 
am drawn but I acknowledge that such passions never come to us fully formed or 
disinterested.  They are constantly discursively mediated and in construction.  Schubert 
goes on to expand his conception of the ‗connoisseur‘ by explaining that readers should 
feel as if they have been taken on a journey with an experienced guide who knows well 
the terrain (1991, p. 66).  While I find this metaphor helpful, I do think it necessary to 




as a method of inquiry, the guide must know the terrain well and will of course lead the 
journey but at the start, she does not necessarily know where that journey will take her.  
She may start her journey on familiar, experienced ground but the journey of 
philosophical inquiry is a wandering from a known point to an unknown one; an 
exploration, as T. S. Eliot (1963) describes in ―Little Gidding‖, where ―the end of all our 
exploring / Will be to arrive where we started / And know the place for the first time‖ 
(p.212). 
I believe that Schubert‘s two other standards will insure that the journey is not 
aimless or wasted.  ―Referential adequacy‖ (1991, p. 66) must be used so that the reader 
can judge the author‘s interpretation by being able to check to see if critical observations 
are grounded in the situation or issue that is discussed.  Enabling the reader to refer back 
and forth between the reference points and the writer‘s speculations will hopefully result 
in the reader seeing the issue in new light (1991, p. 66), if not always in ‗the light‘ the 
writer intends.  The final standard is ―structural corroboration‖ which is a continuous 
inquiry by the reader as to whether the different parts of the essay fit together (p. 66).  
Schubert is part structuralist and part constructivist in his theoretical orientations so he 
would like things to fit together as if it were a puzzle of sorts, although he does stress that 
the ―internal fit of an essay should not be expected to be as cohesive as more refined 
forms of art‖ (p. 66).   
While I appreciate Schubert‘s acknowledgement that the philosophical essay as a 
form of inquiry will lack ‗cohesion‘, I do feel that his structuralist approach is ‗too clean‘ 
for what I am trying to do.  Rather, I foresee disjunctures, and anticipate areas where 




perhaps only more questions remain, which I see as being more in line with Richardson‘s 
poststructualist perspectives. This kind of philosophical inquiry is, I believe, about 
writing oneself into corners, where there are no answers, because there will be much that 
is unresolvable.  If anything, it will be about opening up questions related to psycho-
social aspects of ‗the Crisis.‘ 
In this sense, I am persuaded by Wanda Pillow‘s discussion of reflexivity, in her 
essay ―Confession, catharsis, or cure?  Rethinking the uses of reflexivity as 
methodological power in qualitative research‖ (2003), in which she advocates for the 
incorporation of reflexivity that ―accounts for multiplicity without making it singular and 
that acknowledges the unknowable without making it familiar‖ (p. 181).  She calls it 
―uncomfortable reflexivity‖, which is ―a reflexivity that seeks to know while at the same 
time situates this knowing as tenuous‖ (Pillow, 2003, p. 188).  While I am not doing 
ethnographic work, I find valuable and persuasive Pillow‘s (2003) enticement to set 
ourselves ―the difficult and often uncomfortable task of leaving what is unfamiliar, 
unfamiliar‖ (p. 177).  Her concern is that despite the ‗interpretative turn‘ in the social 
sciences, whereby ―the objectivity of research is brought under question and issues of 
power in research relations is being acknowledged‖ (Pillow, 2003, p. 178), researchers 
attempting reflexive work are still dependent on a modernist subject that is ―a subject that 
is singular, knowable, and fixable‖ (p. 180).  Methodologically, the work she encourages 
is messy and uneasy with ―unfamiliar – and likely uncomfortable – tellings‖ (Pillow, 
2003, p. 192) so that there can be no ―simple story of subjects, subjectivity, and 




Schubert (1991), as already noted, sees the essayist as leading a journey and he 
believes that the writing as ―a special way of thinking‖ (p. 69) ―is a method of inquiry, 
that allows the reader to follow along the often convoluted journey that leads to greater 
illumination‖ (p. 69).  For me, this is a far too linear conceptualization of writing and 
thinking, and of what they do together.  He sees the essay as ―a portrayal of the author‘s 
way of reflecting‖ (1991, p. 66) but the reflection that I experience is hardly linear and 
very rarely ends in an epiphanic moment of illumination!  The reader, according to 
Schubert, is allowed to wander off from the essayist‘s charted journey to ―embark on his 
or her own byways and even pursue other journeys at the same time‖ (p. 70) but the 
writer it would appear is not afforded the same luxury; she, according to Schubert, needs 
to stick to the route and not get lost!   
I however have no doubt that ―getting lost‖ (Lather, 2001) is a very good idea 
when it comes to thinking and writing, and writing about what you‘ve been thinking, and 
writing as a representation of thinking!  In this I am encouraged by Patti Lather‘s (2001) 
stance on ―getting lost‖ in one‘s research.  She asks what research can be made to mean 
considering that we are ―Situated within and against Enlightenment categories of voice, 
identity, agency and experience, we live amidst incommensurability, historical trauma 
and the crisis of representation‖ (Lather, 2001, p. 157).  She warns against ―compelling 
understanding too quickly‖, encouraging instead a practice that enacts ―a stammering 
relationship toward the incompletely thinkable conditions and potential of given 
arrangements where we are all a little lost, caught in enabling aporias that move us 
toward practices that are responsible to what is arising out of both becoming and passing 




conception of narrative structure but I fear that this will not suffice for work that is 
voyaging through incomprehensible experience; there are aspects of ‗the Crisis‘ that 
resist comprehension let alone answers.  The idea of ―getting lost‖ is a stance that I find 
particularly compelling, especially considering that this project is a journey, and as the 
cartographer and explorer, writing (and un-writing) the maps as I go, I have no doubt I 
will get lost!  
Schubert believes that the philosophical essay is eclectic: the chosen topic gains 
meaning when related to extant knowledge and because it would be impossible for 
personal experience and external perspectives to provide a comprehensive context, 
interpretation and explanation of the topic, ―the inquirer must tailor, adapt, and combine 
extant knowledge to fit and illuminate the problem under inquiry‖ (Schubert, 1991, p. 
69).  ―This weaving and re-weaving‖, he tells us, ―is at the heart of the essayist‘s art‖ 
(Schubert, 1991, p. 69).  Finally, because existing knowledge simply does not speak to 
the needs of every topic, the writer must use ―speculative or imaginative projection as a 
method‖ (Schubert, 1991, p. 69) for this is the philosophical essay‘s strength—it is a 
representation of a way of thinking.  In this way, Schubert believes, ―The essay, a fluid 
and less formal form, retains the vitality of lived experience by creating a method of 
inquiry within its presentation‖ (p. 70).  This aspect of the essay is, I believe, crucial to 
the nature and scope of my study, especially as I seek to ponder the psycho-social 
experiences at the heart of ‗the Crisis‘.  I wish to represent through my study the journey 
of my thinking with regard what has happened to my ‗home‘.  In this, the topic is also 




I believe I qualify as a connoisseur of my research topic in that I hold multiple 
privileged vantage points.  My view point is mediated by the following realities: I am the 
youngest child of middle class, white Zimbabweans.  I was born in 1979, the year that 
The Second Chimurenga, or what was then called the Rhodesian Bush War, came to an 
end.  The following year Zimbabwe came into being through its first democratic 
elections.  My parents, Zimbabwean-born of British parents
2
, started their own earth 
moving company that same year.  Over the next twenty-six years, they built the company 
up into one of the biggest and most successful, privately-owned civil construction 
companies in the region.  I have benefited from their success and have enjoyed a life of 
comfort and security that neither my mother nor my father enjoyed growing up.  I 
attended an all-girls, private, multiracial school, and my brother and I were the first of our 
family to go to university.  After completing university and qualifying as a high school 
English and History teacher in South Africa, I returned to Zimbabwe to teach for four 
years, before moving to New York to attend graduate school.   
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Both pairs of my grandparents came out to Rhodesia after the Second World War. There was nothing 
much left for the troops, job wise, so many of them left Britain and came to Zimbabwe, South Africa etc. 
My mother told me recently how her mother always referred to England as home. When people asked her 
where she was going on holiday she always said, "We are going home." She never said, ―We are going to 
England.‖  My Mum said that her mother missed her family terribly and she speculated that so too must 
have many of the other women (especially when they were having babies) whose men insisted there were 
better chances in Africa.  
Both my parents grew up without any extended family, whereas my brother and I grew up with an 
overwhelming number of extended family members as both my parents had three siblings each and all 
those siblings got married and had a couple of kids.  (My whole extended family have now left Zimbabwe 
and live all over the place: South Africa, the U.K., Ireland and Australia.  This is not such a bad thing!)  For 
my parents and their siblings, England was never home but it did feature, I suppose, more in their thoughts 
than it ever did in my generation because their parents were English. But despite their parents being 
English, they would never think to support England during the World Cup Rugby or Cricket for example!  
(The only reason they follow English Cricket at all is because the coach is a Zimbabwean guy they know!)  
What I‘m saying is that there is no sense in which we think of ourselves as English or English-
Zimbabweans.  There are no hyphenated identities amongst the whites in Zimbabwe.  To us, England is a 
completely foreign country to which we feel no ties or attachments.   
There were thriving cultural and sporting clubs in Zimbabwe started by and run for immigrants of 
Italian, Greek, Portuguese, Irish, and even Swiss origins but there wasn‘t an English Club.  Rhodesia itself 




In this study, I see from my vantage point as a ‗semi-displaced‘ Zimbabwean.  
Having lived for the last four and a half years both inside and outside of the country, I 
have been afforded a privileged position in that I can look in while being out and look out 
while being in.  For those Zimbabweans who live fully or in greater part outside of the 
country, notions of centers and peripheries, fundamental to some postcolonial discourses, 
seem to be reversed as Zimbabwe is the center and the diaspora, where exiles end up, is 
the periphery.  I am white, comfortably middle class and Zimbabwean.  I draw from the 
experiences that my class, race and situation have provided.  I choose not to make the 
focus of my study issues of post-colonialism not because those issues are not important 
but because those are not overtly important to the perspectives and scope of this study.  
Mugabe and Zanu-PF‘s use of ―patriotic history‖ (Ranger, 2005, p. 220) and their 
vitriolic attacks against the U.K. and U.S. leadership is nothing more than an attempt to 
use Zimbabwe‘s colonial past as a screen to hide their abuses of power, corruption and 
theft.  This does not mean to say that the colonial and settler history of this country was 
not unjust and still in need of serious scholarship; the Independence War especially, I 
think, needs to be the focus of much more attention.  I, however, have chosen to draw my 
attention to the most recent crisis in a long history of crises in this country.   
In drawing from my interpretations of my experiences, I am cognizant of the fact 
that my view is partial, limited, subjective, raced, classed and gendered, and inevitably 
blind spotted.  In writing autobiographically, I draw from my store of personal memories 
and observations but as Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson (2002) explain in Reading 




the usefulness of such evidence for their stories lies in the ways in which 
they employ that evidence to support, supplement, or offer commentary on 
their idiosyncratic remembering.  In autobiographical narratives, 
imaginative acts of remembering always intersect with such rhetorical acts 
as assertion, justification, judgment, conviction, and interrogation.  That 
is, life narrators address readers whom they want to persuade of their 
version of experience. (p. 6)   
Smith and Watson (2002) outline from their poststructuralist stance the five constitutive 
processes of autobiographical subjectivity, which are memory, experience, identity, 
embodiment, and agency, to show the complexities of life narratives.  These constitutive 
processes remind us that not simply are memories recalled and stories related of them but 
they are ‗created‘ and mediated through complex and opaque processes and discursive 
practices.  In attempts to represent experience, speaking from taken for granted and 
assumed coherent, singular subjectivities, traditionally we would say with conviction, 
―This is what happened.  Do you see how it makes sense; how one thing leads on from 
another in such a seamless order?‖ because we desire an orderly narrative that has a 
beginning, middle and end.  In truth, we do not speak from singular, knowable 
subjectivities and life lived is much messier than how we try to recount and represent it 
after the event.  ―The unified story and the coherent self are myths of identity‖ (p. 47) 
Smith and Watson (2002) remind us.  Instead ―We are always fragmented in time, taking 
a particular or provisional perspective on the moving target of our pasts, addressing 




The reality of the fragmentary and messy nature of the stories we tell is especially 
and poignantly apparent when the events being related are emotional or traumatic and yet 
within the Western tradition the construction of a coherent, orderly narrative of 
experience is the assumed sign of mental health and recovery.   
Within some psychoanalytic circles, doctrines, and practices, one of the 
stated aims of psychoanalysis is to offer the client the chance to put 
together a story about herself, to recollect the past, to interweave the 
events or, rather, the wishes of childhood with later events, to try to make 
sense through narrative means of what this life has been, the impasses it 
encounters time and again, and what it might yet become.  (Butler, 2005, 
p. 51)  
Successful recovery and mental health is considered to have taken place if the stories 
people tell about their traumatic experience/s are, ―if not transcendent, at least resolved 
and integrated‖ (Carney, 2004, p. 205).  Sarah Carney‘s research in ―Transcendent 
Stories and Counternarratives in Holocaust Survivor Life Histories‖ (2004) critiques the 
often ―unscrutinized‖ (p. 202) Western assumptions about what constitutes healthy 
recovery from trauma.  The ―survivor narrative‖ in Western psycho-clinical 
understanding must show evidence of transcendence and resilience.  Transcendent stories 
―are stories structured by a linear progression of events‖ (Carney, 2004, p. 206).  There 
should be no loose ends, or recursive movements, and definitely no questions.  They 
should start at the beginning and work their ways to the end, all the themes integrated and 
plot lines resolved.  But Carney (2004) wonders that ―If transcendence means the linear 




many life story interviews?‖ (p. 211).  How do we account for the ―counternarratives‖ 
that do not meet the assumed standards for healthy recovery?   
I wonder too, though, whether the production of a coherent, linear narrative is ever 
possible, with or without trauma because I believe that in some instances we are born into 
stories and for this reason, ―My account of myself is partial, haunted by that for which I 
can devise no definitive story‖ (Butler, 2005, p. 40).  These stories that we are born into, 
are stories over which we have no authority.  They come to us already written, already 
perceived and we are tied to them because to reject them would be to reject who we think 
we are, which we can do but only at great cost.  It is often the experience of crisis that 
makes us realize this double bind.  In trying to make sense of traumatic experience we are 
forced to assess why we were present in the first place.  How did this happen, we ask?  
How did I get here?  And the paradox is this: our realization that we are tied to stories 
and events over which we have absolutely no control is simultaneously the loosening of 
the ties that bind.  It is a letting go, which more often than not is experienced as a ―radical 
rupture in the way [we give meaning to what has happened in our lives]‖ (Michielsens, 
2000, p. 195).  Patti Lather reminds us of this:  
People make sense of their lives via story lines or narratives that are 
available at particular cultural moments.  No life neatly fits into any one 
―plot‖ line and narratives are multiple, contradictory, changing and 
differently available depending on the social forces that shape our lives.  
Some cultural stories are easily available to us, some not.  Some help us 
tell our lives well; some break down in the face of the complications of 




Both Lather and Butler would agree that this rupturing and breaking down of our stories, 
this loss of faith in narrative reasoning, cannot stop us telling stories, because, as Antjie 
Krog knows, ―We tell stories not to die of life‖ (1999, p. 64) but I do wonder if it frees us 
up to tell our stories differently?  In the Limits of Autobiography: Trauma and Testimony 
(2001), Leigh Gilmore, who looks at four self-representational texts about trauma, which 
she classifies as ―limit-cases‖ in that they reveal and test the limits of autobiography, is 
most surprised by the productivity discovered at the limits of autobiography, where 
boundaries are pushed and difficult questions asked.   
In their complex self-representational engagements, limit-cases point to 
persistent and constitutive issues in autobiography itself: What is the self 
that it can be represented in writing?  Who am I and how did I become 
who I am?  What is the relationship between the self and others?  What 
sort of muse, guide, or judge is memory? (Gilmore, 2001, p. 15)   
All provocative questions that remind us that autobiography is never simply a case of 
‗representing‘ experience as ‗it happened‘.  Autobiography is always an incomplete 
interpretation of already interpreted and mediated events that have been composed by 
―historically situated and discursively inflected practice[s]‖ (Miller, 2005, p. 47).  
For the Afterwords, which are positioned at the end of each chapter, I use 
autobiography as ―both genre and method‖ (Miller, 2005, p. 49) to write ―evocative 
narratives‖ (Ellis & Bochner, 2000, p. 744) as a form of narrative research.  My use of 
autobiography stresses my situatedness.  Using autobiography I wish to challenge ―the 
normative, the ordinary, the taken-for-granted‖ (Miller, 2005, p. 54) as I attempt to 




aspects of ‗the Crisis‘, which has been a formative experience in my life.  But in doing 
this I am aware that the narratives say as much about my conception of my ‗selves‘ as 
they do about my conceptions of events and experiences.  Always we live in relation to 
our historically situated and discursively mediated contexts.  We write for our ‗selves‘ 
but also always we are aware that we are writing for an audience, therefore the tales we 
tell are never innocent but are politically motivated and rhetorically dependent.         
―Evocative narratives‖ (p. 744) as described by Ellis and Bochner (2000) are a 
form of narrative inquiry in that they are ―stories that create the effect of reality, showing 
characters embedded in the complexities of lived moments of struggle‖ (p. 744).  
Richardson (2000) explains that ―writing as a method of inquiry‖ (p. 923) is a departure 
from standard social science practices and as such offers ―additional—or alternative—
research practice‖ (p.923).  The ‗turn‘ away from traditional social science methodology, 
as a consequence of poststructuralist and postmodernist theories of language, power, 
discourses, and subjectivities (Ellis & Bochner, 2000), resulted in an opening up and 
appreciation of narrative as a viable form of research in the social sciences.  Such 
research practice, Richardson (2000) believes, allows narrative researchers to ―investigate 
how we construct the world, ourselves and others‖ (p. 924) and how we have been 
‗constructed‘ through the discursive practices as they permeate social norms (Miller, 
2005).   
―Evocative narratives‖ (Ellis & Bochner, 2000, p. 744) are ―usually‖ (p. 744) 
written in the first person; the story is often focused on a single case; the mode of telling 
is similar to that of a novel and as such employs literary devices; and the text ―refuses the 




the scientific illusion of control and mastery‖ (p. 744), and, I would argue, agency.  
Through this they activate subjectivities and compel emotional responses (p. 744).  In 
writing these narratives from an autobiographical standpoint, I appreciate that, 
constructions of ―selves‖ in narrative as ―never-ending, complex, culturally and 
linguistically conditioned processes‖ (Miller, 2005, p. 56).  What I am not persuaded by 
in Ellis and Bochner‘s (2000) interpretation of narrative inquiry is their insistence on 
coherence.  They stress that personal narrative ―is a response to the human problem of 
authorship, the desire to make sense and preserve coherence over the course of our lives‖ 
(2000, p. 746).  We work as narrators, they explain, to ―produce [a] sense of continuity: 
to make a life that sometimes seems to be falling apart come together again, by retelling 
and restorying the event‘s of one‘s life‖ (Ellis & Bochner, 2000, p. 746).  As previously 
argued, I do not think that a coherent narrative should or even can be our goal for 
narrative inquiry, rather we must accept and acknowledge that our narratives are socially, 
historically and politically situated and discursively mediated.  Therefore we cannot hope 
for coherence when so much of what we tell and how we tell it is dependent on that 
which is out of our control and/or opaque to our ‗selves‘.          
Taking this into account, I see the Afterwords not as attempts to summarize or 
exemplify all that has been covered in the chapter.  They are not conclusions but rather, 
other kinds of beginnings.  They are, in their particular mode of telling, other ways of 
saying the same thing, a detour of sorts.  I hope that they are also seen as sticking points, 
or perhaps potholes would be the better metaphor—areas in my experiences of ‗the 
Crisis‘ that made me stumble, stop and look back and meditate on what has been 




The narratives are placed at end of chapter as they are meant to point to the 
recursive nature of this journey.  They are where this research started for me; they are the 
‗inspirations‘ for the academic work, for the speculations, but I choose to place them at 
the end of the chapter rather than at the beginning because even though the work starts 
with them, I wish to emphasize that it does and it must come back to them, as the journey 
is to ―arrive where we started / And know the place for the first time‖ (Eliot, 1963, 
p.212).  My interpretations of these experiences are read anew through the academic and 
theoretical work.  This work has been an attempt to think through and do something with 
these experiences and to be able to articulate them with/in the frameworks that I 
establish.  And so the narratives placed at the end remind me that this is urgent and 
topical and not over.   
The Afterwords are also an attempt to write into the disconnect between the 
cleanness of telling in the academic prose of the philosophical essay, and the messiness 
of living.  They do, in this way, come after different kinds of words.   This disconnect is 
more easily understood if we accept the paradox at the heart of the experience of loss: 
―loss must be marked and it cannot be represented; loss fractures representation itself and 
loss precipitates its own mode of expression‖ (Butler, 2003, p. 467).  Given this paradox, 
how do you represent the experience of loss if loss itself undermines representational 
forms?  Lather‘s poststructuralist musings that encourages ―getting lost‖ allow me to 
allow myself to not worry about all that will get lost and not expressed because it 
can‘t/won‘t be expressed.  We must appreciate, Lather tells us, that ―texts that do justice 
to the complexity of what we try to know and understand include the tales not told, the 




that gets lost in the telling and the representing‖ (p. 157).  Perhaps, in this context, the 
Afterwords are best understood as attempts at getting lost while on my journey. 
 
  























A (brief) history of Zimbabwe’s pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial 
past. 
 
Home is where one starts from.  
(Eliot, 1963, p. 203) 
 
And if home is the start, then where do we finish? 
 
―The pre-colonial history of Zimbabwe is usually explained in terms of the rise 
and fall of empires – the Great Zimbabwe, the Mutapa, the Torwa, the Rozvwi and 
Ndebele states.  These large states are interesting... but it is misleading to think that 
nothing of significance happened before or afterwards, or outside their frontiers‖ 
(Mazarire, 2009, p. 1).  And with these empires, according to historians, came distinct 
ethnic blocs, such as the Shona
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, the Ndebele, the Tonga, the Venda etc.  Most of what is 
thought of as the pre-colonial history of Zimbabwe was a product of the independence 
struggle in the mid to late 20
th
 Century when it was necessary to unify the black 
population behind the nationalist movement and also to counter the limited and limiting, 
as well as often overtly racist historiography produced by colonial academics.  For those 
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 ―The ‗Shona‘ – a term signifying linguistic, cultural and political characteristics of a people – did not even 




reasons academics have tended to depict pre-colonial Zimbabwe in fairly monolithic 
terms, most popular is the linear trajectory of states rising, falling, and rising again.  It 
does still read that way to an extent but it is important to appreciate that historically, the 
people of the region were much more fluid in their movements and loose in their 
arrangements.  This knowledge will also help us to contextualise the ―patriotic history‖ 
(Ranger, 2004) created and espoused by the overtly political and nationalistic agenda of 
the ruling party in the 21
st
 Century.   
Most recent historiography debunks the ‗Great Empires‘ idea, instead claiming 
that ―most autochthons lived in smaller units and that the famous Shona empires ―were 
not really states but loose systems of over-rule‖; much more important were a multitude 
of smaller units of clan and chieftaincy (Mazarire, 2009; Ranger, 2010).  Rather, the 
region‘s pre-colonial history is one of occupation of Zimbabwe‘s difficult landscape by 
many pioneering groups.  ―Small societies never existed in isolation, pioneers came from 
and maintained links with ‗parent‘ societies; people left small societies to trade or hunt or 
make pilgrimages to major rain shrines or oracular caves and when larger states emerged, 
the small societies had to come to terms with them‖ (Mazarire, 2009, p. 1).  Zimbabwe‘s 
pre-colonial history was such that ―a broadly similar political and religious culture, 
constantly renewed by borrowings and interactions, adapted to many different 
environments and absorbed many different in-migrations‖ (Ranger, 2010, p. 508).   
 For much of its history, this region, which came to be known as Zimbabwe in 
1980, after being Southern Rhodesia from1895, was a destination country for migrants.   
Population migration into and out of present day Zimbabwe long predates 




only did people move from one area to another as need arose, ethnic 
boundaries were fluid enough to allow individuals or groups to move in or 
out of population clusters and ethnic groupings with relative ease. 
(Mlambo, 2010, p. 52) 
Population movement began with the peopling of an area defined by environment and 
topography as the ‗Zimbabwe Plateau‘ (Mazarire, 2009).  The hunter-gathering, stone-
age people, who populated this region from 100,000 years ago, were eventually displaced 
by the Bantu, an iron-age people skilled in mining and iron smelting, who arrived from 
the north (Mlambo, 2010).  A cattle-keeping culture, referred to as the Leopard Kopje 
people, had established themselves in this region by the year 1000 and their culture 
peaked by 1100 with the establishment of Mapungubwe in south-western Zimbabwe.  
This farming and cattle-keeping community also traded in ivory and gold with traders 
from as far afield as China, but eventually this culture went into decline after 1300 with 
the rise of the Great Zimbabwe culture, with their capital at the Great Zimbabwe 
complex, built between 1200 and 1450 (Mlambo, 2010).  (‗Zimbabwe‘ means ‗great 
house of stone‘ and the name of the country is taken from this culture and the famous 
ruins that remain.)  The Great Zimbabwe also kept cattle and farmed, as well as traded in 
gold with the Swahili coast.  This culture started to break apart around 1450, with some 
smaller factions moving westward and founding the Torwa state, with their capital at 
Khami, near modern-day Bulawayo, and other groups moving north and forming the 
Munhumutapa Kingdom, which by 1500 had expanded as far as the Indian Ocean.  The 
Munhumutapa‘s economy was based in gold mining and trade but it eventually went into 




of 1600, the Rozvi Changamire state had emerged as powerful and remained so until the 
Nguni invasion from the South during the Mfecane.  
The Mfecane was a series of political and demographic upheavals in the eastern 
part of South Africa starting in the 1800s (Mlambo, 2010).  There are two surmised 
reasons for this upheaval, one being that aggressive nation-building campaigns by the 
Zulu under Shaka forced these migrations, and the second reason being white expansion 
and settlement in the interior of South Africa.  Whatever the motive, the extensive 
population dispersal greatly impacted the demographic profile of the region north of the 
Limpopo and subsequently the history of Zimbabwe.  The Mfecane brought five waves of 
Nguni migrants into and through the region between 1826 and 1838.  Only two of these 
groups settled in the Zimbabwe plateau while the others destroyed the prevailing power 
structures before settling in other regions, such as the first wave that destroyed the Rozvi 
Changamire state before moving north and eventually settling by Lake Tanganyika.  It 
was only the Gaza and Ndebele groups that permanently settled in the region.  The Gaza 
first moved east, devastating the region around modern day Maputo in Mozambique, 
before establishing their kingdom in north-eastern Zimbabwe where they incorporated 
various Shona-speaking groups.  The last and possibly most significant wave brought the 
Ndebele under the leadership of Mzilikazi.  They moved north of the Limpopo River in 
1837, settling in south-western Zimbabwe, in time establishing their kingdom at 
Bulawayo.  ―In the case of the Ndebele... what began as the movement of a small 
Khumalo clan from the Zulu kingdom as a result of the nineteenth-century Mfecane in 
South Africa, developed into a more heterogeneous nation composed of Rozwi, Kalanga, 




conquest, assimilation and incorporation‖ (Raftopoulos & Mlambo, 2009, p. xix).  
Ndebele hegemony over south-western Zimbabwe remained unbroken until the arrival of 
European colonialists at the turn of the century when white migration changed the 
political and demographic profile of the region even further (Mlambo, 2010).     
 Christian missionaries were the earliest representatives of imperialism in the 
region.  The London Missionary Society was active from as early as the 1820s (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2009) as were white hunters, explorers, traders and, later in the century, mining 
concession-seekers. Bismarck‘s Berlin Conference in 1884-1885, which saw the 
Europeans carve out spheres of influence for expansion in Africa, along with the 
discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 and the discovery of diamonds at 
Kimberley a few years later, all set the stage for aggressive expansion north of the 
Limpopo where it was hoped that gold fields of equal wealth were to be found.  The 
colonization of Zimbabwe therefore was part of the closing scenes of the European 
partition of Africa as well as ―a complex affair that involved the capitalist interests of the 
Cape, Natal, the Rand and London, the British Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and 
the Governors and High Commissioners of the Cape, as well as missionary interests and 
those of the Afrikaners and Portuguese‖ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009, p. 40-41).  Afrikaner 
and Portuguese interests were thwarted and the British emerged as the colonizers in the 
1890s in the form of Cecil John Rhodes‘ newly-formed British South Africa Company 
(BSAC).   
 In 1890, approximately 200 white settlers, ‗the Pioneer Column‘, armed and 
sponsored by the BSAC, arrived in Mashonaland (north-eastern Zimbabwe), claiming the 




pioneers‘ failure to find the rich gold deposits of a ‗Second Rand‘, the Company 
expanded into Matabeleland, where they met Ndebele resistance resulting in the Anglo-
Ndebele War/Imfazo I of 1893.  The British South Africa Company won the war and 
claimed the land between the Limpopo and Zambezi Rivers, calling it Southern Rhodesia.  
The Company granted each settler 1,210 hectares (2990 acres) of land and 15 mining 
claims each.  Ten years after the arrival of the pioneer column, one sixth of the entire 
land area had been seized by whites (Meredith, 2003, p. 113).  In 1896 and 1897, the First 
Chimurenga, (Shona for ‗revolutionary struggle‘) and Imfazo II (Ndebele Uprising) was 
fought by the Shona and Ndebele against the British.  The causes of these uprisings are 
agreed to be a result of the brutality of colonial rule: forced labour, rape, looting and the 
1894 hut tax, as well as the outbreak of natural disasters, such as rinderpest, drought and 
locusts, which all could be blamed on the presence of whites.  These uprisings, though 
unsuccessful, ―eventually formed the basis of a mass nationalism and future imaginings 
of an independent Zimbabwe‖ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009, p. 49).   
 The white population grew as a result of incentivized opportunities for British or 
English-speaking South African whites, especially famers, after realizing that there were 
not comparable gold deposits in the region and that the colony‘s economy would have to 
be based on commercial agriculture.  A variety of means were used to entice farmers to 
the region, such as offering reduced land prices and an expansion of the foreign and 
contract labour supply system (Mlambo, 2010, p. 56).  In 1923, Britain granted the BSAC 
Responsible government of Southern Rhodesia allowing it to become a self-governing 
colony, specifically a settler colony ―whose major characteristics, as in Australia and 




colonial governance, and political and economic privileges for the white community‖ 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009, p. 58).  The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 formally set aside 
over half the country‘s total land area for whites (Copson, 2006, p. 3).  White migration, 
which had steadily grown in the inter war years, declined significantly during the Second 
World war, only to see its most marked increase after the Second World War when 
hundreds of demobilized British soldiers immigrated to the country as part of the 
Rhodesian government‘s post-war settlement scheme (Mlambo, 2010, p. 56).  ―In 1948, a 
record 17,000 immigrants arrived.  Over 100,000 Africans were moved from their lands 
to accommodate the new arrivals‖ (Mlambo, 2010, p. 56).  Not all immigrants came to 
farm; they were attracted by other economic opportunities that the rapidly developing 
Rhodesia could offer and that they couldn‘t be assured of back in post-war Britain.  The 
numbers of whites peaked in 1970 at 270,000 but Mlambo argues, this number would 
have been even higher if not for a restrictive immigration policy towards whites from 
anywhere other than the United Kingdom (2010, p. 61).  Because of such selective 
immigration policies and because natural population growth was slow—throughout the 
twentieth century foreign-born whites outnumbered those born in the country (Mlambo, 
2010, p. 57)—the white population was increasingly outstripped by the black population.  
Added to this, a prominent feature of the white population was its relatively high turnover 
rate, which steadily rose as tensions between the white minority government and black 
nationalists increased.        
The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was formed in 1963, under the 
leadership of Ndabaningi Sithole, as a break-away movement from the Zimbabwe 




banned by the Rhodesian government in 1962.  ZANU‘s mandate was to agitate for black 
majority rule from the white minority government (Matshazi, 2007, p. 19–20).  The 
slogan, ―the land is ours‖ was used in the early 1960s by the nationalist movements to 
gain support and ferment nationalistic sentiment among the black population (Matshazi, 
2007, p. 20).  Robert Mugabe, born in 1924, was raised and educated at the Jesuit 
―Christian village‖ of Kutama Mission in the Zvimba district (Meredith, 2003, p. 20).  He 
trained as a school teacher under the tutelage of Father O‘Hea, who told him stories of 
Ireland‘s Struggles against the British.  After working at various schools in Southern and 
Northern Rhodesia, Mugabe took a teaching job in Ghana, where he met his wife, Sally 
Heyfron (Meredith, 2003, p. 21-24).  In May 1960, while visiting Rhodesia so as to 
introduce his fiancé to his mother, Mugabe joined a protest march against the 
government‘s security forces after the arrest of three nationalist leaders.  This marked 
Mugabe‘s entrance into politics.  He spent eleven years imprisoned for his political 
activism.  In December 1966, his only son, three-year old Nhamodzenyika (―Suffering 
Country‖) died of encephalitis in Ghana and the Rhodesian authorities refused his 
petition to attend the funeral.  Eventually he escaped in 1975 to Mozambique where 
ZANU‘s armed wing was based.  By 1977, he had gained control of the party (Meredith, 
2003, p. 37).  
 Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Prime Minister since 1964 and leader of the right-wing 
Rhodesian Front, signed the Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Great Britain in 
1965, which sought to entrench white rule. Isolated attacks began in 1966 but full-scale 
guerrilla war began in 1972 (Copson, 2006, p.3-4) and was fought on two fronts by both 




supported by China and based in Mozambique (after that country gained its independence 
in 1975), and the Zimbabwe People‘s Revolutionary Army (ZAPU‘s forces), based in 
Zambia and trained and supported by the Soviet Union.  This was the Second 
Chimurenga.  
Superficially it appeared that ZANU mostly enjoyed the support of the Shona 
population while ZAPU enjoyed the support of the Ndebele but this notion of a ―a pre-
existing unified ideological or political subject that could quickly be mobilised against 
colonial rule‖ inevitably came up against ―complex processes of historical agency in 
which nationalist ‗unity‘ and hegemony were always contingent, and were founded on 
the interplay of different identities, social forces and strategic alliances‖ (Raftopoulos & 
Mlambo, 2009, p. xvii).  The struggle to form a cohesive national identity from such 
diverse and disparate groups with starkly competitive agendas was experienced by both 
the black and white communities.  The black population was dissected by various 
ethnicities with attendant historical grudges; by rural vs. urban lifestyles; by the emerging 
labour movement which stood in opposition to the nationalist politicians as they sought to 
entrench a singular national unity while undermining the autonomy of other African 
associations; and by the small black elite which clung to some hope of a multiracial 
political landscape.   
The whites were equally divided.  While the community was unified by race and a 
sense of a national identity ―founded on racialism and an idea of the nation that excluded 
the black majority‖ (Alexander, 2004, p. 195), their struggle to find cohesion was 
affected by class and different national origins so as to make ―the emergence of such a 




2009, p. xxiii).  The arrogance and cultural chauvinism of the settlers of British stock 
meant that white society was highly stratified and hierarchical—for example, settlers 
from Continental Europe and those of Afrikaans origin were considered second class 
citizens—as well as being divided along political lines as the more liberal members of the 
white community came up against the elitist right wing.  ―In the face of such tenuous 
white unity and the exclusive sense of Rhodesian identity that emerged, Ian Smith‘s 
Rhodesian Front sought what it perceived to be a more universal reference for its racist 
policies‖ (Raftopoulos & Mlambo, 2009, p. xxiv) which was the Cold War and the fight 
against Communism.  In the face of this affront, African nationalist movements attempted 
to build an alternative unified vision of the nation that would subsume all identities and 
politics below the national level.  While this remained a hope,   
the discourse and politics of nationalism and ethnicity did not reside at 
opposite ends of the spectrum but overlapped, contradicted and drew their 
mobilisation resources from common historical ground.  Pre-colonial 
elements of culture, community and belonging were incorporated, 
reinterpreted and inscribed in the modernist vision of nationalist politics, 
and the instrumental manipulation of ethnic politics took place not on the 
basis of some primordial identity, but on the reconfiguration of past 
memories, symbols and moral economies. (Raftopoulos & Mlambo, 2009, 
p. xxiv) 
This use of such a limited and limiting idea of nationalism proved to be a pre-cursor to 
the absurd but powerful use of nationalism in the 2000s.  Similarly, the use of violence by 




characteristic of the post-colonial state as violence has been used to suppress dissent.  
―Such violent confrontation within nationalist parties took place within the context of 
long-term enmity and struggles between the major liberation parties of ZANU and 
ZAPU‖ (Raftopoulos & Mlambo, 2009, p. xxvi).  By the end of the 1970s, the legacies of 
the liberation struggle were broadly ambiguous: ―The enormous hopes of building a 
postcolonial nation had to contend with these divisions and differences, as well as with 
the formidable challenge of transforming the colonial legacies of structural inequality‖  
(Raftopoulos & Mlambo, 2009, p. xxvii).     
Zimbabwe gained its independence on 18
th
 April 1980.  This first democratic 
election came after the British mediated a peace agreement at Lancaster House between 
the white Rhodesian government and the black nationalists who had been fighting for 
seven years.  A new constitution emerged from the mediation process along with the 
agreement to a ceasefire and democratic elections within three months to elect a majority 
government.  The one area that remained unsatisfactorily resolved was the issue of land.  
The nationalists wanted the majority government to be able to expropriate unused white-
owned commercial farmland to be given to land-hungry blacks but the Lancaster House 
Constitution stated that land would have to be bought on a willing-seller-willing-buyer 
basis. Acknowledging that the new government, already inheriting a war-debt of Z$200 
million, would never have the financial means to afford the land, the British and 
American governments agreed to buy and develop the white-owned lands, without, 
however disclosing how much money they would provide for the compensation exercise 
(Mtisi, Nyakudya, Barnes, 2009, p. 165).  Under pressure from the leaders of Zambia 




the political and armed wings of the two nationalist parties for the duration of the war as 
well as accommodating the spill-over of refugees fleeing the violence, the nationalists 
agreed to these hastily ‗settled‘ issues, which would come ―to provide material for contest 
in the post-colonial era‖ (Mtisi, Nyakudya, Barnes, 2009, p. 165).   
Zanu-PF won the majority in the election with 57 of the 100 seats to ZAPU‘s 20.  
Mugabe kept his guerrillas in the field so they could spread the message: Vote for 
Mugabe or ―the war goes on‖ (Copson, 2006, p. 5); a handy piece of persuasion that 
Zanu-PF has used since.  Mugabe became Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, promising that  
If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend 
and ally with the same national interests, loyalty, rights and duties as 
myself.  If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that 
binds you to me and me to you.  Is it not folly, therefore, that in these 
circumstances anybody should seek to revive the wounds and grievances 
of the past?  The wrongs of the past must stand forgiven and forgotten.  
(1984)   
These words of reconciliation were not, it turned out, intended for the Ndebele.  In 
December 1982, Mugabe deployed the North Korean trained militia, known as the Fifth 
Brigade, to execute what he coined ‗Gukurahundi‘ against Ndebele civilians living in 
Matableleland and the Midlands provinces.  (‗Gukurahundi‘ is the Shona word for the 
first summer rain that washes away the chaff left from the previous harvest: the Ndebele 
were meant to see themselves as rubbish that had to be swept away before a new fruitful 
time could begin (Eppel, 2004, p. 59).)  Over the next three years anywhere between 10 




known—their bodies buried in mass graves or thrown down disused mine shafts.  Isolated 
attacks continued until Joshua Nkomo, the leader of ZAPU, to end the violence, signed 
the Unity Accord in 1987, making Zimbabwe a de facto one party state (Eppel, 2004, p. 
46) and insuring the subordination of Matabeleland.   
‗Informalisation‘ of the economy and erratic displays of force were employed as 
the country headed into its second decade.  Structural adjustment in the 90s marked the 
beginning of a process of informalisation: urban dissatisfaction as a result of curtailed 
government spending (and growing evidence of corruption and kleptocracy) lead to 
strikes and protests, provoking a government backlash and then concessions to 
accommodate a range of informal practices through deregulation and new enabling 
statutes in a process of negotiation that differed notably from the later autocratic military-
style ‗Operations‘ used during the 2000s (i.e. Operation Murambatsvina ―clean out the 
flith‖ and Operation Dzikisa Mutenga ―price controls‖) (Hammar, McGregor, Landau, 
2010, p. 270).  In 1998, without consulting Parliament, Mugabe sent troops to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo to prop up Laurent Kabila‘s regime at the cost, at one 
point, of $1 million a day (in return for which, Kabila handed out mining and timber 
concessions to Mugabe‘s allies).  The cost of the government‘s involvement in the war in 
the DRC also contributed to the failures of the structural adjustment programmes.  
Mugabe and Zanu-PF continued to ‗win‘ every election for the next twenty-five 
years until, in 2008, Zanu-PF lost its majority in parliament and Mugabe lost narrowly to 
Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), formally the head 
of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.  The MDC, formed in 1999, offered the first 




‗No‘ vote in the 2000 national referendum, through which the government hoped to get 
the nation‘s support to change the constitution so as to increase Mugabe‘s powers and 
expropriate white-owned farm land.  The fast-track land redistribution plan went ahead 
regardless and 3500 commercial white-owned farms were appropriated, in some cases 
violently.  This was, according to the government, the start of the Third Chimurenga.  
The intended beneficiaries were supposed to be landless black peasant farmers but all the 
best farms were given to well-connected members of the ruling party (Meredith, 2003, p. 
195-200). The decimation of the agricultural sector is seen as the most significant cause 
of the collapse of the economy and severe food shortages.  Historically-unseen levels of 
hyperinflation peaked in 2008 at what the International Monetary Fund estimates was 500 
billion percent, effectively and swiftly wiping out life savings, making trillion dollar 
notes worthless and propelling the health and education systems into a state of total 
collapse (Dugger, 2010).   
The MDC contested all presidential and parliamentary elections since 2000.  
Wide-spread electoral fraud is blamed for the continued leadership of Mugabe and Zanu-
PF.  According to Human Rights Watch, ―Zimbabwe has a history of elections that fall 
far short of international and regional standards and of government-sponsored repression 
of opposition parties‖ (June 2008, p. 2). In the lead up to the 2002 elections for example, 
Mugabe told delegates at a party conference, ―What we are now headed for is real war, a 
total war…When the time comes to fire the bullet, the ballot, the trajectory of the gun 
must be true‖ (Meredith, 2003, p. 226).  Finally, in 2008, at the urging of South Africa‘s 
then President Thabo Mbeki, the results of the March 29
th
 election were to be counted at 




significantly cut any chances of electoral fraud.  Zanu-PF suffered their first ever loss of 
the majority in Parliament but the electoral commission refused to release the results of 
the presidential election, which the MDC had declared a victory for Tsvangirai. When the 
results of the presidential election were finally released on May 2
nd
 showing that 
Tsvangirai had received the most votes but fell short of a majority, it was agreed, in 
accordance with the Constitution, that a second round of voting must be held.  This was 
scheduled for 27 June 2008.  Mugabe‘s Joint Operations Command (JOC) launched 
Operation MaVhoterapapi (―Whom Did You Vote For?‖), which resulted in the murder 
of an estimated 200 people as well as the beating and torture of 5000 more, and the 
displacement of about 36 000 people (Human Rights Watch, 2011).  The JOC is 
comprised of the heads of Zimbabwe‘s security forces: Gen. Constatine Chiwenga of the 
Zimbabwe Defence Forces; Commissioner General Augustine Chihuri of the police; 
Happyton Bonyongwe, director general of the Central Intelligence Organization; Maj. 
Gen. Paradzayi Zimondi of the prison services; and Air Marshal Perence Shiri, 
commander of the Air Forces, who also commanded the Fifth Brigade during 
Gukurahundi (Matshazi, 2007, p. 78).  Minister of Rural Housing Emmerson Mnangagwa 
is reported to be in charge of the JOC (Human Rights Watch, June 2008). (Mnangagwa, 
as Mugabe‘s security advisor in the early 1980s, was directly involved in the planning 
and implementation of Gukurahundi (Meredith, 2003, p. 63) and he is touted as being 
one of two in the running to succeed Mugabe.)  Neither the perpetrators of the election 
run-off violence nor those who gave the orders and orchestrated the murders and human 




 Four days before the June 27
th
 run-off, Tsvangirai withdrew from the contest 
unable to compete in safety or with any guarantee of fairness. Mugabe declared himself 
the winner and was inaugurated as President, despite international, regional and local 
outrage. Mugabe finally agreed to enter negotiations with the MDC in late July after 
African election monitors concluded that the June runoff was not free or fair and African 
leaders insisted on talks. A power-sharing agreement, the Global Political Agreement 
(GPA), mediated by Thabo Mbeki, was signed on the 15th September 2008 with the two 
parties agreeing to form a Government of National Unity (GNU).   
The coalition government was formed on 13
th
 February 2009 after the 
inauguration of Tsvangirai as Prime Minister and Mugabe as President.  The ministries of 
state were divvied up between the parties and even though the Ministry of Finance is now 
in the control of the MDC‘s Tendai Biti, the fact that the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
which controls the police, and the Army are still in the control of Zanu-PF is cause for 
great concern.  The agreement stipulated that over the following eighteen months, a new 
constitution must be drawn up and elections held in 2011.  As of early 2011, there has 
been little sign that the MDC holds any credible power as Mugabe and his ministers 
continue to flaunt their disregard for ―power sharing.‖  Mugabe has refused to abide by 
some of the key stipulations of the agreement, namely the need to consult with Tsvangirai 
over the appointment of the Reserve Bank Governor and Attorney General and the 
process of drawing up a new constitution has been halted due to continued reports of 
political violence.   
Other recent developments affecting the state of the nation include: The discovery 




Zimbabwe.  It has been suggested that Marange holds a larger deposit of diamonds than 
Kimberley in South Africa.  Zanu-PF have already been accused of turning these 
diamonds bloody after the massacre of hundreds of small-scale diamond miners by the 
military.  It is thought that the funds procured from the diamonds will fill Zanu-PF‘s 
until-recently dry coffers and fund violence in the coming election.   
After the MDC took control of the Ministry of Finance, the decision was taken to 
abandon the Zimbabwe dollar, which had become completely worthless, and instead use 
a variety of foreign currencies, mainly the US dollar and South African rand.  This has 
helped to stabilize inflation (now resting at a reasonable 3.6 percent) and fill once-barren 
store shelves but not all the population have access or any means to earn foreign 
currency.  Meanwhile, Zanu-PF‘s Saviour Kasukuwere, Minister of Youth Development, 
Indigenisation and Empowerment, oversaw the passing of the Indigenization Bill, which 
requires all white- and foreign-owned businesses worth $500 000 or more to give 51% 
ownership to indigenous blacks.  The passing of the Bill has significantly curtailed 
investment which had seen improvement since the signing of the GPA (Bell, 2010).  A 
new election will likely be held sometime this year even though many of the stipulations 
of the GPA have not been fulfilled.   
‗Informalisation‘, which began by affecting the economy in the 90s, has now 
infected all areas of official and institutional life in Zimbabwe.  Historian Brian 
Raftopoulos, in a keynote address at the Conference on ‗Political Economies of 
Displacement in Post-2000 Zimbabwe‘ in Johannesburg in June 2008, argued that 
‗informalisation‘ best describes the results of the economic crisis, its displacements and 




in the Zimbabwean countryside, formal tenure rights had been replaced by 
political bargaining; in the cities, the contraction of formal employment 
undercut the union movement, and both parties increasingly depended not 
on formal appeals to their respective constituencies, but on the deployment 
of unemployed youth; informality also characterized the greater part of the 
mass displacements across national borders and states responses to them.  
(Hammar, McGregor, Landau, 2010, p. 269)   
It is now accepted that ―many of the changes of the previous ten years are potentially 
irreversible: land distribution, the exodus of citizens, the highly militarized state and new 
patterns of economic control‖ and that these changes ―will have legacies that shape the 
region for the next generation although the outcomes are still emergent and unclear‖ 
(Hammar, McGregor, Landau, 2010, p. 264).   
 The historian, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2010), writing for The Independent, a 
South African newspaper, believes that Zimbabwe is ―undergoing a generational leap-
forward‖ in that it is at a ―crossroads in which the old are dying and the new are being 
born‖.  ‗The Crisis‘, as he sees it, is that ―the old are taking time to die and the new are 
taking time to be born‖ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2010).  In the mean time, however, ―monsters 
have come to the centre of politics, spoiling everything and generating new crises‖ 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2010).   
 What happens when the will of the young comes up against the will of the old?  
The recent events in North Africa are, of course, prescient and illuminating on this issue.  
In some cases, the dictator flees in the night ―like a broken king‖ (Eliot, 1936, p. 201); in 




appropriate rhetoric and citing any manner of reasons why he should stay; and 
sometimes, so convinced is he of his right to rule, clutching the country to his chest, 
saying ―mine, all mine‖, he will turn his army against his own people and start murdering 
them until they no longer doubt that he is their father, that he is in charge, that the country 
is indeed his.   
 Dictators, like Mugabe, are heavy: obdurate and unmoving, like the stone 
statues they erect to themselves.  Chenjerai Hove (2008) believes that what was fought 
for during the Liberation Struggle will never be taken away by anybody because, 
―dictatorships, tyrannies, they are transient‖ (Hove, 2008, p. 146).  He is right, of course, 
but dictatorships often take a long time to become transient!  The millions who have had 
to go into exile because of Mugabe‘s obduracy are, conversely, fluid, fluctuating, 
transitory, and mobile.  Eventually, (surely?) these two opposing states of being, fluidity 
and obduracy, will clash to such an extent that the dictator will become ―transient‖ 
(Hove, 2008).  Water, after all, can crack and wear away at stone.   
 Robert Muponde (2004) writes how the regime dictates who counts as 
‗Zimbabwean‘ but that their definition is rigid and inflexible, and hard as stone:  
Zanu PF is the people, and the people are Zanu PF, in itself an equation 
that creates an indivisible utopian community.  But it is a community of 
hermetically sealed and time-proofed identities.  Mugabe‘s is a politics of 
reconstruction and ‗return to source‘, in which there is a clear and vicious 
selective reproduction of the people in a selectively reproduced and 
redistributed land-space.  This land-space is a tight matrix which is more 




eponym of the country.  The ‗house of stone‘ is a mindset which is 
inflexible as it is stony in its seeming timelessness and imperviousness. (p. 
177)   
What can we hope to build out of this stoniness?  What fecundity can be found in 
Zimbabwe‘s ruins?  I intend that the following study will navigate its way from this 
wreckage to a possible place of creativity and learning that may be found through 






Harare International Airport used to be that scene from old movies: passengers exiting 
onto the tarmac and those waiting for them standing on the open-air balcony waving and 
shouting with joy.  As a child, it was the most exciting thing going to the airport to 
welcome relatives and friends.  We would rush upstairs to get pole position on the 
balcony, taking in the thunderous noise of the aeroplanes as they landed and took off and 
breathing deeply the thick smell of plane fuel.  In 1999 though, the Chinese built us a 
new airport, all shine and gloss and fanciness, with the watchtower built as a replica of 
the conical tower of Great Zimbabwe, the ruins dating from the middle ages, from which 
our country takes its name.  The old one had become too small for all the thousands of 
international tourists that visited our country annually.  But a year after the new airport 




new fancy airport stands near empty except for a few regional flights.  ―An international 
airport only in name‖ (Gappah, 2009, p. 75), which is sad of course but what is really sad 
is that for those of us who do still fly into the country, we can no longer walk down the 
stairs from the aeroplane onto the hot tarmac and look up into the smiling faces of our 
family waving and shouting on the balcony.   
In August 2006, flying out of that empty airport to the States for the first time to 
start my graduate degree at Teachers College, I was travelling on one of the very last 
British Airways flights to fly into and out of Zimbabwe—the airline, the last of the 
international airlines, pulled out of the country for a variety of logistical, commercial, and 
perhaps even ethical reasons, and now only African airlines fly here.  I was seated in the 
first row of economy and while settling in before take-off I could see and hear the family 
of four (mum, dad and two young girls, their hair brightly beaded) seated in the last row 
of First Class.  I watched as the parents buzzed and bustled, putting away bags in the 
overhead compartment, making sure their girls had their toys to keep them occupied, and 
I noticed that they were African American.  Once all was sorted, the Dad turned to the 
Mum and with a visibly huge sigh of relief said, ―Thank god!  The African nightmare is 
over!‖  Oh dear, I thought cynically, the return ‗home‘ to the motherland didn‘t go as 
planned; should have stuck to Cape Town, so much more civilized down there.  While 
the assessment was of course unfair for a number of reasons, the truth of it is that nobody 
would have enjoyed Zimbabwe in 2006.  Even those who were born and raised in the 
country, called it home and loved it were leaving in their droves.  Isn‘t that just what I 









 But one day we woke to disgrace; our house   
a coldness of rooms, each nursing   
a thickening cyst of dust and gloom.   
Carol Ann Duffy, ‗Disgrace‘ (1993) 
 
In this study, I use ‗the Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe as a site of inquiry into questions 
related to what happens after the rupture caused by political, economic and psycho-social 
catastrophe.  In this chapter, I conceptualize the idea of the scope and possible 
experiences of this time after.  I begin just after the catastrophe with the naming of the 
event and move on to theorize notions of rupture and loss and how those affect 
temporality.   
 
What’s in a word? 
  
The first decade of the 21
st
 century has seen a vast majority of the Zimbabwean 
people suffer as a result of acute levels of political and economic corruption, violence and 
oppression, resulting in the near-total collapse of the economy; the emigration of an 
estimated 3 million people (near on a quarter of the total population); the murder of many 




and resulted in the death of over four thousand people; and one of the highest rates of 
HIV infection in the world (thought to be at 25%).
4
  The 2010 Human Development 
Index, a composite national measure of health, education and income for 169 countries, 
puts Zimbabwe as the worst places to live (along with Niger and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo) and it is also one of only three countries in the world to be worse off 
now than it was forty years ago (Dugger, 2010).  The economy has almost halved in size; 
formal unemployment stands at more 90 percent; 1.7 million of the country‘s 11 million 
people will need food aid in the coming months; the average Zimbabwean is dead by age 
36 down from age 62 in the early 90s; and the country has the highest percentage of 
orphans in the world.  The government has called the events of this past decade the Third 
Chimurenga but to most everyone else, it is known simply as ‗the Crisis.‘   
The Palestinians have a word for the cataclysmic and defining events of 1948 
when they were forced to flee from their homeland.  The word is ―Nakba,‖ which means 
―the catastrophe‖ (Abu-Lughod, p. 79).  This word holds all that loss in its two syllables.  
It is the representative for lives irrevocably changed: for a homeland lost; for 
communities displaced; for the humiliation and the horror and the mourning.  Such words 
work as markers holding the before and the after together.  They have to carry the weight 
of historical trauma and are therefore heavy with significance. ―Nakba‖ signifies loss; it 
is the marker of absence, scabbing over the trauma and bridging the rupture because, after 
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all is lost, what have you left but words?  Or rather, what have you left but the task of 
finding the words to say it (Michielsens, 2000, p. 186)?5    
Some words, though, that are used to mark catastrophic events, work as a 
diversion; a smoke screen to hide what is really going on.  The use of the word 
―Chimurenga‖ to describe the events of the last eleven years in Zimbabwe is an example 
of such a diversion.  The word itself is ripe for abuse because it is a historically weighty 
word—it is Shona for ―the struggle for independence‖ and so carries with it the weight of 
ninety years of colonial domination—and so it is heavy with psycho-social and cultural 
meaning. In this way, the government is positioning the many losses suffered over the 
last ten years as something gained rather than lost, or rather they are saying that the losses 
are actually gains.  From my perspective, in so doing, Zanu-PF strive, by illusion and 
blackmail, to tame the populace.  The government‘s steadfast insistence that the country 
is not in a state of crisis but rather in the final glorious stages of the struggle for 
independence is part of a pervasive and dedicated propaganda machine that uses 
historical truth to hide the lies motivated by greed and corruption.  Brian Chikwava, in 
his award-winning short story, ―Seventh Street Alchemy,‖ describes the illusion as such:  
Several official declarations only perfect the parallel existence of most of 
Harare‘s residents.  Officially basic food commodities are affordable 
because prices are State-controlled.  Officially no one starves because 
there is plenty of food in supermarket shelves.  And if there is not, it is 
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 In Magda Michielsens‘s (2000) ―Memory Frames: The role of concepts and cognition in telling life-
stories‖, she draws her research from the experience of having interviewed women in Bulgaria after the 
collapse of communism and considers the difficulty that these women had in ―finding the words to 
construct the past‖ (p. 199) after such a ―radical rupture in the way they were giving meaning to what had 
happened in their lives‖ (p. 195).  She describes it as a social process whereby ―words lose their power to 




officially somewhere, being hoarded by the Enemies of the State.  With all 
its innumerable benefits who would not want to exist in this other world 
spawned by the authorities—where your situation does not daily remind 
you what a liability your mouth and stomach are. (Chikwava, 2003, p. 23) 
Officially, Zimbabwe is the perfect place to live; the only cause for concern is the 
shadowy ―Enemy of the State,‖ or more obviously put, the enemy of the struggle for 
independence.  But continual and irrefutable physical evidence to the contrary of every 
government announcement shatters the illusion, creating a slippage between the official 
reality and lived realities.  Pettina Gappah satirizes this slippage in her short story, ―An 
Elegy for Easterly.‖  The narrator comments, ―If the government said that inflation would 
go down, it was sure to rise.  If they said there was a bumper harvest, starvation would 
follow.  If the government says the sky is blue, we should all look up to check‖ (2009, p. 
38).  The weight of the physical reality—barren store shelves, empty grain silos—is hard 
for the government to consistently deny and so the illusion of ―Chimurenga‖ is also cast 
in doubt.   
But the use of ―Chimurenga‖ to control the people works much more effectively 
by blackmail and guilt.  Because of the historical legacy of the word, the implication is 
that if you are opposed to the government‘s actions, actions which they position as part of 
the struggle, then you have betrayed the struggle itself and you have betrayed your people 
and all those who fought and died in the liberation war.  Not only are they implying that, 
―If you‘re not with us then you‘re against us,‖ they‘re also saying, ―If you‘re not with us 




Muponde, the former director of literary studies in the Department of English at 
Zimbabwe Open University (now living in South Africa), explains:  
The Third Chimurenga, better known as ‗the Crisis‘, is premised on a 
platform of political and cultural ideologies that Terence Ranger (2004) 
has called ―patriotic history‖.  It is a virulent, narrowed-down version of 
Zimbabwean history, oversimplified and made rigid by its reliance on 
dualisms and binaries of insider/outsider, indigene/stranger, 
landed/landless, authentic/inauthentic, patriot/sell-out.  The net effect of 
operating these binaries is the institution of othering as a permanent 
condition of political and cultural life where ‗difference‘ translates 
unproblematically into ‗foe‘.  For the other to insist on being different is to 
invite the title of enemy of the state: it is to invite treason charges upon 
oneself (Muponde, 2004, p. 176).    
 
The abuse of history 
 
The abuse of history for political gains has been one of the hallmarks of Zanu-
PF‘s strategy these past ten years; the other has been violent acts of retribution. ―The 
consistent deployment of Goebbels-like impassioned sound-bite politics‖ is a means to an 
end, as is ―terrorist and mafia-type strategies that include arson, torture, bone-breaking, 
displacement, and suchlike ‗final solution‘ tricks‖ (Muponde, 2004, p. 177).   
The historian, Terence Ranger, upon retiring his Oxford Chair in 1997, returned 




taught there.  Once back in the country, he noticed that ―In Zimbabwe, history seemed 
enormously important.  The question was—which history for what Zimbabwe?‖ (Ranger, 
2005, p. 219).   In a valedictory lecture given in 2001, he spoke of two circumstances in 
which historical scholarship, which seeks to ―complicate over-simplifications‖ and offers 
―a plural history‖ (Ranger, 2005, p. 219) was vitally important for a country.  The first 
was when people were denied a history, which had been the case during the years that 
Zimbabwe was a colony and ruled by a minority white government.  The second 
circumstance was when you had too much history, which was the case twenty years into 
Zimbabwe‘s independence.  ―You could have too much history if a single, narrow 
historical narrative gained a monopoly and was endlessly repeated‖ (2005, p. 219).  In the 
late 90s and first years of the 21
st
 century, there emerged a new variety of State-
sanctioned historiography, which Ranger calls ―patriotic history‖ (2005, p. 220).  Such a 
history ―resents the ‗disloyal‘ questions raised by historians of nationalism.  It regards as 
irrelevant any history which is not political.  And it is explicitly antagonistic to academic 
historiography‖ (2005, p. 220).  The ―patriotic history,‖ which the government espouses, 
is a ―condensed resistance history communicated at various levels, from the relatively 
sophisticated to the crudely racist‖ (Ranger, 2005, p. 221).   
In the lead-up to the 2005 presidential election, the state-controlled national 
newspaper, The Herald, ran an article which articulated the government‘s stance towards 
the election: 
Zimbabwe is a product of a bitter and protracted armed struggle.  That 
armed struggle should serve as the guiding spirit through the presidential 




choice should not be considered as a mere exercise of a democratic right.  
It is the advancement of a historical mission of liberating Zimbabwe from 
the clutches of neo-colonialism.  Any other wild illusion about it 
constitutes a classic example of self-betrayal and self-condemnation to the 
ranks of perpetual servitude.  The stampede for democracy should not 
undermine the gains of the liberation war.  (Quoted in Ranger, 2005, p. 
221).     
―yellowed news-sheet / shamed by its own print‖ (2009) is how the Zimbabwean poet-in-
exile, Amanda Hammar, describes such propaganda.  Shameful, indeed!  And hidden 
beneath such words she writes, ―pressed into mud,‖ is ―a mosaic of dried blood / and 
bone in silent invocation‖ (Hammar, 2009), which reminds us that, ultimately, the use of 
the word ―Chimurenga‖ is a call to arms.  (What comes after words?  In the Zimbabwean 
context, ―blood and bone‖ (Hammar, 2009) come after words.)  If we are to believe the 
opinion expressed in the newspaper, the electoral process in Zimbabwe is not about 
universal suffrage or any other such ―wild illusion,‖ it is about war.  In positioning ‗the 
Crisis‘ not as something distinct with its own causes and culprits but rather as part of the 
process of creating ―the product‖ that is their nation of Zimbabwe, it is seen as an 
extension of the continuing war for independence.  Are we really to believe that these last 
ten years of murder and mayhem are just the afterbirth of the postcolonial nation?  
One of the most pernicious results of Zanu-PF‘s employment of ―patriotic 
history‖ (Ranger, 2005, p. 220) is a country bound and tethered by the rope of the past: a 
rope that over time has tied itself into a noose of ―twisted nationalism‖ (Ranger, 2005, p. 




awake reminds me of Walter Benjamin‘s ―angel of history‖ who is described as looking 
like he is about to flee, ―his wings are spread,‖ but his head is turned and he is staring 
fixedly back ―toward the past‖ (1968, p. 257).     
Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which 
keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet.  The 
angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been 
smashed.  But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his 
wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them.  The 
storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, 
while the pile of debris before him grows skyward.  This storm is what we 
call progress. (Benjamin, 1968, p. 257-258)  
Benjamin‘s use of the word ―progress‖ points to the temporal connotations we have of 
history: our humanist assumptions imagines history to be a linear process where we 
consistently move forward on to better things; but the problem with history, of course, is 
that it leaks out from the discourses that try to contain it.  In reality the movement is 
much more recursive.   
Judith Butler explains that there are a series of paradoxes at the heart of the 
experience of ―the temporality of social and political life‖ (2003, p. 467): ―the past is 
irrecoverable and the past is not past; the past is the resource for the future and the future 
is the redemption of past‖ (2003, p. 467).  The past is not over, in part, because historical 
catastrophe is never a clean break: material as well as psychic debris remains.  By the 
force of time, we are propelled into the future while still reeling from the past.  Our 




1968, p. 258) finding ourselves stumbling over the ―debris‖ (Benjamin, 1968, p. 258) of 
history that is piled up around our feet.   
In Amanda Hammar‘s poem, ―Debris,‖ the speaker‘s gaze focuses in on what has 
been lost and now ―lies scattered / in a desolate wasteland‖ (Hammar, 2009).  The poem 
mostly reads as a list of artifacts, as if from an archeological dig, of a culture and society 
now extinct.  The descriptions of a ―faded blue school dress, pockets / ink-stained, proud 
hem unraveled;‖ a ―sweat-stained hoe, splintered door,‖ and ―random fragments of glass, 
iron, clay, thatch‖ (2009) work to imbue the material debris with psychic loss.  The scene 
is deathly quiet—―dried blood‖ and ―bone‖ remain in ―silent invocation‖ (2009)—as 
those who inhabited this life are gone in one way or another.  What remains after the 
catastrophe, to haunt the survivors, is the memory of life as it was before.  In the final 
stanza of the poem, we find ―a flame tree‘s waxy / orange blossom,‖ which is ―caught in 
the rusted barbs of a fence‖ but is ―still full with the memory / of its own magnificence‖ 
(2009).  And it is these memories that haunt the life that comes afterwards.  This is where 




In her essay, ―Return to Half-Ruins: Memory, Postmemory, and Living History in 
Palestine,‖ Lila Abu-Lughod recounts the story of her father‘s return to his homeland 
after many years in exile.  Her father, Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, a noted academic in the 
U.S., decided to make ―‗Awda‖ (p. 77), the return, after steadfastly refusing to do so for 




that he might die without ever having seen Palestine again‖ (Abu-Lughod, 2007, p. 78).  
For the majority of Palestinian refugees, ―cut off from their homes and their pasts‖ (Abu-
Lughod, 2007, p. 78) and living in the diaspora, ―memories of home were frozen‖ (p. 78).  
Contemplating the significance of memory and Marianne Hirsch‘s concept of 
‗postmemory,‘ which is the term Hirsch employs to describe the transfer of traumatic 
memory across generations, Abu-Lughod learns that both have ―a special valence‖ for 
Palestinians ―because the past has not yet passed‖ (p. 79).  She rejects any notion that the 
catastrophic effects of ―the Nakba‖ are over, finished, or past.  For Abu-Lughod, 
Palestinians are still living in the aftermath of the catastrophe.  The effects of the 
―different kinds of losses‖6 (Butler, 2003, p. 467) suffered as a result of that event, 
continue now:   
For the Palestinian catastrophe is not just something of the past.  It 
continues into the present in every house demolished by an Israeli 
bulldozer, with every firing from an Apache helicopter, with every 
stillbirth at a military checkpoint, with every village divided from its fields 
by the ―separation‖ wall, and with every Palestinian who still longs to 
return to a home that is no more.  (Abu-Lughod, 2007, p. 103)    
 Eva Hoffman‘s book After Such Knowledge: Memory, History and the Legacy of 
the Holocaust is about her experiences growing up as the child of Holocaust survivors.  
The experience was such that   
Everything else was precarious aftermath, or maybe an interregnum.  In 
retrospect I can see that I spent much of my childhood waiting for the war.  
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 Butler (2003) describes the ―different kinds of losses‖ (p. 468) as being ―the loss of place and the loss of 
time, a loss that cannot be recovered or recuperated but that leaves its enigmatic trace‖, as well as the loss 




Waiting for it to manifest itself again, to emerge from where it lurked with 
its violent ravaging claws.  Waiting for danger and destruction, which 
were the fundamental human condition, to trample the fragile coverlet of 
peace. (Hoffman, 2004, pg. 4-5) 
According to Hoffman, one of the results of catastrophic trauma, even trauma that is 
transmitted cross-generationally, is a feeling that one‘s life is fragile; that one‘s position 
in the world is tenuous.  We learn from J. M. Coetzee‘s fictionalized autobiography, 
Summertime, that such feelings of ―provisionality‖ (Coetzee, 2009, p. 211) can be 
transmitted not only through the familial line but more indirectly too, historically even.  
In the novel, Martin, a friend of the main character, ―John Coetzee,‖ is being interviewed 
by an English biographer who is researching a particular period of the now dead author's 
life.  The biographer has been reading the private notebooks of the author and noted that 
in one entry the author seemed to be heading in the direction of a discussion of what he 
thought of his own ―white South Africanness‖ but the notebook entry stops short before 
saying anything of substance on the issue.  The biographer asks Martin why he thinks the 
author did not elaborate any more on the issue.  Martin says that he believes that the 
author stopped short of exploring his own ―white South Africanness‖ because he held the 
attitude that his presence in South Africa was ―legal but illegitimate‖ (Coetzee, 2009, p. 
209).  The presence of whites in South Africa, he says, ―was grounded in a crime, namely 
colonial conquest, perpetuated by apartheid‖ (Coetzee, 2009, p. 209) and so Martin and 
John felt themselves to be ―whatever the opposite is of native or rooted…We thought of 
ourselves as sojourners, temporary residents, and to that extent without a home, without a 




continues even after there is no one alive who has firsthand experience of the original 
catastrophe.  ―His ancestors in their way…had toiled away, generation after generation, 
to clear a patch of wild Africa for their descendants, and what was the fruit of their 
labours?  Doubt in the hearts of those descendants about the title to the land; an uneasy 
sense that it belonged not to them but, inalienably, to its original owners‖ (Coetzee, 2009, 
p. 210).  While it is claimed that this experience of ―provisionality‖ (p. 211) was not 
tragic, there is, we imagine, still the ―enigmatic trace‖ (Butler, 2003, p. 468) of loss found 
here because we ourselves cannot imagine living a life ―without a home‖ (Coetzee, 2009, 
p. 210).   
What I find particularly striking about this passage is Coetzee‘s use of the word 
―sojourners‖ (Coetzee, 2009, p. 201).  In the context that is described it does seem 
especially apposite but it clashes with the perception of what displacement and 
rootlessness should feel like.  (The character, in fact, even describes the experience as 
―comic‖ (Coetzee, 2009, p. 210).)  A common trope that is used in descriptions of 
displacement is that of the journey.  Considering this, ―traveler‖ or ―voyager‖ connote a 
much sturdier and more committed intention and type of journey, whereas ―sojourner‖ 
seems so idle, so spectator-like, more expat than citizen, more tourist than traveler.  
Coetzee‘s character seems to be implying that the ―crime‖ of colonialism made ―internal 
exiles‖ (2007), to use Hove‘s phrase, of white Africans no matter their generation and 
personal history; they are destined to merely sojourn.   
Indeed, in another of Coetzee‘s novels, Age of Iron (1990), the main character 
Mrs. Curren is telling the homeless man, Mr. Vercueil, whom she has taken up with (or, 




1976 as a kind of personal protest against the apartheid government.
7
  Mrs. Curren, who 
is, in the narrative present, dying from terminal cancer, will not tell her daughter how sick 
she is because her daughter will not come back anyway: she made a vow, when she 
―shook the dust of this country from [her] feet‖ (Coetzee, 1990, p. 139), that she will not 
come back; will only come back when the men of the apartheid government ―are hanging 
by their heels from the lampposts‖ (p. 75).  Her daughter now lives in America, is 
married and has two children.  Mr. Vercueil, upon hearing this, comments: ―So she is an 
exile?‖ Mrs. Curren‘s response is to say, ―No, she is not an exile.  I am the exile.‖ 
(Coetzee, 1990, p. 76).  The point is made that those living in and under apartheid are 
those truly in exile; it is they who are banished from ‗home‘; ‗out of place‘.  This ―crime‖ 
that was committed ―so long ago that [she] was born into it… it is part of her inheritance‖ 
(Coetzee, 1990, p. 164) and according to Coetzee‘s characters, some catastrophes are so 
monumental that there is no clean and reconciled afterwards; there is only the aftermath.  
Because of this Mrs. Curren feels that despite the fact that she herself did not commit the 
crime, it was committed in her name, and therefore she has to pay the price and endure 
the punishment, which she thinks is to live life with a sense of shame ―as a touchstone‖ 
(Coetzee, 1990, p. 165), with acts of kindness as a means of lifting her ―out of this pit of 
disgrace‖ (Coetzee, 1990, p. 117).   
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 Briefly, Age of Iron is written as a letter from Mrs. Curren, who lives in Cape Town, to her daughter, who 
is living in the United States.  The writing of the letter is initially inspired by two events, which occur one 
after the other on the same day: upon returning home from her doctor‘s office, where she has been told that 
she has terminal cancer, Mrs. Curren finds a homeless man sleeping in the alley alongside her house.  The 
homeless man, she later finds out, goes by the name of Mr. Vercueil.  Mrs. Curren‘s letter offers an account 
of her remaining days as she tries to understand what it is and what it has been for a liberal, white, educated 
woman to live through the horror of apartheid.  The novel is set in 1986 when the struggle in South Africa 
against apartheid had all but reduced the country to a state of civil war. 




While I can agree with Coetzee‘s notion of people being forced into a state of 
―internal exile‖ (Hove, 2007) while living under political, economic and social conditions 
that cannot be sustained or countenanced, I am not sure of what the point would be in 
even considering such notions as the ―original owners‖ (Coetzee, 2009, p. 210) of the 
land?  For example, considering the long history of migration into and out of the 
Zimbabwe Plateau, as outlined in the previous chapter, who are the original and so 
apparently rightful owners?  How far back in history do we have to go?  To the direct 
descendants of the Leopard Kopjie people 1000 years ago, because those are the first 
people of this region that we have a name for?  Is this the kind of historical debris that we 
have to contend with?  Of course, I am exaggerating to make a point, and while I am not 
denying that crimes were committed under the name of imperialism and colonialism, it is 
this very talk of ―original owners‖ and those not of that stock being mere visitors that 
Mugabe and his propaganda machine use.  In calling the events of the last decade the 
Third Chimurenga, they are historicizing the present by invoking the struggle for 
independence which began in 1896/97.  (I cannot believe that when Zanu-PF chant, ―This 
land is ours‖, that that is what they really mean; their intention is much more singular, 
much more individual.  What they really mean is, ―This land is mine, all mine.‖)     
 Considering all this, I must ask again, and this time not rhetorically: Is ‗the Crisis‘ 
in Zimbabwe just the afterbirth of the postcolonial nation?  Is ‗this‘ merely a question of 
redress?  Or is it something much more?  Should we white Zimbabweans give up our 
farms, our homes, our businesses, and our citizenship as payment for a crime that was 
committed before we were born but was committed in our name?  (For many, some or all 




responsible thing to do?  As a collective, are we responsible, and so blameworthy for the 
crime of colonialism?  And leading on from that, the next, and more important question 
must be: How responsible are we for the history we inherit?  Certainly, we are implicated 
because as T. S. Eliot emphasizes, ―History is now‖ (Eliot, 1963, p. 222); we live it every 
day as ―the past is not past‖ (Butler, 2003, p. 467).  Antjie Krog, writing in Country of 
My Skull (1999), her book about South Africa‘s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
describes a similar sense of the weight of colonial history and implies that we will forever 
be implicated by the history we inherit:    
And suddenly it is as if an undertow is taking me out…out…and out.  And 
behind me sinks the country of my skull like a sheet in the dark—and I 
hear a thin song, hooves, hedges of venon, fever, and destruction 
fermenting and hissing underwater.  I shrink and prickle…And what we 
have done will never be undone.  It doesn‘t matter what we do. (Krog, 
1999, p. 171)   
Krog‘s description of ‗history as undertow‘ reminds me of our need for history to be a 
container for all that has ―been lost / And found and lost again‖ (Eliot, 1963, p. 203).  We 
want history to structure the past but we know from experience that the structure is 
rickety and the container leaks.  There is also the sense, again reiterated here, that there is 
no afterwards, or rather that afterwards there is only the aftermath, and the aftermath can 
go on and on and on.   
 Hoffman (2004) takes the title of her book, After Such Knowledge, from T. S. 




forgiveness? Think now / History has many cunning passages, contrived corridors / And 
issues, deceives with whispering ambitions, / Guides us by vanities‖ (1963, p. 54).   
Employing personification, Eliot gives history a vindictive and conniving disposition, to 
which it would seem we humans often and easily fall victim.  Shoshana Felman, in 
Testimony: Crises in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History, says that ―History is 
written in a foreign language, a language that the reader who relies on a translation 
cannot understand‖ (1992, p. 160).  Felman warns that what ―the translator has to give up 
is the temptation to translate history by making sense of it, that is, by using apologetic or 
apocalyptic discourse‖ (Felman, 1992, p. 158).  Hoffman knows that, as the inheritor of 
the history of catastrophe, the responsibility is to not ―make a nice story out of loathsome 
cruelty and of piercing, causeless hurt‖ (2004, p. 15).  ―Translation thus itself becomes a 
metaphor for history, not only in that it demands the rigor of a history devoid of pathos, 
but in that it opens up the question of how to continue when the past, precisely, is not 
allowed any continuance‖ (Felman, p. 162, my italics).  ―How to continue‖ seems to be 
the right question to ask because even though past events are not allowed any 
continuance their effects reach out, tentacle-like, and pull us back and push us forward.   
Judith Butler (2003) in ―After Loss, What Then?‖ the Afterword to Loss: the 
Politics of Mourning considers the space that is the aftermath of catastrophe:  
Places are lost—destroyed, vacated, barred—but then there is some new 
place, and it is not the first, never can be the first.  And so there is an 
impossibility housed at the site of this new place.  What is new, newness 
itself, is founded upon the loss of original place, and so it is a newness that 




fundamentally determined by a past that continues to inform it.  And so 
this past is not actually past in the sense of ―over,‖ since it continues as an 
animating absence in the presence, one that makes itself known precisely 
in and through the survival of anachronism itself. (p. 468) 
It is the ―animating absence‖ (Butler, 2003, p. 468) that haunts the present.  It is a 
negative space, which in artistic composition is the space between objects.  It is the area 
of a painting, which contains no contrasting shapes, figures, or colors itself, but is framed 
by solid or positive forms (OED).  If we think of loss in terms of artistic composition, 
what is lost are the shapes and images that would make up the ―positive forms.‖  In a 
painting our eye is drawn to the positive space, that is the objects at the center of the 
composition, but in their absence, our eye sees only negative space and is haunted by 
what is missing from the picture.  It seems that it is the absence of what used to be there, 
of what should be there that we cannot ‗get over‘ and it is experienced as a rupture to our 
psychic life because the rupture draws a line between before and after.  The rupture is the 
catastrophe, the cataclysm.  Variously, Butler calls it ―the fractured horizon‖ and ―the 
internal break‖ (2003, p. 468).  Nostalgia, among other feelings and from some 
conceptualizations, seems to be located at this point.  It is a longing for the before: before 
the event, before the break, before the end, before the knowledge.   
Eliot wrote ―Gerontion‖ in the wake of the First World War, and Hoffman wrote 
After Such Knowledge in and about the shadow of the Holocaust and the Second World 
War, both in their ways considering the ravages of history.  For my purposes, considering 
―the Crisis‖ in Zimbabwe, it seems to me that Eliot‘s and Hoffman‘s question: ―After 




‗forgiveness‘ here in terms of the psychological process of being able to accept and 
‗move on‘.  How do we continue after such knowledge?  What do we, those who inhabit 
the afterlife, do with the knowledge of what has and can be done?  What do we do when 
things come undone?   
Accepting that we can never go back far enough to right the wrongs; accepting 
that the past will never be past and that there is no after the afterwards; accepting that 
―Somewhere, sometime, something was lost‖ (Butler, 2003, p. 467); accepting that ―a 
fractured horizon looms in which to make one‘s way as a spectral agency, one for whom 
full ―recovery‖ is impossible, one for whom the irrecoverable becomes, paradoxically, 
the condition of a new political agency‖ (Butler, 2003, p. 467); accepting all these things, 
what might it mean to continue into ―this new place‖ (Butler, 2003, p. 468)?  What might 
it mean for us to live as ―spectral agency‖?  What might it mean for us to live, knowing 
there is no after, no clean finish, no post-?  What might it mean for us to live, knowing all 
this, but with the promise of there being a ―strange fecundity‖ (Butler, 2003, p. 469) in 
the wreckage?  And what shape and form might that ―fecundity‖ take?   
David Eng and David Kazanjian, in the introduction, ―Mourning Remains‖, to 
their edited collection of essays, Loss: The Politics of Mourning (2003), believe the task 
we must set ourselves is that of ―mourning remains—mourning what remains of lost 
histories as well as histories of loss‖ (p. 1).  Drawing on Walter Benjamin‘s ―Theses on 
the Philosophy of History‖ (1940), Eng and Kazanjian, describe their notion of ―the 
politics of mourning‖ as being a ―creative process mediating a hopeful or hopeless 
relationship between loss and history‖ (p. 2).  Eng and Kazanjian (2003) interpret 




hopefully…to establish an active and open relationship with history‖; it is a ―creative 
process‖ which seeks to animate history ―for future significations as well as alternate 
empathies‖ (p.1).  Rather than blotting everything else out that one knows about the later 
course of history (the method employed by ―historicism‖ according to Benjamin), 
historical materialists must bring the past to memory, establishing ―a continuing dialogue 
with loss and its remains—a flash of emergence, an instant of emergency, and most 
important a moment of production‖ (Eng and Kazanjian, 2003, p. 1).  Eng and Kazanjian 
introduce their notion of ―mourning remains‖ by acknowledging that what might seem 
counterintuitive—imputing loss as creative—is precisely the location of their concern: 
―We might say that as soon as the question ―What is lost?‖ is posed, it invariably slips 
into the question ―What remains?‖  That is, loss is inseparable from what remains, for 
what is lost is known only by what remains of it, by how these remains are produced, 
read, and sustained‖ (p. 2).  Their hope is to encourage a politics of mourning that might 
be ―active rather than reactive, prescient rather than nostalgic, abundant rather than 
lacking, social rather than solipsistic, militant rather than reactionary‖ (Eng and 
Kazanjian, 2003, p.2).   
Eng and Kazanjian (2003) use Sigmund Freud‘s theory of mourning and 
melancholia to structure their ideas of what hopeful and ―continuous engagement with 
loss and its remains‖ (p. 4) might look like.  In the next chapter, I too will consider 












I remember the exact day that things started to go wrong in Zim.  It was the 14
th
 
November 1997; the day that I wrote my ‗A‘ Level Economics exam, which was awful, 
by the way.  I went to school and wrote the three hour paper—Mercy Mutetwa, sitting 
behind me, cried for the first hour; I wanted turn around and say, ―I know how you 
feel‖—and when I got home in the evening there was a nationwide power cut (now this is 
a common occurrence, not so much then)  and my Mum told me that Mugabe had just 
paid out billions of dollars from the Reserve Bank (money the country couldn‘t afford) to 
the war veterans (yes—from that war thirty years earlier) to assure their support, which 
had been waning of late.  I remember this so well because all three events connected in 
my mind—bad exam, power cut, war veterans pay out.  ‗Black Tuesday‘ they came to 
call it.  Or was that the Wall Street Crash?  Perhaps it was a Thursday.   
 
2000 
During my third year of university in South Africa, the farm invasions started.  Angus 
and I would huddle around the television every night to watch the news—white farm 
owners and black farm workers were being killed, people were given three months to 
leave their homes with only their personal belongings while the green bombers and war 




Zimbabwean students.  We had very little to do with them and now I cannot even 
remember their names, although I‘m sure one was called Judd.  They were what we 
(derogatorily) call ―Rhodies‖.  Rhodies, in our humble estimation, were more often than 
not of farming stock, and in fact I‘m sure the one girl‘s father was president of the 
Commercial Farmers Union, an organisation that was much in the news during this time.  
Rhodies, to those of us who came from Harare, were thought of to be badly-dressed, 
culture-less, and invariably racist.  (True to expectation, the one girl who lived next door 
dressed so badly that Angus and I couldn‘t help but make fun of her, behind her back of 
course.)  The only connection that we had with our neighbours was that we shared a 
maid, Eunnis, who couldn‘t have been more than five feet tall.  She had TB and was old 
beyond her years; she hand-washed all our clothes.  She would tell me how rude the 
neighbours were to her, how they spoke to her badly.  ―Typical fucking Rhodies,‖ I 
thought to myself, ―God they make you sick.‖  But remembering all this now, it is the 
thought that these people, these neighbours, were, while we laughed at their clothes, 
having their homes violently stolen from them that makes me feel sick. 
 
2005 
When the call came, ―Leigh Reilly, I am going to kill you.  I know where you work‖ (or 
something along those lines) I initially found it hysterically funny.  I can‘t really 
remember his exact words but he definitely knew that I was a teacher at Chisi and it was 
that part that I found so funny.  I had a vision: sitting in my classroom with my 




grade movie-quality thug, wielding a weapon, wandering the school grounds, stopping to 
ask students, ―Miss Reilly‘s classroom, please?‖  
 
2005 
How do you live with this going on around you?  I read The Amazing Adventures of 
Kavalier and Clay during the opposition-organised mass stay-away; I taught A Grain of 
Wheat during Operation Murambatsvina; and when I returned home from work because 
the police had closed our school and arrested our headmistress, I found Cordy, my 
domestic worker, enjoying her mid-morning break, sitting in a patch of sun by the back 
door, drinking a cup of tea, reading my copy of Coetzee‘s In the Heart of the Country, 
which put to mind John, ―Poor John,‖ in Coetzee‘s Age of Iron, who we are told is 
―destined to be a garden boy and eat bread and jam for lunch at the back door and drink 
tea out of a tin‖ (1990, p. 151).   
 
2006 
My parents started their own earth-moving and civil construction company in 1980, the 
year of Zimbabwe‘s Independence.  They borrowed some money from a wealthy friend 
and bought one second hand bulldozer.  Two men were hired and trained to work as 
operator and machine assistant and everything else my parents did themselves.  Over the 
next twenty-five years, the company grew and grew to be the largest, privately-owned 
civil construction company in the region.  And in its twenty-sixth year it was stolen by 
Zanu-PF.  After months of intimidation, including a death-threat, my parents agreed to 




hyperinflation.  The appropriation of white-owned businesses started after the success of 
the farm invasions.  The tactics were more subtle but no less effective.  I remember 
vividly thinking to myself: what is happening to us is too terrible, it is a crime.  And there 
is absolutely nothing we can do about it.  My father mourned the loss of his company for 
two years and then his first grandchild was born.         
 
2006  
―How do we vomit out the poison?‖ asked the man with one eye and no arms.  He 
looked at me. ―Do you know how we do it?  Do you know how we vomit out the poison 
that is our anger and hatred and bitter furious need for revenge?‖   
Seven years ago, while living in Harare, he had received a letter, he had opened 
the letter and it had exploded in his face.  A bomb in a letter—a letter bomb.   
Bile.  I tasted it in the back of my throat.  He looked at me and I didn‘t know the 
answer.  How do we vomit out the poison?  I don‘t know the answer to this question.  
Panic and fear (or was it revulsion?) induced this reaction in me, a rush of saliva to my 
mouth, followed by the bitter taste in the back of my throat.  Bile rising.  I don‘t know 
how to vomit.   
A letter bomb robbed him of his eye and both arms and now he asked me, ―How do 
we vomit out the poison before it curdles our insides and we become just like them?‖  
Them?  Them who put bombs in letters and cars and subways.  Them who strap bombs to 
their shaved-hairless chests and walk them into market squares and cafes and onto buses 
and into bars.  After being so rudely forced to become something other than what he was 




altered.  Afterwards, he wanted to know, how do you carry on afterwards.  Can you 
transform yourself from being an object of history to becoming a subject of history? 
Rather jauntily, he wears a navy beret.  When his nose itches, he uses his pincers to 
scratch.  Articulated fingers, they move joint by joint.  My mind goes blank.  I don‘t 
know how this man puts his beret rather jauntily on his head.  I don‘t know how he 
buttoned his shirt this morning.  I don‘t know how he fishes money out of his wallet.  I 
don‘t know how he eats, or drinks, or writes, or loves and so lives.  So no, I don‘t know 
how we vomit out the poison. 
 
2011 




















Red hills, and the smell of exile 
Exile breathing over our shoulder 
in a race that already looks desperate. 
Red hills, and the pulse of exile 
telling us this is home no more.  
(Hove, ―Red Hills Of Home‖, 1985, p. 2) 
 
Chenjerai Hove‘s ―Red Hills of Home‖, published in 1985, describes what he 
would later come to call, during ‗the Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe, ―internal exile‖ (2007).  The 
exile experienced by the peasant community in the poem is created by a radically 
changing rural landscape in the face of colonial domination (―Yesterday sabhuku 
Manyonga had the push / of muscular hands on his chest / and now lives in drunken 
exile‖ (Hove, 1985, p. 2)) and bullish urbanization (―the nearby sooty homes of peasants / 
live under the teeth of the roaring bulldozer‖ (p. 2)), and the attendant effects thereof, 
such as labour migration to the mines in South Africa (―Father died underground seven 
rainless seasons ago‖ (p. 2)).  Where once there was harmony with the land: ―Father grew 
up here / tuning his heart / to the sound of the owl‖ (Hove, 1985, p. 2), there is now only 
―Red hills and the smoke of man-made thunder / plunder the land under contract‖ (p. 2).  




has been in exile for ten years), and the predicament of millions of Zimbabweans living 
inside and outside the country who have experienced ―the smell of exile / Telling [them] 
this is home no more‖ (Hove, 1985, p. 2). 
In a 2007 interview, Hove quoted the passage cited above and made this 
comment: ―Many years ago I wrote these lines, which remind myself that ―the smell of 
exile‖ has always been like a vulture hovering over my head, our heads‖ (2007).  For 
exile to be vulture-like (in that vultures scavenge off the dead), those forced into exile 
have, in some way, died.  This death by exile, Edward Said (2001) explains, in his 
seminal essay ―Reflection on Exile‖, is as a result of being ―torn from the nourishment of 
tradition, family, and geography,‖ and so exile is ―like death but without death‘s ultimate 
mercy‖ (p. 174).  What does this mean in relation to the Zimbabwean Crisis and the 
conditions of ―internal‖ and ―external‖ exile‘ (Hove, 2007)?  If the rupture caused by ‗the 
Crisis‘ is a like a death, then is exile a form of afterlife?  And if that is so, how do we 
continue to live after life?   
David Eng, in his essay ―Transnational Adoption and Queer Diasporas‖ (2003), 
uses Sigmund Freud‘s theories of mourning and melancholia to conceptualize aspects of 
loss and depression, which attend the conflicts and struggles associated with immigration, 
assimilation, and racialization.  He stresses that ―it is important to emphasize that the 
experience of immigration is based on a structure of loss‖ and that ―when one leaves a 
country of origin, voluntarily or involuntarily, a host of losses both concrete and abstract 
must be mourned‖ ‖ (Eng, 2003, pg. 16).  Sigmund Freud, in ―Mourning and 
Melancholia‖ (1917), describes mourning as ―the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or 




liberty, an ideal, and so on‖ (1957, p. 125).  Where would the many ―different kinds of 
losses‖ (Butler, 2003, p. 467) suffered because of ‗the Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe fit in to this 
definition?  Zimbabwe is dramatically different from what it was ten years ago—in some 
ways it is no longer recognizable—but it is still there.  It is not as if the place itself has 
been swept off the map.  It is not lost in a physical sense.  I can go home to my country, 
to my city, to my house.  But still, something has been lost.   
Finn Stepputat, in a keynote address entitled ‗Studying Displacement: Reflections 
on States, Sovereignty and Ethnographies of Im/Mobility‖, at the Conference on 
‗Political Economies of Displacement in Post-2000 Zimbabwe‘, held in Johannesburg in 
June 2008, called the experience ―domicide‖, which he argued ―was apposite as it 
captured the loss of home, social relations, work, rights, predictability and also 
ontological security‖ (Hammar, McGregor, Landau, 2010, p. 268).  ―Domicide‖ invokes 
not just loss though but something much more violent and catastrophic as it suggests the 
murder of ‗home‘.  He discussed in detail the diverse meanings of displacement as a 
result and cause of ―domicide‖ saying that the term invokes ―the fragile link between life 
and death‖ and so ―invites reflection on the phenomenology of loss‖ (Hammar, 
McGregor, Landau, 2010, p. 268).  For most of us Zimbabweans, our lives have been 
dramatically disrupted by e/immigration and exile whether we live there still or not.  We, 
and yes, ―loss has made a tenuous ‗we‘ of us all‖ (Butler, 2004, p. 20), have lost our 
communities, and our physical, financial, and psychological security.  We‘ve even lost 
our planned for futures because the traditional narrative trajectory of our lives has been 
interrupted and we flounder in the gap between what went before and what has come 




Nostalgia, describes this as ―the unrealized dreams of the past and visions of the future 
that became obsolete‖ (xvi).   
Another keynote speaker at the conference in Johannesburg in 2008, Jane Guyer, 
drew on her most recent research surrounding economies in crisis, specifically looking at 
Nigeria in the late 1990s.  ―Guyer reflected that the term ‗displacement‘ implied spatial 
movement, but that the Nigerian modes of survival she had documented did not involve 
physical displacement.  She suggested an alternative metaphor, ‗dislodged‘, that could 
capture profound changes in situ that occurred in the contexts of crisis and grief when 
people were ‗existentially dislodged from ideas about the future‘‖ (Hammar, McGregor, 
Landau, 2010, p. 268).  Drawing on James Ferguson‘s work, Expectations of Modernity: 
Myths and Meanings of Life on the Zambian Copperbelt (1999), which looks at the 
economic crisis in Zambia after the copper price collapsed, Guyer elaborated that 
―periods of profound economic crisis shake expectations of modernity: ―what imagined 
future trajectory can there be when essentials are suddenly lacking and there is no petrol, 
no water, no electricity, and when parents are unable to take their sick children to 
hospital?‖ (Hammar, McGregor, Landau, 2010, p. 268).  Unable to imagine the future, 
while scrambling to get by from day to day, can change ―not only economic logics, but 
also the nature of social bonds and the sense of oneself in the world‖ (Hammer 
McGregor, Landau, 2010, p. 280).   
In the Zimbabwean context of ‗the Crisis‘, there is a real and profound sense that 
‗we‘8 have lost our ‗home‘: some literally have lost their homes in that their houses were 
                                                 
8
 I appreciate that the plural pronoun that I use throughout this section might seem awkward but in this I am 
persuaded by Judith Butler‘s argument in ―Violence, Mourning, Politics‖, that ―Loss has made a tenuous 
we of us all‖ (Butler, 2004, p. 20) as referenced earlier.  Her intention in the essay is to ―consider a 




demolished, appropriated or left behind after immigrating; some have lost their idea of 
what constitutes their ‗home‘ (for example, ideas of security, belonging, and citizenship); 
and some have lost elements and aspects that made up the totality of their ‗home‘ with 
the emigration of family, friends and acquaintances.  It is in this context that I am drawn 
to Judith Butler‘s expression of the many ―different kinds of losses‖ (Butler, 2003, p. 
467) to describe the losses suffered by many Zimbabweans because of ‗the Crisis‘.  
Considering these losses, I would argue that ‗we‘ fit into Freud‘s definition and are in 
mourning for ―the loss of some abstraction‖ (1957, p. 125).)  Boym (2001) says that what 
is most missed ―during historical cataclysms and exile‖ is ―the potential space of cultural 
experience that one has shared with one‘s friends and compatriots that is based neither on 
nation nor religion but on elective affinities‖ (p. 53).  Those affinities found in that place 
helped to define who we thought we were.  But here‘s the rub: the place is not lost but 
our place in it is, whether we live there still or not.  Those relational ties that once 
tethered us so tightly have come undone and so, for many, ‗Zimbabwe‘ lives forever in 
our imaginations and devotedly we mourn the loss of that way of life.    
Freud explains that ―grief involves grave departures from the normal attitude to 
life‖ (1957, p. 125), and the experience of mourning is characterized by,  
the feeling of pain, loss of interest in the outside world—in so far as it 
does not recall the dead one—loss of capacity to adopt any new object of 
love, which would mean a replacing of the one mourned, the same turning 
                                                                                                                                                 
questions: ―Who counts as human?‖ and ―What makes for a grievable life?‖ (p. 20).  She does not assume 
that there is necessarily a human condition that is universally shared, which would call for a ―we‖, but 
rather she assumes, as do I, that ―despite our differences in location and history…it is possible to appeal to 
a ‗we,‘ for all of us have some notion of what it is to have lost somebody‖ (p. 20).  Working off Butler‘s 
assumption, I use the plural pronoun more specifically in that I assume that many Zimbabweans have 
during ‗the Crisis‘ ―despite differences in race, class, gender, age, experience, political affiliation and 





from every active effort that is not connected with thoughts of the dead. 
(1957, p. 125) 
The ―inhibition and circumspection in the ego,‖ he says, ―is the expression of an 
exclusive devotion to its mourning‖ (Freud, 1957, p. 126).  Such ―exclusive devotion‖ 
accounts for the painful, seemingly impossible task of ‗letting go‘ or ‗getting over.‘   
This tendency to tether ourselves to what has been lost illuminates for Judith 
Butler (2004) ―the thrall in which our relations with others hold us, in ways that we 
cannot always recount or explain‖ (p. 23).  This experience of being held captive, of 
being bound and so in service to our relations with others is most acutely experienced 
when that person or thing is lost.  And so white-knuckled we hold on and make no 
sudden movements (so inhibited is our ego), and the rope that binds us burns our skin 
because we fear that if we lose the thing to which we are bound, then we would become 
unmoored, the rope could unravel and we could simply float away. (But what is it that we 
are holding on to because what was there is no longer there?  We are holding onto 
absence, left only with negative space.)  We are undone by our relations with others, by 
the loss of our relations with others.  ―When we lose some of these ties by which we are 
constituted, we do not know who we are or what to do‖ (Butler, 2004, p. 22).9   
The ties that constituted many of us as Zimbabweans were ties of nationality, 
identity and community, and privately, I would argue, our notions and perceptions of 
                                                 
9
 Butler‘s thinking is influenced by the Hegelian notion of relational recognition, which is a psychological 
stance but also metaphysical and dependent on language.  In this we must recognize our ―fundamental 
dependency on the other, the fact that we cannot exist without addressing the other, without in some ways 
being addressed by the other, and that there is no wishing away our fundamental sociality‖ (Butler, 2001, p. 
93).  We exist in relation to the other but there is a danger in only wanting to see ourselves this way.  We 
must accept that we will never see ourselves just reflected in the other because we are always shifting and 
changing: ―no matter how much we each desire recognition and require it, we are not therefore precisely 
the same as the other – there is an irreducibility to our being, one which becomes clear in the distinct stories 





these markers are still in place.  In fact, it could be argued that in ‗losing‘ these ties, or as 
a result of the threat of ‗losing‘ these ties, the experience of ‗the Crisis‘ has in some ways 
made these ties even stronger; white-knuckled we‘re holding on.  But ‗officially‘ and in 
the public, bureaucratic space these ties have been severed because you can only belong 
if you toe the party line and fit a narrowed, prescribed definition of a what constitutes a 
‗real‘ Zimbabwean.  As Brian Raftopoulos explains:  
In former settler societies in which race has been a central signifier of 
political and social identity, compounded by a global environment in 
which this category has been hardened, race ―and the hard-won, 
oppositional identities it supports are not likely to be lightly or 
prematurely given up‖ (Gilroy, 2000, 12).  In Zimbabwe the crises over 
the legacies of colonial rule and post-colonial legitimacy have certainly 
hardened state politics around the race question.  The result has been an 
extraordinarily prohibitive conception of national belonging and a severe 
closing of spaces for discussion of citizenship, economic transformation 
and democratization. (Raftopoulos, 2004, xix-xx)   
And in Zanu-PF‘s Zimbabwe, belonging is not only dependent on race but also on 
political affiliation, sexual orientation and place of residency.  In this way, the idea of 
home and one‘s place in it, for many millions of Zimbabweans, has been undone.   
It is this coming undone, that as Butler explains, ―often interrupt[s] the self-
conscious account of ourselves we might try to provide‖ (2004, p. 23).  Our narratives 
falter in the midst of the telling because what has been challenged is ―the very notion of 




who I am or where I am going while knowing that I have very little control over that 
story?  Finally, we do not just lose that person or that place, we also lose ourselves, our 
‗old‘ selves, our conception of ourselves because loss forces us to recognize that agency 
is a ―spectral fantasy‖ (Butler, 2003, p. 467).  And with this terrible knowledge we have 
to go on.   
If we come undone, how do we tie ourselves up again, and do we want to?  Freud 
initially assumed that ―the absorbing work of mourning‖ (1957, p. 127) would be 
successfully completed when our grasp of the ties that bind us begin to slip.  Overtime, he 
assures us, the rope will go slack and fall down about our feet and we will be able to grab 
hold of some other rope as we transfer our affections elsewhere (1957, p. 125-127).  
Freud maintained that mourning involves ―the testing of reality‖ (1957, p. 126), a long 
and painful process that often results in an intense struggle, forcing the mourner to turn 
away from reality and cling to the lost object ―through the medium of a hallucinatory 
wish-psychosis‖ (1957, p. 126).  While we mourn, ―the existence of the lost object is 
continued in the mind‖ as all of ―the memories and hopes which bound the libido to the 
object is brought up and hyper-cathected‖ (Freud, 1957, p. 126).  All of our mental 
energy is concentrated on re-living and reviewing the past and because of this, while 
grieving, ―the world becomes poor and empty‖ (Freud, 1957, p. 127).  In the case of 
exile, I see this devotion to mourning and fixation on what has been lost (i.e. the exile‘s 
home) as a contributing factor to the exile‘s inability to assimilate.  Said describes this as 
―The sheer fact of isolation and displacement, which produces the kind of narcissistic 
masochism that resists all efforts at amelioration, acculturation, and community‖ (2001, 




used with stiffened will,‖ with the exile insisting on ―his or her right to refuse to belong‖ 
(Said, 2001, p. 182).   
David Eng (2003), however, believes that those who immigrate struggle to 
assimilate not because of the processes of mourning but because they are in a state of 
melancholia.  ―In contrast to ―normal‖ mourning, where libido is eventually removed 
from a lost object to be invested elsewhere, melancholia as described by Freud is a 
―pathological‖ mourning without end‖ (1957, p. 16).  In leaving one‘s country of origin, 
losses of homeland, family, language, property, identity, custom, status are irrecoverable 
and so Eng places immigration within the framework of melancholia:  
a state of suspension between ‗over there‘ and ‗over here.‘ In Freud‘s 
theory of mourning, one works through and finds closure to these losses 
by investing in new objects and ideals. One‘s inability to invest in new 
ideals, i.e. those that belong to the host country, either because of one‘s 
―outsider‖ status or because of one‘s own sense of ―otherness‖ means that 
one cannot ‗get over‘ it and actively set about the ―work‖ of mourning. 
(Eng, 2003, pg. 16)  
 Judith Butler (2003), too, wonders if mourning can ever be thought of to be 
successfully completed.  She makes reference to Freud, and describes his first theory
10
 as 
pointing to a ―promiscuity of libidinal aim‖ (p. 21).  She cannot imagine that once one 
has completed the work of mourning one is simply able to pick and move on to a 
replacement.  She thinks, in contrast, that ―one mourns when one accepts that by the loss 
                                                 
10
 Freud changed his mind on this aspect of his theory of mourning.  In The Ego and the Id (1923), Freud 
explains that the ego itself is constituted through the remains of abandoned object-cathexes, meaning that 
the work of mourning is not possible without melancholia. The ego is composed of ―the residues of its 




one undergoes one will be changed, possibly forever‖; one must submit oneself to a 
transformation ―the full result of which one cannot know in advance‖ (2004, p. 21).  
Mourning is an unplanned for and unknowable process.  Life now takes place in this 
foreign terrain for which we have no map or compass, and the latitudinal and longitudinal 
coordinates are Hallmark clichés.  We learn how to mourn.  It is not something 
instinctual.  It is a skill learned over time-spent living.   
Eva Hoffman in After Such Knowledge (2004) explains that Freud, in ―Mourning 
and Melancholia‖ (1917), ―makes the suggestive observation that in order to accomplish 
the natural process of mourning—to grieve and then move on—you have to know what 
you have lost.  If you do not know what the lost object is, then mourning can turn into a 
permanent melancholia, or depression, as we would call it today‖ (p. 72).  Melancholia, 
as Eng (2003) explains, is ―a psychic condition whereby certain losses can never be 
avowed and, hence, can never be properly mourned‖ (p. 16) and if they can‘t be properly 
mourned then how can they be got over? Or are they, as Butler believes, merely 
submitted to?  Hoffman (2004) explains that ―emigration is an enormous psychic 
upheaval under any circumstances‖ because  
It involves great, wholesale losses: Of one‘s familiar landscapes, friends, 
professional affiliations; but also of those less palpable but salient 
substances that constitute, to a large extent one‘s psychic home—of 
language, a webwork of cultural habits, ties with the past.  Perhaps even ties 
with the dead.  (p. 80)   
She wonders what we do with the losses from which it is impossible to recover, which 




―condition of terminal loss‖ (p. 173).  There is perhaps deliberate ambiguity here because 
terminal in this context can be understood in a variety of ways.  He could be describing 
the finality of the loss (but are not all losses final?), or he could be saying that exile is the 
final loss—the ultimate loss after many losses. Or does he mean that this kind of loss is 
terminal, as in lethal?  This use of such a temporal descriptor is ambiguous precisely 
because the loss experienced by those in exile is a loss that is never-ending: ―like death 
but without death‘s ultimate mercy‖ (Said, 2001, p. 174).  Death is more kind in that it is 
an event: once someone has died, those who live on can busy themselves with the ―work 
of mourning‖ (Freud, 1957, p. 127), knowing that there is no going back, no hope of a 
return.  But for the person in exile the ―unhealable rift forced between a human being and 
a native place, between the self and its true home‖ (Said, 2000, p. 173) feels like a death 
but there can be no active work of mourning until one knows for certain that one will 
never go home.  And how can anyone ever give up on the hope of return?  It is the 
waiting that makes this kind of loss so cruel, so painful, and perhaps so ―terminal.‖  It is 
the indefinite postponement, the endless deferral of one‘s life as one waits to go home 
that can be terminal.   
―Let‘s wait and see...‖ we Zimbabweans often say (too often, I wonder?).  There‘s 
been a lot of waiting over the last eleven years and so many could wait no longer and so 
they left, emigrated, exiled themselves so as to get on with their lives.  But many are still 
waiting. Some certainly have ‗moved on‘ and made lives for themselves but many have 
not been able to for a variety of reasons from the practical to the psychic.  ―Processes of 
exclusion have generated a sense of limbo among many of those who have left Zimbabwe 




2010, p. 264).  And those who have not been able to ‗move on‘, continue to wait and see 
when they can go home; vacillating between hope and despair, living off hope and 
memory.  In A Grief Observed (1961), a collection of observations written from notes 
taken in the months following the death of his wife, C. S. Lewis begins by commenting: 
―No one ever told me that grief felt so like fear‖ (p. 5).  Over time he finds that grief 
continues to feel like fear, or ―Perhaps, more strictly, like suspense.  Or like waiting; just 
hanging about waiting for something to happen.  It gives us a permanently provisional 
feeling.  It doesn‘t seem worth starting anything‖ (Lewis, 1961, p. 30).  He believes that 
grief feels like suspense because of the ―frustration of so many impulses that had become 
habitual….‖ And where there were ―So many roads once; now so many culs de sac‖ 
(Lewis, 1961, p. 41). Lewis‘s experience of grief as something similar to ―hanging 
around and waiting for something to happen‖ (1961, p. 30) seems more akin to Freud‘s 
observation that the process mourning involves turning away from the world and fixating 
on the lost object so that one is immobile and in this sense waiting for the time when 
you‘ll be able to concentrate on something else.  Whereas the ‗waiting and seeing‘ that 
many of us Zimbabweans have experienced seems more akin to a melancholic state: 
being unable to move on and get over because we ask: ―what has been lost and will we 
get it back?‖  Eng and Kazanjian, in ―Mourning Remains‖ (2003), see melancholia as a 
―confrontation with loss through the adamant refusal of closure‖ (p. 3) and so ―the past 
remains steadfastly alive in the present‖ (p. 4).  This, Eng and Kazanjian believe, is the 
work of ―mourning remains‖ productively and creatively—allowing for the losses of the 




Amanda Hammar, in her poem ―Partitioned‖ (2002), explores the condition of 
exile, evoking imagery of death, and speaking to this sense of aimlessness:   
I cross continents 
inhabit heartless landscapes    to escape the ache of exile 
a persistent dead-weight  
like stones in my shoe 
stubbornly kept there so as not to forget 
the Other Place  
 
the Otherwhere    full of watchful ghosts now 
and I am one too 
an eager shadow  
seeking not revenge but the right of return 
as ancestors do 
Her descriptions of the condition of exile are of an afterlife: a world inhabited by 
―watchful ghosts‖ and ―ancestors‖.  Life is now aimless habitation in ―heartless 
landscapes‖ (Hammar, 2002); ―culs de sac‖ instead of roads (Lewis, 1961, p. 41); the 
limbo-like, melancholic state of an ―eager shadow‖ (Hammar, 2002).  Andre Aciman, in 
his essay ―Shadow Cities‖ from the book False Papers (2000), evokes a similar 
aimlessness, attributing it to the exiles‘ inability to re-root because of the damage done to 
their concept of home and the loss of that abstraction:  
They may be mobile, scattered, nomadic, dislodged, but in their jittery 




you have no roots that you don‘t budge, that you fear change, that you‘ll 
build on anything, rather than look for land.  An exile is not just someone 
who has lost his home; he is someone who can‘t find another, who can‘t 
think of another. Some no longer even know what home means.  They 
reinvent the concept with what they‘ve got, the way we reinvent love with 
what‘s left of it each time.  Some people bring exile with them the way 
they bring it upon themselves wherever they go. (2000, p. 39).  
Said another way: ―exiles‖ have ―two homes in the wrong places‖ (Aciman, 2000, p. 
152).  Is it this very homelessness that is unvowable?  Is it this homelessness, this loss of 
the abstraction of home, whether we live there still or not, suffering internal or external 
exile, that we can‘t name and so can‘t successfully mourn?  Or are we stuck with 
something else?  Is it instead, merely, a pathological nostalgia?   
I wonder, in the context of the Zimbabwe Crisis, what the difference is between 
mourning and melancholia and nostalgia.
11
  Do I prefer to consider the terms ‗mourning‘ 
and so ‗melancholia‘ as a mourning without end simply because as Svetlana Boym 
(2001), in The Future of Nostalgia, puts it, ―Nostalgia is something of a bad word, an 
                                                 
11
 Nostalgia, from the Greek nostos, to return home, and algia, a painful feeling, is defined as the state 
of being homesick, or a wistful, excessively sentimental yearning for return to some past period, or 
irrecoverable condition (Merriam-Webster).  First coined in 1688 by Swiss physician, Johannes Hofner, 
nostalgia was thought of as a disease.  Returning ―nostalgics‖ to their homes was thought to be the cure for 
the condition (Hirsch & Spitzer, 2002, p. 255).  Over time, the perception of nostalgia changed and by the 
mid-nineteenth century, it was no longer considered a medical condition (Hirsch & Spitzer, 2002, p. 258; 
Miller, 2009b, p. 14).  Its core definition has remained as a ‗longing for home‘ but nostalgia has been taken 
up as a concept by a number of different disciplines. In some articulations, the understanding of nostalgia 
now includes a sense of loss for ideas, places/civilizations, and times (Miller, 2009b, p. 14 – 16).  Svetlana 
Boym (2001) explains that ―nostalgia goes beyond individual psychology. At first glance, nostalgia is a 
longing for place, but actually it is a yearning for a different time—the time of our childhood, the slower 
rhythms of our dreams‖ (p. xv). For this reason, nostalgia can be prospective as well as retrospective (Boym, 
2001, p. xvi) and it is this that Boym says must make us take responsibility for our nostalgic tales: ―Unlike 
melancholia, which confines itself to the planes of individual consciousness, nostalgia is about the 
relationship between individual biography and the biography of groups or nations, between personal and 
collective memory‖ (p. xvi).   




affectionate insult at best‖ because it is thought of as ―an abdication of personal 
responsibility, a guilt-free homecoming‖ (p. xvi).  (This is certainly true in the white 
Zimbabwean context. As journalist Sean Hunter Christie writes, ―Any hint of nostalgia 
will be met by pained groans of ‗When-we!‘‖ (2009). ‗When-wes‘ are classified as white 
expatriate Zimbabweans who talk constantly of the good old days ―when we lived in 
Zimbabwe…‖  To be called a ‗When-we‘ is a great insult.)  But is there a more subtle 
difference between mourning, melancholia and nostalgia, besides this baggage that 
nostalgia carries around with it?  There certainly is a difference between the connotations 
of nostalgia as a ‗longing‘ to return home, which seems so passive, while mourning is 
described as ―labor‖ and ―work‖ (Freud, 1957, 126).  Boym, who describes two types of 
nostalgia: restorative and reflective, does not necessarily see a distinction between 
reflective nostalgia as ―a form of deep mourning that performs a labor of grief both 
through pondering pain and through play that points to the future‖ (Boym, 2001, p. 55) 
and mourning.  Reflective nostalgia ―thrives in algia, the longing itself, and delays 
homecoming—wistfully, ironically, desperately‖ (Boym, 2001, p. xviii).  While this form 
of nostalgia can create ―a new kind of space that plays with the past and the present‖ it 
also understands that ―the labor of grief…could take a lifetime to complete‖ (Boym, 
2001, p. 55), which also seems melancholic in its devotion.  Restorative nostalgia, on the 
other hand, does seem reactionary and manipulative as it ―stresses nostos and attempts a 
transhistorical reconstruction of the lost home‖ (Boym, 2001, p. vxiii).  Boym (2001) 
tells us that this type of nostalgia does not think of itself as nostalgia but rather the 




If one can‘t ever go ‗home‘, to that original place, then must one become at home 
in the experience of the ―labour of grief,‖ or reflective nostalgia, or melancholic 
existence?  Andre Aciman sees the movement of traffic as an accurate metaphor to 
describe the homeless and nostalgic psyche.  This kind of movement,   
captures the confused, back-and-forth, up-and-around, congested nature of 
ambivalence, of love, and of nostalgia.  Traffic captures the bizarre nature 
of the psyche, where the dominant motion is one not so much of 
ambivalence as of perpetual oscillation.  The true site of nostalgia is 
therefore not a land, or two lands, but the loop and interminable traffic 
between these two lands.  It is the traffic between places, and not the 
places themselves that eventually becomes the home, the spiritual home, 
the capital.  Displacement, as an abstract concept, becomes the tangible 
home. (2000, p. 139) 
He borrows from Heraclitus, calling this traffic-like movement ―palintropic‖.  
―Palintropic‖ means that which ―turns again and keeps turning,‖ which loops back or 
―turns back on itself‖ or is backstretched‖ (Aciman, 2000, p. 139). “This,” he suggests, 
―is the seat of nostalgia, perhaps not its origin but certainly its end point‖ (Aciman, 2000, 
p. 140).  And to live there is to construct the world as palintropic because everything is 
now other:  
My home is a counterhome, and my instincts are counterinstincts.  Yet this 
is my home, my emotional, aesthetic, and intellectual home.  Exile, 




unless they induce a corresponding set of intellectual, psychological, and 
aesthetic reversals as well. (Aciman, 2000, p. 140)   
Considering these iterations of the experience of exile, whether internal or external, I 
would imagine that there are moments and times when all ‗conditions‘ have been 
experienced and are being experienced almost simultaneously—mourning, melancholia, 
reflective nostalgia and restorative nostalgia—such is the effect of such a radical rupture.  
James Clifford, writes in his essay ―Diasporas‖ (1994) that the experience is such that 
―Linear history is broken, the present constantly shadowed by a past that is also a desired, 
but obstructed, future: a renewed, painful yearning‖ and the result is a ―sense of rupture, 
of living a radically different temporality‖ (p. 318).  This experience would surely induce 
all manner of nostalgic longings, while also having to work through mourning, and while 
not being able to ‗get over‘ certain aspects of the experience because within it is 
contained many ―different kinds of losses‖ (Butler, 2003, p. 467):  material, existential, 
psychic, physical, aesthetic.     
 So what does it mean to live within this non-linear time, having realized that 
agency is a spectral fantasy (Butler, 2003)?  What would it mean to live without a 
homeland?  How do we learn to live with thinking and feeling ‗out of place‘?  Is this now 
our task, our responsibility?  What can be learnt from constantly feeling like a stranger 
lurking outside the house?  If homelessness is the new home of the exile, because we 
know that ―in a secular and contingent world, homes are always provisional‖ (Said, 2001, 
p. 185), can we learn to live without feeling rooted?  ―Exile is predicated on the existence 
of, love for, and bond with, one‘s native place; what is true of all exile is not that home 




2001, p. 185).  The experience of this kind of loss becomes ―the condition and necessity 
of a certain kind of community, where community does not overcome the loss, where 
community cannot overcome the loss without losing the very sense of itself as a 
community‖ (Butler, 2003, p. 468) but becomes a ―new place‖ of belonging.  Here 
perhaps is where we must, despite being ―marked for life‖ (Butler, 2003, p. 472) by our 
loss, find fecundity in the wreckage (Butler, 2003). 
 
 
Communities “lost / And found and lost again” (Eliot, 1963, p. 203) 
 
A common sense of what has been lost because of ‗the Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe are 
the communities that had come to make up a significant part of our lives.  As a result of 
the ―extraordinary exodus‖ (McGregor, 2010, pg. 3), communities no longer had the 
requisite population to sustain themselves and for this reason, whether we live there still 
or not, our communities, or perhaps I should say, our notion of our communities, have 
been dismantled.  It is the loss of those people with whom we shared ―elective affinities‖ 
(Boym, 2001, p. 53) that shakes us as those people found in that place helped to define 
who we thought we were.  It is this aspect of community that is often so alluring and, of 
course, so oppressive.  Tethered as we are by the relational ties to such communities, 
however false and arbitrary, we believe: These are my people, this is where I belong.  It 
is, Marilyn Friedman (1995) explains, ―a social conception of the self… which 




constituting both self-identity and the nature and meaning of particular individual lives‖ 
(p. 5).   
Sociologists call the communities we are born into ―communities of origin‖ 
(Friedman, 1995, p. 295).  Made up of family, neighborhood, school, it is, in most cases, 
the community about which we have no choice.  Friedman (1995), in her essay, 
―Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the Community,‖ distinguishes between 
communities of origin and ―communities of choice,‖ which are ―found‖ (p. 295): a union, 
or a support group, a political coalition, or a research community.  The important 
distinguishing factor here for Friedman (1995) is that people are motivated to join or 
form ―communities of choice‖ because of their ―own needs, desires, interests, values, and 
attractions‖ (p. 295) and I would argue, their changing circumstances.   
Our romanticized notions of community are in part born of two powerful 
connotations of the term.  One is to be rooted and the other is to share.  
Communities are formed when something is shared.  It can be, for example, 
―sharing common cultural or ethnic identities‖ or ―a group of people who share the 
same interests, pursuits, or occupation‖ (OED).  This ideal of sharing something, of 
being in sync, is linked to the other powerful connotation of the notion of 
community and that is to be rooted.  In sharing something we feel we have found a 
person or group to which we belong and in belonging we are rooted.  Through these 
affiliations we come to identify ourselves or are identified as such with that group.  
―We desire to think things together in a unity, to formulate a representation of a 
whole, a totality‖ (Young, 1995, p. 234).  We are family; we‘re from the same 




so attractive, so comforting, but can and has in many cases also been very 
oppressive and exclusionary because if there‘s a ―we‖ then there‘s also a ―them.‖  
When ―we‖ get together, who is left out?  The manipulation and ferment of group 
identities and affinities can and has lead to all manner of oppressions of those 
deemed outside of the sacred ―we‖.  Iris Marion Young (1995) writes, in ―The Ideal 
of Community and The Politics of Difference,‖ ―The desire to bring things into 
unity generates a logic of hierarchical opposition.  Any move to define an identity, 
a closed totality, always depends on excluding some elements, separating the pure 
from the impure‖ (p. 235).  This unity is always a fiction (Miller, 2009a); a face put 
on to meet the many faces that we meet (Eliot, 1963, p. 2).  Young (1995) argues, 
―The ideal of community presumes subjects who are present to themselves and 
presumes subjects can understand one another as they understand themselves.  It 
thus denies the difference between subjects‖ (p. 234).  We gloss over the fact that 
communities are made up of many-varied individuals.  And while Friedman‘s 
delineation of communities into ones of origin and choice may be helpful as 
a descriptor, it does, I believe, of course polarize and works into the dichotomy of 
one being ―better‖ than the other.  The distinction is arbitrary because all 
communities are made up of ―selves‖ who are opaque to themselves as much as 
they are opaque to each other (Butler, 2005).  And so oftentimes, not only are the 
outsiders left out but the insiders are left out too.  There is perhaps nothing as 
lonely as feeling like an outsider from the inside out.   
It is the denial of our differences that can be so oppressive.  Janet Miller 




on Ruben Gaztambide-Fernandez‘s ‗Toward Creative Solidarity in the ‗Next‘ 
Moment of Curriculum Work‘‖, describes working with the group who were 
reconceptualizing the field of curriculum studies in the 1970s.  Miller (2009a) 
recollects at first being ―disturbed by such fissures, and then recognizing the 
necessary and contingent differences among that loosely organized group‖ (p. 96).  
She came to recognize that what was needed in that community, in any and all 
communities, was a ―riotous array of theoretical stances‘‖ (Miller, 2009a, p. 96).  
Accepting divergent and conflicting views from within one‘s own community can 
be an uncomfortable experience.  Young (1995) describes difference as ―the 
irreducible particularity of entities, which makes it impossible to reduce them to 
commonness or bring them into unity without the remainder: such particularity 
derives from the contexuality of existence‖ (p. 236).  Miller (2009a) wonders how 
we might become comfortable with such difference; how we might become 
comfortable with ambiguity and ambivalence from within.  She envisions 
―communities without consensus‖ (Miller, 2009a, p. 96), which is an ―active refusal 
to construct any universal notions of ‗selves,‘ ‗collective,‘ or ‗solidarity‘‖ (p. 96), 
thus enabling representations to be ―unfixed, mobilized, destabilized, and released 
as forces capable of recombining in as yet unimagined and perhaps untraceable 
ways‖ (Miller, 2009a, p.100).      
Communities drawn together by a common sense of loss have additional 
complexities.  Whether communities of ―origin‖ or ―choice‖ (Friedman, 1995, p. 
295) or some ―new place‖ (Butler, 2003, p. 468) altogether, how those members are 




collectively, will influence the politics of the community, which is already riddled 
by differences.  Where grief is often thought to be privatizing, Butler (2004) 
believes that loss could furnish ―a sense of political community of a complex order‖ 
(p. 22), which it does by drawing to our attention the ―relational ties‖ (p. 22) that 
illuminate our ―fundamental dependency and ethical responsibility‖ (p. 22).  If this 
could be a consequence of grief, what kind of responsibility could be learnt?  
Would it be individual responsibility or collective responsibility or both?  And if it 
is collective responsibility, is it to the new community, or to something that exceeds 
the community?  In the Zimbabwean context, could a community founded on a 
sense of loss, become responsible for that loss, for the nation, or just for itself?  
These complex questions will be given attention in the last chapter, but I do wish to 
summarize, in conclusion, that how the losses of ―internal‖ and ―external‖ (Hove, 
2007) exile are mediated, reflected upon, and narrated will influence not only how 
the experience is lived but also what can be done with it afterwards.  Mourning, 
melancholia, and the different kinds of nostalgia will influence how the exile lives 
with exile.   
Accepting that ―my account of myself is partial‖ and that ―my efforts at 
narrative reconstruction are always undergoing revision‖ (Butler, 2005, p. 40), the 
Afterword that follows allows me to read my ambivalent and shifting place within a 
so-called community of origin (an expatriate group of Zimbabweans) from the 
inside out.  In the next chapter, I write about a very different kind of community, 
one of ‗choice‘ in that it is a diaspora community.  My intention, in part, is to 




autobiographical point of view in the following Afterword, and then reflect, in the 
next chapter, on the collective experience of exile in the diaspora by reading 




The following tale was based on the observation of a group of wedding guests.  
The group observed is from a white Zimbabwean community who live or used to live in 
the wealthy Northern Suburbs of Harare, known in some circles as ―The Golden 
Triangle.‖  Those of the group who no longer live in the country are referred to as 
―When-wes,‖ which is a colloquial term for a once indigenous white inhabitant of the 
country Zimbabwe, now living elsewhere, so called because they regularly start a 
conversation with the expression, ―When we lived in Zimbabwe...‖  (Please note: ―when-
wes‖ must not be confused with ―been tos‖, which is a colloquial term for black 
Zimbabweans who have studied or trained in the West and so have ―been to Britain…‖.)  
The study was conducted in Harare, Zimbabwe on Saturday, 1
st
 of September 2007.  The 
natives were observed from approximately 4.30 p.m. to 5.30 p.m. during the cocktail 
hour, known locally as ―sun downers.‖  The hour was spent as a fully participating 
wedding guest.  My role as researcher was not made explicit.  While this raises obvious 
ethical concerns, I took the decision to masquerade as a fellow guest, so as to allow the 
subjects to speak freely in my presence.  The conversational data are drawn primarily 
from naturally occurring encounters with other guests.  Since I did not use a tape 




No formal interviews were conducted (Van Maanen, 1988, p. 55).  Final note: The title of 
this tale is borrowed from Samuel Taylor Coleridge because, like the Ancient Mariner, 
―till my ghastly tale is told‖ about this wedding guest ―This heart within me burns‖ 
(Coleridge, 2005, p. 12). 
 
My Ghastly Tale 
 
The When-wes are in town.  All here for the big wedding.  They‘re gathering like hyenas 
around a decaying carcass.  To be fair, they do fall into two distinct categories: those who 
belittle the country and try to make you do the same and those who long to come home, 
who yearn for it, and imagine it to be the place it was ten years ago.  Some hold home on 
a pedestal, while others knock home off its high horse and stamp it into the mud of their 
disappointment.  
              Those who have stayed express varying degrees of derision, irritation, even fury 
towards the When-wes (but never to their faces of course).  ―Who are they,‖ they think, 
―to have an opinion at all!  And when things come right, do they presume that they can 
just waltz back in here and enjoy the benefit of all that we‘ve stayed and fought for?‖   
For some who have left, they pity the poor, backward lot who didn‘t get out: ―Such hicks, 
so uncouth, wouldn‘t even know how to navigate the underground!‖   
Contested ground, indeed.  And all this, stirring at the wedding, like Yeats‘s 
―rough beast‖ after ―things fall apart‖ (1965, p. 27), while we watch the sun retreat 




―It is surreal, just surreal to be here,‖ says the (ex-) Zimbabwean who has lived 
overseas for ten years, ―Don‘t you think it surreal?‖ he asks me again getting on my last 
nerve.   
―No,‖ I reply.   
―I mean, all this expense, the food and the booze, while the country‘s collapsing.  
You must admit it is obscene.‖ 
Obscene, really?  That seems a little strong, I think to myself.  And if they had decided to 
celebrate their wedding outside of the country, like you did, would it really be any 
different?  If they had spent thousands of dollars for as lavish a wedding but in a foreign 
land, would it really be any different?  Really?  Why is celebrating here more 
reprehensible?  Why is living more contested?  Should we just lie down and play dead?  
Or behave like that antelope (what‘s it name?) whose only line of defense is to freeze like 
a statue in the face of danger?  They have weddings in Afghanistan you know.   
His wealthy American wife, a few days earlier: ―Harare‘s such a village, a small 
provincial village, the way you‘re all in each other‘s business.‖  She went on to call our 
landscape ―dry and ugly.‖  We‘d just had winter for fuck‘s sake!  (I think I hate her and 
I‘ve only met her once.  Hate‘s a strong word, my mother says.)     
His mother sidles up; she now lives in South Africa, ―So tell me what you‘re up 
to?‖  
―I‘m studying for a doctorate in New York.  I‘m enjoying it.  A little unsettled at 





Said fiercely, while she grips my arm, ―You mustn‘t come back here.  You 
mustn‘t waste yourself on this place.‖     
Mustn‘t waste myself on this place?  This place is my home.   If I were to be laid 
to waste anywhere, surely it should be here.  Here in this land of drought and fever; here 
in this land of ―red hills, and the pulse of exile / Telling us this is home no more‖ (Hove, 

























 ―Whenever we Zimbabweans in Lilongwe get together, we invariably end up talking 
about home. I assume that is the case with Zimbabweans in other parts of the world.‖  




 of June 2009, Morgan Tsvangirai (leader of Zimbabwe‘s opposition 
party, the Movement for Democratic Change, and, after the protracted election battle of 
2008, now the country‘s Prime Minister to Mugabe‘s President) addressed over one 
thousand exiles living in London. Tsvangirai‘s arrival at Southwark Cathedral was met 
with cheers and ululations: for many he is a hero figure, having fought, always 
peacefully, a brutal regime for ten years as the leader of the lone opposition movement.  
With the formation, in February 2009, of the transitional Government of National Unity 
(GNU), which has resulted in the opposition party taking control of some of the 
government ministries, and knowing that Zimbabwe‘s revival is, in part, dependent on 
the return of the skilled workers living ‗elsewhere,‘ Tsvangirai had come to London to 
call the diaspora home.  Once he made the declaration: ―Zimbabweans must come 
home,‖ the mood in the cathedral shifted dramatically.  The call to return, one that has 
been ardently longed for, was met by jeers and booing, angry shouts and ―sucking of 
teeth‖ (Logan, 2009).  The Prime Minister brought his speech to an abrupt end and 




groups blaming each other for the turn of events with speculations that certain groups had 
plotted the disruption.  The Zimbabwean news websites were filled for days with 
accusations being flung back and forth as well as sobering editorials wondering what 
went wrong.    
The swift change of mood illuminates James Clifford‘s (1994) description that, 
―Diaspora consciousness lives loss and hope as a defining tension‖ (p. 312).  Tsvangirai 
is a symbol of hope for many people: hope that the situation in Zimbabwe will change 
(the MDC‘s rallying cry is Chinja Maitiro, which means ―change in the way things are 
done‖), hope that Mugabe will be toppled, hope that one day the diaspora can go home.  
And yet, when the call came, it was met by anger and resentment, distrust and despair.  In 
this chapter, I will ‗read‘ this event and the fallout through the lens of diaspora discourses 
and articulations of the experiences of exile, asking: What is diaspora consciousness?  
How is the diasporic condition different from the condition of exile?  And how is it the 
same?  What happens to the relations within the diaspora community when the ―myth of 
return‖ is threatened?  What happens when the existential crisis, typical of ―ideal‖ 
diasporas, becomes ‗merely‘ a logistical one?  If one doesn‘t want to go home, how can 
one retain a myth of return, which is a defining characteristic of diasporic existence?  Can 
the events in the cathedral add to our understandings of the tensions and (perhaps 








Definitions of diaspora 
 
―Diaspora,‖ which means, "to scatter about, to disperse," historically describes the 
―the exile of the Jews from their historic homeland and their dispersion throughout many 
lands‖ (Safran, 1991, p. 83).  The Jewish Diaspora is seen as the ―ideal type‖ and their 
experience has been used to read other experiences of dispersal and scattering.  William 
Safran (1991), in ―Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return,‖ 
recognizes that today, the term ―seem[s] increasingly to be used as metaphoric 
designations for several categories of people—expatriates, expellees, political refugees, 
alien residents, immigrants, and ethnic and racial minorities tout court‖ (p. 83) and ―lest 
the term lose all meaning‖ (p. 83) he offers a comprehensive definition which covers the 
experience of dispersal: the communal memory of the homeland; feelings of (self-
imposed?) alienation in the host country; belief in the possibility of an eventual return 
home; a collective commitment to the restoration of the homeland; and continued 
relations, in some form, with the homeland (p. 83 – 84).   
James Clifford (1994), in his essay ―Diasporas,‖ similarly feels that the term is 
―loose in the world‖ (p. 302) as a result of ―decolonization, increased migration, global 
communications, and transport‖, in other words ―a whole range of phenomena that 
encourage multi-locale attachments, dwelling, and travelling within and across nations‖ 
(p. 306).  Not wanting to limit diaspora discourse, something he sees as ―travelling‖ or 
―hybridized‖,  by relying too strictly on a definition of an ‗ideal type‘, he draws on 
Safran‘s definition but distills ‗the essentials‘ of diaspora as: ―a history of dispersal, 




eventual return, ongoing support of the homeland, and a collective identity importantly 
defined by this relationship‖ (Clifford, 1994, p. 305).  Clifford (1994) goes on to make 
important distinctions between immigrant communities and diaspora communities—the 
former can be defined by a desire for assimilation into the host nation, something 
diaspora communities do not desire because their ―sense of identity is centrally defined 
by collective histories of displacement and violent loss‖ which ―cannot be ‗cured‘ by 
merging into a new national community (p. 307)—and between the conditions of 
diaspora and exile—exile being the individualistic experience of leaving and 
subsequently longing for one‘s home, while diaspora is the communal and collective 
experience (p. 308).
12
  Despite his desire to tighten the meaning of the term, Clifford 
admits that in this age, ―all or most communities have diasporic dimensions (moments, 
tactics, practices, articulations)‖ and while ―Some are more diasporic than others,‖ he 
believes it possible ―to perceive a loosely coherent, adaptive constellation of responses to 
dwelling-in-displacement‖ (Clifford, 1994, p. 310).   
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  Nico Israel, in Outlandish: Writing Between Exile and Diaspora (2000), makes a more specific 
distinction between the terms. While both ―exile‖ and ―diaspora‖ distinguish ―two overlapping ways of 
describing the predicament of displacement‖, he explains that exile, which in literary and cultural studies is 
most closely associated with literary modernism, ―tends to imply both a coherent subject...and a more 
circumscribed, limited conception of place and home‖, whereas diaspora, which he sees as being more 
closely associated with ―the intersection of postcoloniality and theories of  poststructuralism‖ by contrast 
―aims to account for a hybridity or performativity that troubles such notions of cultural dominance, 
location, and identity‖ (p. 3). McGregor (2010a) explains that while both terms hark from ancient times, 
predating the modern state, and are prone to romanticisation, distinctions are seen in that the idea of 
diaspora is broader than that of exile, and exile denotes an act of banishment, while diaspora can invoke a 
degree of choice (p. 10-11).  She concurs with Clifford‘s assessment that exile is a more individualistic 
experience while diaspora is intrinsically collective, however, she claims that in the Zimbabwean context, 
those who have mobilised as ‗exiles‘ have been able to breach this individualism and ―use it as a shared 
identity and as a basis for broader solidarity campaigns‖ (McGregor, 2010a, p. 11).  She further 
distinguishes between the two terms, explaining that ―While being in exile often suggests little about the 
duration of time abroad or the relationship with the host land, the term diaspora implies a degree of 
embeddedness in the country of residence (even if clearly also estrangement)‖ (McGregor, 2010a, p. 11).  
Some Zimbabweans, McGregor (2010a) tells us, have rejected the term ‗diasporan‘, instead choosing 




Susan Stanford Friedman (2009) simplifies the definition even further, describing 
diaspora as, ―migration plus loss, desire, and widely scattered communities held together 
by memory and a sense of history over a long period of time‖ (pg. 9).  Of Friedman, I 
wish to ask: How long is a ―long period of time‖?  For those who long to return home but 
cannot, a year can feel like millennia.   
Considering these articulations of ‗diaspora‘, how does the Zimbabwean 
experience ‗fit‘ the definition?  Sarah Logan, a Zimbabwean friend, attended Tsvangirai‘s 
meeting at the cathedral in June and wrote a descriptive narrative of what took place, 
which she posted in a public forum on Facebook.  Her description, entitled ―Ishe 
komborera Africa!‖ gives an on-the-ground, in-the-crowd description of what took place. 
The Bishop welcomed us into his cathedral, closely linked with 4 out of 
the 5 dioceses in Zimbabwe, and pointed out to us the portrait of the first 
Zimbabwean Anglican martyr, Bernard Mizeki, on the pulpit, and the map 
of Zimbabwe on the wall of the church. The map is made out of earth from 
various parts of Zimbabwe, he told us, and continued to say that his 
church prayed for Zimbabwe and its people every single day. He called for 
the meeting to start by the singing of our national anthem, and as the 
singing drifted back to where I was standing, I realised that people were 
singing 'Ishe komborera Africa', Zimbabwe's old national anthem, instead 
of our new one 'Simudzai Mureza'. Ishe komborera is a beautiful anthem, 
the Shona version of South Africa's Nkosi Sikelel' iafrica, and the anthem 
I associate with happier days in Zimbabwe, when it was peaceful and 




together. We prayed for Zimbabwe and its people and for Morgan 
Tsvangirai on the loss of his wife.
13
 (Logan, 2009)   
―Diaspora cultures work to maintain community, selectively preserving and recovering 
traditions‖ (Clifford, 1993, p. 317).  The community building ―work‖ was done at the 
cathedral meeting by three things: making reference to the soil of Zimbabwe, the singing 
of the ‗old‘ national anthem, and the communal prayer for the home country.  The map of 
Zimbabwe made from soil from different parts of the country works in creating that sense 
of community and ‗homeland‘ because it evokes for the attendants what has been lost and 
what is worth returning to.  Clifford (1994) reminds us that, ―rootedness in the land is 
precisely what diasporic peoples have lost‖ (p. 310).  The political act of choosing to sing 
the old national anthem, which translates as ―God Bless Africa,‖ rather than the more 
recent and overtly nationalistic anthem, also works to remind the audience of a time 
before the rupture.  Singing ―Ishe komborera Africa!‖ brings with it attendant feelings of 
nostalgia, which importantly are not just for the lost place (as the map of soil evokes) but 
also for a lost time.  This disjuncture between time and place is important to keep in mind 
when theorizing the diasporic condition: exiles desire to go home but they desire to go 
home to a different time, which can be past or future, but not present.  Svetlana Boym 
(2001) describes nostalgia as both seductive and manipulative (p. xviii) and I would 
argue that the nostalgia at work in the singing of the old national anthem is what Boym 
would call ―restorative nostalgia.‖  This kind of nostalgia ―stresses nostos (meaning to 
return) and attempts a transhistorical reconstruction of the lost home‖ (Boym, 2001, p. 
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 Less than a month after Tsvangirai was sworn in as prime minister of the unity government, he and his 
wife, Susan, were involved in a car accident just south of Harare. She was killed and he sustained neck 
injuries.  Immediately suspicions were raised and calls were made for the crash to be investigated. 
Prominent Zimbabweans, who pose any sort of threat to Mugabe‘s regime, have a history of dying in ‗car 




xviii).  Finally, the work of community-building is done through communal prayer for the 
homeland.  I imagine that all of these elements would have made for a very moving start 
to the proceedings but also they could have worked to bring cohesion, at least for some, 
to a very large of group of ethnically, racially and socio-economically diverse 
Zimbabweans.   
 
Diaspora and responsibility 
 
Sarah admits that ―there was a strange tension in the air‖ as people were 
―uncertain about how the meeting would go.‖  The reception to Tsvangirai‘s opening 
comments was warm.  He told the crowd that ―he knew most of [them] had not come to 
the UK voluntarily, coming as political and economic refugees, and that, given the 
opportunity, most of [them] would go back to Zimbabwe as soon as [they] could‖ 
(Logan, 2009).  Leaving one‘s homeland can carry with it feelings of betrayal.14  While 
the remittances that Zimbabweans in the diaspora have sent home have been of vital 
importance to their families and the economy at large (the International Organization on 
Migration estimates that in 2007, 7.2% of the country‘s GDP was derived from 
remittances (IOM, 2009)), in leaving one also leaves one‘s on-the-ground 
responsibilities, which include the personal, such as the care of family members, but also 
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 In a recent blog post on Sokwanele.com, an online forum that also gathers the latest news from 
Zimbabwe and documents state abuses of power, blogger ‗Glow‘ wrote, ―I am a Zimbabwean who has 
lived out of Zimbabwe for 10 years now. Though this is hardly an unusual revelation, I do somehow have 
the sense that I am making a guilty confession. I retain something of a deserter's sense of shame. The shame 
of having left a sinking ship. The guilt of having left friends and family behind. Of course, there are none 
who leave Zimbabwe without losing a part of themselves‖ (Glow, 2010).  Petina Gappah,  award-winning 
author of a collection of short stories entitled Elegy for Easterly, also speaks about feeling guilty for being 
outside of the country, especially ―when you have dinner party conversations where people say, ‗Oh, those 
Zimbabweans, why aren‘t they getting rid of their tyrant? They should just go out on the streets.‘ Yeah, but 




political and civic.  Safran (1991) acknowledges that ―While the homeland myth exists, 
however, it is exploited for a variety of political and social purposes by the diaspora, the 
homeland, and the host society‖ (p. 92).  Tsvangirai, importantly, begins his speech by 
recognizing the very hard decisions that those in the diaspora have had to make.  
Recognition of their predicament, which is an element of the diasporic experience—the 
choice to leave is very rarely a choice at all—is a savvy move, especially as he means to 
play on their sense of responsibility and harness their economic and political power.  
Considering that ―It is certain that without significant return migration there is little hope 
of sustained economic recovery in Zimbabwe‖ (Crush and Tevera, 2010, p. 16), the 
relevant and urgent question that must be asked is: What is the responsibility of the 
diaspora to its homeland?  Does the diaspora, as a community, have a collective 
responsibility to its home nation that supersedes responsibility for individual personal 
safety and well-being?  Is what is good for the greater number of people more important 
than what is good for oneself and one‘s family?  Taking into account the fact that many 
of those who left Zimbabwe were obliged to do so because they were responsible for 
their families, we must ask: What is the distinction between obligation and 
responsibility?
15
   
Tsvangirai declared, "Zimbabwe is changing for the better, and that change is for 
you and me to ensure that we can build a Zimbabwe together" (BBC, 2006).  Despite 
smacking of political rhetoric, he does make a valid point: more change ―can‖ happen if 
the collective ―we‖ make it happen.  To some extent, this is a numbers game.  In the 2008 
election, Tsvangirai won 47.9% of the vote, missing the required majority by 3.1%.  If a 
significant portion of the diaspora returned by the next election, surely Tsvangirai would 
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win an outright majority.  (This, I know, is a rather pointless argument because it is 
reliant on too many unknowns and assumptions: if the diaspora returned, would they even 
be on the voter‘s roll and if not would they be able to register to vote; would they vote for 
Tsvangirai and if so, is Tsvangirai the answer to our prayers?).  Whose responsibility is it 
to make that change happen?  Can the diaspora, with any legitimacy long to return home 
without helping to create the conditions conducive to return?   
Blogger ‗Glow‘ (2010), in a recent post ―When will the Zimbabwean diaspora 
return?‖ on Sokwanele.com, explains the experience of living in the diaspora as feeling 
like an unmoored ship bobbing on ―foreign seas, waiting for a storm to clear so that they 
can one day make their way home. Of course, we have been bobbing on those foreign 
seas for years now. The storm has still not abated.‖  As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Zimbabweans are well-known for ―waiting and seeing.‖  The reaction of the 
audience in the cathedral to Tsvangirai‘s call to return was an expression of great 
frustration but were they not also saying that it is too soon to tell if they can come home; 
they will have to ‗wait and see‘.  Glow (2010) asks provocatively, ―How long I can 
responsibly wait for change?‖  Feeling that the diaspora are waiting for someone else to 
solve their problems is a significant issue at the heart of the ―love/hate‖ (Magaisa, 2006) 
relationship between those who‘ve left and those who‘ve stayed.  Is not this kind of 
waiting an abdication of political responsibility?  Is it not cowardice?  Glow goes on to 
cite Ghandi‘s call to be the change you want to see in world but confesses that she does 




Is it enough, she wonders that the diaspora engage in various forms of activism overseas 
and send back their monthly remittances?
16
  She rightly wonders,  
how real change can come in Zimbabwe when such a large part of its 
wealthiest, most skilled and educated populace live and invest in faraway 
places… It certainly does not seem legitimate to stand outside, awaiting a 
new day whilst expecting someone else to make the sacrifices that will 
bring it…Can one exist as "diaspora" forever? There surely comes a time 
when storm or not, we must either anchor where we are or else turn our 
ships and steer them homewards. (Glow, 2010) 
Tsvangirai went on to speak about the progress that the MDC had made working 
in the difficult confines of the new political dispensation—schools and hospitals had been 
reopened, he announced, which cheered the crowd.  But upon hearing him claim that 
―their success includes having made Zimbabwe peaceful and more stable‖ the audience 
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 In 2005/2006, it was estimated that half of the families in the two major cities in Zimbabwe were in 
receipt of remittances from workers in the diaspora (Raftopoulos, 2009, p. 223).  In fact, the high volumes 
of remittances kept the economy grinding along for a number of years (Crush & Tevera, 2010, p. 14). 
However, Zimbabwean emigration has had serious implications for the country‘s economic growth and 
development as it has led to significant human resource shortages in key sectors (IOM, 2009).  Therein lies 
the double irony: ―Without the economic crisis in Zimbabwe, migration would not have reached the 
volume that it has.  In turn, migration (through remittances) has staved off the worse aspects of that crisis 
for many households‖ (Crush & Tevera, 2010, p. 37).  While it cannot be denied that without the 
remittances the country‘s economy and many of its residents would have been in dire, life-threatening 
situations, researchers remain skeptical about the long term benefits of remittance payments.  This is 
because they are used solely for basic needs (food, school fees, healthcare) rather than for savings and 
investment in productive activity (Crush & Tevera, 2010, p. 14).  Recent studies have emphasized the 
importance of remittances but have also begun to provide evidence showing how they can contribute to 
inequities.  For example, households in Zimbabwe‘s affluent suburbs receive more than those in the high 
density suburbs and are disproportionately dependent on funds from relatives in the West rather than in the 
region. The Solidarity Peace Trust shows the limits to remittances in the region by drawing attention to the 
rural households who have no relatives abroad or received little or nothing at all from family members in 
South Africa, particularly if migrants had departed recently and lacked longer-standing connections 
(Hammar, McGregor, Landau, 2010, p. 266).  Celia Dugger, Southern Africa correspondent for the New 
York Times, while investigating a story of a rural hospital in Zimbabwe that (literally) accepts peanuts as 
payment for health care met a woman, Esther Chirasasa, who is quoted as saying, ―It‘s very difficult to get 





starting ―jeering and heckling, hurling at him examples of continued violence and 
assaults‖ (Logan, 2009).  Once the verbal assault had died down, thanks to the 
intervention of the Bishop, Tsvangirai continued, ―saying that the MDC was doing all 
they could to fulfill their continuing goal of making Zimbabwe safe for its people to live 
in‖ (Logan, 2009).  He made it clear, Sarah writes, that ―Zimbabwe needed the skills of 
those living in the diaspora to rebuild [the] nation,‖ to which most of the audience agreed.    
"Zimbabwe is changing," he said, and "Zimbabweans must 
come home".  The heckling and shouting started up again, 
louder than before. A lady next to me yelled, "When you 
bring your own children out of exile, we'll go back!" and 
those around her yelled their agreement. (Logan, 2009)  
A call deserves a response.  The response to the call in this situation is supposed to be the 
return, or at least the assent to return.  But the response of this one particular woman 
shows that a return would not even be a consideration until she saw further evidence of 
real change in the country.  This seems to be the location of the double bind: the diaspora 
will not go home unless significant political and economic change takes place, and 
significant political and economic change will not take place unless the diaspora go 
home.  ―While the Zimbabwean diaspora remains intensely interested in their home 
country and follows events there with great assiduity, many in the diaspora are 
profoundly hostile to the political regime in power.  Supporting struggling families at 
home is one thing.  Engagement in any other activity that might be deemed supportive of 
– or co-optable by – Mugabe is not‖ (Crush & Tevera, 2010, pg. 19).  To some members 




evidence that he himself does not believe in the progress of the unity government.  There 
must have been the sense that he was being disingenuous in his assessment of the 
situation back in Zimbabwe.  Was he really saying: Do as your leader says, not as he 
does?   
Tsvangirai is in a difficult position: As the leader of the opposition movement, 
how does he shift his stance and discourse, now that he is a member of the government, 
without seeming insincere?  For years he has decried the oppression and violence of the 
state and now as a representative of that same state, he has to make believe that the 
situation has significantly changed.  He has to re-brand the country to the diaspora, who 
in (large?) part could hold the power to turn the country around, by glossing over the 
reality of the excesses of state, the very reality that brought him to power in the first 
place.  Is he then not also guilty of obfuscation?  Who must he be most responsible to 
now: his party, his movement, or his government?   
Despite this, I do think that the reaction to the call to return illuminates the 
tensions and ambivalent sentiments of those who inhabit the diaspora.  Diasporic 
consciousness is, in part, founded on the myth of return.  ―The myth of return serves to 
solidify ethnic consciousness and solidarity when religion can no longer do so, when the 
cohesiveness of the local community is loosened, and when the family is threatened with 
disintegration‖ (Safran, 1991, p. 91).  If the diaspora is a product of dispersion, the myth 
of returning to one‘s origin works to cement the dispersed individuals into a community 
that shares similar origins and experiences of loss and displacement.  The reaction of the 
Zimbabwean audience to Tsvangirai‘s call to return is illuminating and shocking in that it 




do not go ‗home‘—because there is no homeland to return to; because although a 
homeland may exist, it is not a welcoming place with which they can identify politically, 
ideologically, or socially; or because it would be too inconvenient and disruptive, if not 
traumatic, to leave the diaspora‖ (p. 91).  It is important that return is spoken of as a 
―myth‖ rather than a ―goal‖ or ―ambition.‖  I can understand it being described as a 
―myth‖ for those who will never be able to return, as in the case of the Jewish Diaspora, 
but what if the reasons for not returning are logistical rather than existential?  Does that 
make the ―myth‖ any less alluring?  Or any less legitimate?  I find interesting the range of 
words that Safran uses to describe the reasons for not returning: ―inconvenient,‖ 
―disruptive‖ and ―traumatic.‖  Emigration is very traumatic.  Eva Hoffman (2004) writes 
that it involves ―enormous psychic upheaval under any circumstances‖ (p. 80) and for 
some I would imagine that the thought of disrupting their lives and moving again would 
be far too traumatic.   
Writing after the event for allAfrica.com, one of the many online Zimbabwean 
news sites that have sprung up in the last ten years, Farayi Maruzani (2009) tries to 
understand what went wrong at the cathedral and why.  He believes that the audience 
became so upset because many of them were asylum seekers and they feared that if the 
British Home Office heard of Tsvangirai‘s assessment of the situation, their asylum 
applications would be refused.  (In the last six months, both the British and South African 
governments have ended the temporary measures they had imposed to allow illegal 
migrants and failed asylum-seekers temporary leave to remain in their countries because 
they feel that the humanitarian and political crisis is over.)  ―Some people want to bring 




being threatened by Tsvangirai's statements.  Many Zimbabweans expected Tsvangirai to 
actually come and assist them to get asylum by demonizing Mugabe and painting a bleak 
future for the inclusive government‖ (2009).  Tawanda Takavarasha, writing for the 
Harare Tribune, after Tsvangirai made another call to the diaspora to return in Cape 
Town on the 3
rd
 of December 2009, says, ―Most Zimbabweans abroad are afraid to come 
home, thinking that the shaky GNU deal might collapse and leave them stranded in a 
country where there is no rule of law‖ (2009).  To ask someone to return to a place of 
trauma and fear just because ‗your country needs you‘ is a lot to ask, especially when you 
cannot offer them assurances of safety and well-being.  And so an equally important and 
urgent question must be: What is the responsibility of the homeland to its diaspora?  
Tsvangirai cannot legitimately appeal to the diaspora‘s sense of responsibility without 
addressing the responsibility of the homeland in return.  I believe that the antagonized 
response of the audience in the cathedral articulated, at least in part, this perceived 
discrepancy.   
Phil Matibe, writing for the Zimtelegraph, describes the lives of Zimbabweans 
living in the US, numbering over fifty thousand, according to the US State Department:  
This Diaspora grouping is now accustomed to and anchored in 
unavoidable capitalist consumerism social habits that are an indispensable 
feature of the fast-paced life in the USA. Drive through banking, fast food 
courts and the emergency (911) number that promptly triggers the 
response of an efficient ambulance, fire or police service within minutes 




Immigrants change the communities they move to; just as they themselves are changed 
by those communities.  Matibe‘s comment speaks to the fact that the return is sometimes 
not possible because the journey and relocation has changed the individual; a 
transformation has taken place. This can be a cause of confusion and anguish though 
because yearnings for home, which can be very powerful, must live alongside the painful 
realization that one no longer ‗belongs‘ or ‗fits in‘ at home; one has grown accustomed to 
another way of life.  In Leon and Rebecca Grinberg‘s Psychoanalytic Perspectives on 
Migration and Exile (1984), they detail the realities of the process of return as such:  
The nature of an emigrant‘s return to his home country is as variable as the 
subject‘s personality, the duration of the absence, the many motives of 
returning, and the circumstances of the return, as well as his success or 
failure in accomplishing the objectives of the original migration.  Yet the 
inescapable fact is that no return is solely a return; it is a new migration, and 
as such implies all the fears and hopes that characterize migration.  Those 
who return are not the same people they were when they left, and the place 
they return to is not the same place. (p. 215)   
The idea of a glorious return is always an impossibility—it is known as a ―myth‖ after 
all, not a ―fact.‖  Clifford (1994) reminds us: ―In diaspora experience, the copresence of 
―here‖ and ―there‖ is articulated with an antiteleological (sometimes messianic) 
temporality.  Linear history is broken, the present constantly shadowed by a past that is 
also a desired, but obstructed, future: a renewed, painful yearning‖ (Clifford, 1994, p. 
318).  What is longed for is the remembered future and the romanticized past and there is 




Diaspora and trauma 
 
When the heckling did not die down a second time, Tsvangirai abandoned his 
speech and allowed for the Q & A to begin.  He was asked what he was doing about the 
traumatized people in Zimbabwe; he was asked not to forget them and to do all he could 
for them.  ―He responded saying that he would not forget them, and, after all, if anyone 
had been traumatized, it was him‖17 at which point, ―People started screaming that he had 
not been as traumatized as many had been, with a woman yelling, "Were you raped? No!" 
(Logan, 2009).  For me, these comments point to a tendency to ‗grade‘ experiences of 
trauma, which takes a qualitative assessment of loss and trauma, in which the implicit 
question is: whose loss counts the most?  In considering the vulnerabilities of our bodies, 
Judith Butler, in Precarious Life (2004), asks the political question: What makes a 
grievable life?  She believes that the experience of loss should work to make us feel more 
like a community in the world; ―loss‖ she says, ―has made a tenuous ‗we‘ of us all‖ 
(Butler, 2004, p. 20).  ―Many people think that grief is privatizing, that it returns us to a 
solitary situation…But I think it furnishes a sense of political community of a complex 
order, and it does this first of all by bringing to the fore the relational ties‖ (Butler, 2004, 
p. 22).  We live amongst each other and in that way we are dependent on and ethically 
responsible to and for each other.  Butler (2004) wonders if there is a way that we can 
strive for autonomy while simultaneously considering the demands of ―living in a world 
of beings who are, by definition, physically dependent on one another‖ (p. 27).  She 
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 Tsvangirai has suffered a number of attacks from the ruling party‘s security forces: once he was strung 
out of the window of his 10
th
 floor office building, only to be pulled back in when his unsuspecting 
secretary walked into the room (Meredith, 2003).  In 2007, he was also tortured while in police custody for 




wonders if there is ―another way of imagining community‖ (Butler, 2004, p. 27).  When 
Tsvangirai responds to the question about the people in Zimbabwe who have been 
traumatized by insisting on his own trauma, he is speaking from a privatizing position, as 
is the woman, who undermines his trauma by implying that it ‗could have been worse‘, in 
her estimation, sexual trauma would be worse than the physical torture Tsvangirai is 
known to have experienced.  It certainly does not seem, drawing from this example, that 
an awareness of the vulnerability of our bodies can help us form ―a political community 
of a complex order‖ (Butler, 2004, p. 22).  The community that uses its losses as a place 
of gathering should be a place of understanding but oftentimes, I imagine, it is rather a 
place of measuring and grading.   
I would not want to discount Butler‘s theory too soon though.  By this stage, the 
situation in the cathedral was already fractious so I imagine that people spoke from that 
place of frustration.  (And perhaps the fractious nature of the event is itself an aspect of 
―a community of a complex political order‖ (Butler, 2004, p. 22).)  Also, there is a 
political and social precedent in Zimbabwe, dating from the Liberation War, which uses 
individual victimhood as a badge of honor and token of belonging.  Robert Muponde 
(2004) sees the privatization of victimhood as a direct consequence of the how the 
political structures in Zimbabwe have been used in the past.     
There is a way in which the nightmares and traumas of the past, whether 
experienced individually or collectively, are invested as an insurance 
policy against present and future power shifts.  It is necessary therefore for 




is no wonder that ownership of past victimhood is privatized by Zanu PF, 
and is ‗passed on‘ via totemic and lineage politics. (Muponde, 178)     
It has become a situation, in certain political and social spheres, whereby you can‘t really 
belong unless you have battle scars: unless you fought and were wounded in the fight.  
And added to all this, I would say that there is a limit to how much we can share with one 
another.
18
  C. S. Lewis (1961) understood this after the death of his wife:   
There‘s a limit…You can‘t really share someone else‘s weakness, or fear, 
or pain.  What you feel may be bad.  It might conceivably be as bad as 
what the other felt…But it would still be quite different…It can‘t be 
transferred.  The mind can sympathize; the body, less. (p. 13)    
Despite these qualifiers, I am still persuaded by Butler‘s theory.  I myself have certainly 
found that if I happen upon a fellow Zimbabwean while ‗overseas‘ there is an instant and 
warm recognition and connection.  The second question that is always asked after ―where 
are you from?‖ is ―when did you leave?‖  And these moments of recognition have been 
indiscriminate.  There is a deeper and more subtle recognition (I‘m sure of it), beyond 
what would ordinarily be experienced if the circumstances were different, if we were on 
holiday in a foreign country, for example, and happened upon a fellow tourist of the same 
national origin.  There is certainly a recognition of the loss that has been shared; a 
recognition of a shared melancholy.  Alex Magaisa, writing for NewZimbabwe.com, says 
that words fail to capture the emotion of this kind of meeting: ―You shake hands and you 
smile at each other – the connection is more than physical‖ (2010) and it inevitably leads 
to a sharing of stories about ―the trials and burdens of living far away from home‖ and a 
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sharing of reasons why one left in the first place.  In these instances, there is a sense of 
community formed through feelings of empathy and compassion, knowing that the other 
person shares your experiences.  Recalling this, I do wonder (and hope) if the experience 
of diaspora could teach us to appreciate and acknowledge that all lives are grievable; that 
all losses count.  I do think that if those community meetings are carefully mediated, 
diaspora could help to unify people isolated by trauma.   
I see the clash between Tsvangirai and members of the audience also being a 
result of conflicting notions of temporality.  Tsvangirai is implying that ‗the Crisis‘ is 
over and so it is time to come home as there is work to be done.  His linear and 
reconciled projection of events antagonizes those in the audience who have no sense that 
anything is over.  The clash is a result of these conflicting ideas of the time span of the 
aftermath.  Those in the diaspora and with/out are still living within the aftermath of 
current abuse, state terror, displacement and exile.  There is, for them, therefore, no sense 
that anything is over or finished; they do not yet consider themselves to be living after 
‗the Crisis‘.  In Tsvangirai‘s estimation, the worst is over but for those he is addressing 
who live ‗elsewhere‘, the diaspora is the aftermath. 
 
Diaspora and class 
 
―After the jeering wouldn‘t stop, Tsvangirai stepped down from the podium and 
refused to continue with the meeting‖ (Logan, 2009). The fallout saw Zimbabwe Vigil 
and Restoration of Human Rights (ROHR), two UK-based Zimbabwean advocacy 




blame for the disruption of the meeting.  Alex Magaisa (2009), a political analyst and 
lawyer based in the UK, wrote about ―Tsvangirai‘s Fateful Western Voyage‖ for the 
Zimbabwe Standard.  He calls the scene in the cathedral the ―biggest blemish‖ on 
Tsvangirai‘s trip, which also saw him trying to secure funds from Western nations.  
Magaisa takes pains to assure his readers that the hecklers were just ―one section of the 
crowd‖ and he wants the Prime Minister to know that ―the heckles do not necessarily 
represent the homogenous views of all the Zimbabweans living in the diaspora.  Indeed, 
contrary to general thought, the diaspora is not a homogenous entity…their concerns, 
fears and interests may meet at times but they are not necessarily uniform across the 
board‖ (Magaisa, 2009).  He continues: ―At the risk of sounding elitist, with all due 
respect, the call of the PM is very relevant to certain segments of the diaspora—the 
skilled and professionals—but not all and it would have been well-received and discussed 
sufficiently by that type of audience‖ (Magaisa, 2009).  He admits to having this 
privileged information because he ―works[s] with many Zimbabweans who have shown a 
critical interest in playing a role in rebuilding the country.  They appreciate that when the 
Prime Minister calls for people to return home, it is not a literal call for people to pack 
their bags to return home instantly‖ (2009).  (Indeed, when Tsvangirai returned to the 
pulpit after first stepping down in the face of the jeering, he said, backtracking 
rhetorically, ――I did not say ‗pack your bags tomorrow,‘ I said you should be thinking 
about coming home‖‖ (Sokwanele, 2009, June).)   
While Magaisa‘s observations may very well seem elitist, despite his not wishing 
to appear so, he does draw our attention to the lived realities of any diaspora community, 




understood as reified groups with a fixed essence, but as the outcome of historical, 
political and cultural processes through which ideas of belonging come to be defined 
primarily in terms of attachment to a distant homeland and shared national imaginaries‖ 
(McGregor, 2010a, p. 6).  McGregor (2010a) feels it important to stress this distinction as 
some leading experts, in her opinion, employ the term in an ―essentialised manner‖ 
whereby they specify that there is neither invention nor imagination.  Instead she draws 
on the work of Turner (2008) who researched Burundian diaspora communities and 
argued that the term ‗diaspora‘ is more appropriately used as an adjective rather than a 
noun, though in Zimbabwean discourse it is only used as noun and oftentimes it is also 
capitalized, ―as if it were an ethno-national group or country itself‖ (McGregor, 2010a, p. 
6).  McGregor (2010a) prefers using the term as an adjective because she feels that it has 
a ―more fluid alignment‖ (p. 6) permitting an examination of why some people do not 
consider themselves part of the diaspora, or the circumstances that encourage or 
discourage diasporic positioning, and the tensions and movements within diasporic 
communities.  ―Particularly when produced in the context of conflict, diasporic 
communities are characteristically fractious and riven, partly along imported political and 
social divides, partly frustrations and differences opened up in countries of settlement‖ 
(McGregor, 2010a, p.6-7).  The Zimbabwean diaspora is fractured and fragmented so that 
any generalizations about a singular diaspora can be profoundly misleading and 
problematic.      
Alex Magaisa‘s (2009)19 comments also draw our attention to the diverse classed 
experiences of diaspora communities.  Clifford worries that ―theories and discourses that 
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diasporize or internationalize ―minorities‖ can deflect attention from long-standing 
inequalities of class and race‖ (1994, p. 313) and he admits that much more could be said 
about class differences among diasporic populations: ―degrees of diasporic alienation, the 
mix of coercion and freedom in cultural (dis)identification, and the pain of loss and 
displacement are highly relative‖ (Clifford, p. 312-313).  For many who are ‗lucky‘ 
enough to escape Zimbabwe, life in the diaspora is a miserable existence.  Petina Gappah, 
in the short story, ―Something Nice from London‖, has a character describe this reality: 
many Zimbabweans, she says, ―have flooded England to wipe old people‘s bottoms‖ 
(2009, p. 73).  And another character in another story, ―My Cousin-Sister Rambanai,‖ 
describes how she and her husband had to give up their respective professions of teaching 
and engineering because ―the curse of the green passport condemned us to work in the 
unlit corners of England‘s health-care system, in care homes where we took out the 
frustrations of our existence by visiting little cruelties on geriatric patients‖ (Gappah, 
2009, p. 190).
20
   
The Zimbabwean diaspora ―is widely-dispersed, very young and extremely 
insecure.  This is not a group who have emigrated permanently to another country over an 
extended period of time, put down roots and achieved some kind of social and economic 
success‖ (Crush & Tevera, 2010, pg. 19).  Migrants to the Western world are drawn 
predominantly from Zimbabwe‘s elite and middle class.21  They, of course, can afford the 
                                                                                                                                                 
consultant; a public writer; and Chair of the Board of the Zimbabwe Diaspora Development Interface—and 
so his assessment of Tsvangirai‘s address is seen through that particular lens.   
 
20
 Caring for Britain‘s elders is the largest single occupational category among Zimbabweans in Britain, so 
much so that caring has become iconic of the process of migration to the UK: Zimbabweans joke 
derogatorily of their compatriots joining the BBC, meaning not the British Broadcasting Corporation but 
the ―British Bottom Cleaners‖ (McGregor, 2010b, p. 179).   
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long distance flights, and have the professional qualifications or contacts necessary to 
make the journey.  Despite this, though, very few have been able to use their skills or 
professions in the West; they have had to rely on underpaid, exploitative menial work 
oftentimes because they have arrived in the country on visitor or tourist visas and so lack 
work permits, or because good jobs are hard to find and very often ‗foreigners‘ are not 
considered for the position.  Many migrants speak of appalling working and living 
conditions whereby they have no recourse to the law because they are ‗illegal‘ and have 
to contend with racism, as well as their own shame at working jobs they deem to be 
beneath them (McGregor, 2010b; McGregor, 2010c).  ―The stress created by doing 
insecure, poorly-paid and low-status work is compounded for some by life on the margins 
of the law and fear of deportation and for other, who worked legally, by a sense of being 
trapped without prospects‖ (McGregor, 2010b, p. 201).   
South Africa is the main destination for Zimbabwean labour migrants, some 
professionals, refugees, and circulating traders, and non-professionals.  For many of the 
estimated millions who have migrated ‗down South‘ instead of ‗overseas‘, life in the 
diaspora is equally fragile.  Stories abound of hundreds of thousands of desperate people 
‗jumping the border‘ to get into South Africa—the border in this instance being the 
crocodile-infested Limpopo River—having to watch out for maguma-guma (people who 
prey on those crossing the border, often committing violent acts of thievery, rape and 
murder) on the Zimbabwean side, while also dodging wild animals, police roadblocks 
and army patrols (Rutherford, 2010, p. 254; Lefko-Everett, 2010, p. 274-275).  Once 
across the border, migrants have to contend with South African tsotsis (thugs), 




and openly-expressed hostility from South Africans (Lefko-Everett, 2010).  ―Diasporic 
identities are, of course, intimately shaped both by the politics of receiving countries and 
by unfolding events back home‖ (McGregor, 2010a, pg. 4) and just as ―the processes and 
experiences of displacement have reconfigured Zimbabwean geographies, political 
economies and social forms, the ‗export‘ of ‗Zimbabwean‘ bodies, logics and practices 
beyond the country‘s political frontiers has contributed to processes of change within 
neighbouring countries‖ (Hammar, McGregor, Landau, 2010, p. 264).  A shameful 
example of this was the outbreak of xenophobic violence in South Africa in May 2008 
when scores of Zimbabweans, along with migrants from other African countries, were 
hounded out of their homes by rampaging mobs, accused of stealing South African jobs 
(Crush & Tevera, 2010, p. 21).  ―Popular xenophobia and resentment over competition 
for jobs have stimulated or revived debates over the nature of community, nationhood, 
and the limits of inclusion and fraternity‖ (Hammar, McGregor, Landau, 2010, p. 264) as 
well as casting the lived experiences of working in the diaspora in stark light. 
It is important to remember that the lived experiences of those in the diaspora are 
differently mediated by race, class and gender.  As a white, comfortably middle-class, 
educated woman, with easy access to work and student visas for South Africa and the 
U.K., and comparatively easy access to a student visa for the U.S., my geographic and 
logistical transition to any of these locations has been and would be dramatically easier 
than the majority of other diasporans.  Many white Zimbabweans now live in South 
Africa; I don‘t imagine that any of them had to get there by swimming across the 
Limpopo River, and certainly none of them were hounded out of their homes during the 




Diaspora and community 
 
Experiences of loss, marginality, and exile (differentially cushioned by 
class) are often reinforced by systematic exploitation and blocked 
advancement.  This constitutive suffering coexists with the skills of 
survival: strength in adaptive distinction, discrepant cosmopolitanism, and 
stubborn visions of renewal.  Diaspora consciousness lives loss and hope 
as a defining tension. (Clifford, 1994, p. 312)   
Where can we find ―hope‖ in this example of the tensions that exist in the Zimbabwean 
diasporic community?  For Clifford, ―stubborn hope‖ resides in the ability to not ―merely 
lament a world that has been lost‖ (1994, p. 328) because loss, which has resulted in 
unplanned for gains, must be mediated and put to good use.  I see connections here to 
Butler‘s idea of the ―strange fecundity in [the] wreckage‖ (2003, p. 469).  Butler tells us 
that after ―Places are lost—destroyed, vacated, barred‖ there is not nothing left but rather 
―some new place‖ (2003, p. 468).  This new place that remains is ―founded upon the loss 
of original place‖ and so contains within it ―a sense of belatedness, of coming after, and 
of being thus fundamentally determined by a past that continues to inform it‖.  The ―new 
place‖, Butler thinks, rather than being a place of no belonging, could perhaps be a place 
―where belonging now takes place in and through a common sense of loss‖ (Butler, 2003, 
p. 469).  Loss in this sense (although she stresses that not all losses are the same), 
―becomes the condition and necessity for a certain sense of community, where 
community does not overcome the loss, where community cannot overcome the loss 




is true, Butler says, then this new place ―turns out to be oddly fecund‖ (Butler, 2003, p. 
468).  She goes on the wonder what this productivity could be, because whatever it is, ―it 
cannot constitute a rewriting of the past or a redemption that would successfully 
reconstitute its meaning from and as the present‖, no, ―whatever is produced from this 
condition of loss will bear the trace of loss‖ (Butler, 2003, p. 468).   
We too must wonder what fecundity could be found in the wreckage; what kind of 
productivity could come out of ―the new place‖; where would we find ―stubborn hope‖ 
(Clifford, 1993, p. 328)?  The diaspora community is founded on a common sense of 
loss, and this ―new place‖ that they inhabit, which is not a geographic location but rather 
an existential and perhaps ethical place too, could be strangely fecund existentially and 
ethically, if there is not the attempt to stick to the same temporal plane that was inhabited 
before the catastrophe.  There can be no moves informed by restorative nostalgic (Boym, 
2001) attempts to simply rebuild a lost home and ‗go back‘ to what was lost or ‗go 
forward‘ to what was thought and imagined to come next.  Rather, there can only be 
movement from the ―new place‖ if one has accepted that one has undergone a 
―transformation‖ (Butler, 2004, p. 21).  But what kind of movement could it be?   
Clifford believes that the experience of diaspora can teach the ―practice of 
dwelling (differently), as an ambivalent refusal or indefinite deferral of return, and as a 
positive transnationalism… These decentered, partially overlapping networks of 
communication, travel, trade, and kinship connect the several communities of a 
transnational ―people‖‖ (Clifford, p. 321 – 322).  Is this kind of movement—decentered, 
transnational, overlapping—the kind of movement that diaspora communities should 




Diaspora and transnationalism 
 
Would such transnational movements apply to the Zimbabwean context?  And if 
so, could they be put to good use?  Zimbabwean migrants living in South Africa and the 
region as well as those living in Britain and other Western nations maintain close links 
with the country and return home frequently.  The intensity and frequency of the contact 
and exchange is such that terms ―transnational migrants‖ and ―transnationalism‖ have 
been increasingly applied to the Zimbabwean situation and its patterns of migration 
specifically (Crush & Tevera, 2010, p. 19).  Transnational migration has been defined as: 
―a pattern of migration in which persons, although they move across international 
borders, settle and establish ongoing social relations in a new state, maintain ongoing 
social connections with the polity from which they originated‖ (Glick Schiller & Fouron, 
1999, p. 344).  In an essay entitled, ―The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and 
Promises of an Emergent Research Field‖, the authors Portes, Guarnizo & Landolt (1999) 
explain that transnational migrants live out their lives across international borders 
through ―the high intensity exchanges, the new modes of transacting, and the 
multiplication of activities that require cross-border travel and contacts on a sustainable 
basis‖ (p. 219.)  Zimbabwean migrants certainly maintain ―high intensity exchanges‖, 
characteristic of transnationalism, and in fact, Crush and Tevera wonder if the fact that 
Zimbabwe‘s migration is ‗crisis-driven‘ and that ―the dire situation of many people in the 
country‖ might have even intensified the level of exchange connectivity with home‖ 




Another important characteristic of transnational migrants is that they are 
simultaneously embedded in more than one society (Glick Schiller, Basch & Blanc-
Szanton, 1995, p. 48).  The reality of ―simultaneous embeddedness‖ is crucial to 
understanding the movements and flows of transnational migrants but it is important to 
note that while circulation is a feature of transnational migration, ‗transnationalism‘ itself 
is not simply about continuous or regular physical movement between two places (Crush 
& Tevera, p. 19), rather, ‗transnationalism‘ first emerged as a way of describing and 
understanding migrant cultural identities and practices rather than their movements 
specifically.  While assimilation of immigrants into some notional ‗national culture‘ is a 
goal of many social and cultural integration and social cohesion programmes in the West 
(Crush & Tevera, 2010, p. 20), for transnational migrants ―success does not depend so 
much on abandoning their culture and language to embrace another society as on 
preserving their original endowment, while adapting instrumentally to a second‖ (Portes, 
Guarnizo & Landolt, 1999, p. 229).  This idea of ―simultaneous embeddedness‖ (Glick 
Schiller, Basch & Blanc-Szanton, 1995, p. 48) encourages the construction of hybrid 
identities and cultures.
22
   
Crush and Tevera (2010) wonder to what extent Zimbabweans living in diaspora 
feel and experience ―embeddedness‖ in the host nation, especially considering the 
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 ‗Hybridity‘, in post-colonial theory, generally refers to ―the creation of new transcultural forms within 
the contact zone produced by colonization‖ (Ashcroft, Griffiths, Tiffin, 1998, p. 118).  These forms can be 
linguistic, cultural, political, racial, aesthetic, or a combination.  The term is disputed though with 
competing assertions about the implications of its meaning within the postcolonial context.  In terms of 
transnationalism, I would argue that the experience of ―simultaneous embeddedness‖ allows for the notion 
of hybridity employed by post-colonial discourse to mean ―cross-cultural exchange‖.  This notion has been 
disputed because it implies ―negating and neglecting the imbalance and inequality of power 
relations…stressing the transformative cultural, linguistic and political impacts on both the colonized and 
colonizer‖ (Ashcroft, Griffiths, Tiffin, 1998, p. 119).  While in the transnational diaspora context, we are 
not talking about the power relations that impact the colonized and colonizer, there are, of course, 
imbalances and inequalities that would impact the lives and experiences of those living as immigrants in 




generally, but of course not comprehensively, unwelcome reception they have received 
on arrival.  Much research suggests that Zimbabwean migrants as a whole are denigrated, 
devalued and marginalized, especially in South Africa and the United Kingdom 
(Mawadza & Crush, 2010; Zimbabwe Torture Victims Project, 2005; Human Rights 
Watch, 2006; McGregor, 2010d).  Considering this hostile reception, Crush and Tevera 
(2010) think that for many Zimbabweans their level of ―embeddedness‖ in their host 
nations could be superficial.  And if that is the case, would that mean that it is unlikely 
that Zimbabwean migrants feel transnational?  Phil Matibe, writing for the Zimtelegraph, 
seems to think that this is not the case (we must keep in mind that reception is heavily 
dependent on one‘s class, race, level of education, and profession):   
Life in the Diaspora requires the dexterity of balancing the patriotic 
yearning for a return to Zimbabwe and surviving in the difficult rigors of 
an exiled existence. This tenacity and resilience has become a hallmark by 
which the majority of Zimbabweans abroad are now defined.  
Zimbabweans have become world citizens and tolerant 
internationalists. Soon it will be common to experience a cultural fusion 
that will blend Asian, European, American and African Diaspora 
experiences at a single-family reunion in Zimbabwe. (2009) 
Matibe‘s vision, I think, speaks to what Clifford (1994) believes are the versions of 
utopic/dystopic tensions present in all diasporic cultures: ―They begin with uprooting and 
loss.  They are familiar with exile, with the ‗outsider‘s‘ exposed terror‖ but at the same 
time they ―work to maintain community, selectively preserving and recovering traditions, 




(p. 317).  Clifford speaks of diaspora communities grappling with a fundamental 
ambivalence because of ―the entanglement of subversion and the law, of invention and 
constraint—the complicity of dystopia and utopia‖ (1994, p. 319).  This ambivalence is a 
result of living with loss and hope simultaneously for an extended period of time: 
enjoying the experience of certain aspects of one‘s new home and culture, while longing 
for home; and longing for home while knowing that aspects of that life and culture are 
traumatic, discriminatory, and hostile.   
 ―Diasporist discourses reflect the sense of being part of an ongoing transnational 
network that includes the homeland, not as something simply left behind, but as a place 
of attachment in a contrapunctual modernity‖ (Clifford, 1994, p. 311).  (―Contrapunctual‖ 
describes a piece of music in which more than one melody is played at the same time, 
without one dominating.)  Said (2001) in Reflections on Exile also uses the term 
contrapunctual to describe one of the positive experiences of exile:  
Seeing ―the entire world as a foreign land‖ makes possible originality of 
vision.  Most people are principally aware of one culture, one setting, one 
home; exiles are aware of at least two, and this plurality of vision gives 
rise to an awareness of simultaneous dimensions, an awareness that—to 
borrow a phrase from music—is contrapunctual…For an exile, habits of 
life, expression, or activity in the new environment inevitably occur 
against the memory of these things in another environment.  Thus the new 
and the old environments are vivid, occurring together contrapuntually. (p. 




Clifford believes that these reflections on exile also apply to experiences of diaspora, 
excepting that with exile the experience is more individualistic and existential and with 
diaspora the experience is ―tempered by networks of community, collective practices of 
displaced dwelling‖ (1994, p. 329).  Petina Gappah, the Zimbabwean author, speaks to 
this experience when she talks about simultaneously feeling guilt for having left 
Zimbabwe but also being able to appreciate that in having left she can see with a ―more 
objective eye…a larger context, that‘s freed [her] to be more distanced‖ (2009b).  This 
objectivity has allowed her to see that ―We‘re not that special: you‘re like any other 
country that has had a similar history.  Kenya‘s been through the same thing, Nigeria has, 
but it is human to only see your own crisis and your own dilemmas‖ (2009b).  Achieving 
something like objectivity as a positive outcome is commonly experienced by anyone 
who has directly or indirectly experienced some form of crisis but usually we lose that 
sense of objectivity more quickly than we should; as life moves on so too do we revert to 
our blinkered, day-to-day obsessions.  The experience of exile and diaspora however, 
because it is usually experienced over an extended period of time, does not necessarily 
allow one to ‗revert‘, certainly not as quickly as usually experienced.  The aftermath lasts 
longer because diaspora is the aftermath.   
In its contrapunctuality, diaspora consciousness is constituted both positively and 
negatively.  It is constituted negatively, Clifford writes, ―by experiences of discrimination 
and exclusion‖, but it is constituted positively ―through identification with world 
historical cultural/political forces‖ and also by ―feeling global‖ (1993, p. 311-312).  What 




learn from the ―practice of dwelling differently‖ (Clifford, 1993, p. 321) and is that the 




This chapter has attempted to articulate and trouble the experience of diaspora as 
it relates to my greater concern of how ―internal‖ and ―external‖ exile as a result of ‗the 
Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe is and can be lived.  What does become clear is that while diaspora 
is conceived of as the collective experience to exile‘s individual experience, that 
collective is hardly homogenous.  The events in the cathedral show the tensions and 
ambivalences and losses experienced by those who have left Zimbabwe.  The possibility 
of return, pointed to here, is something I will look at in greater depth in the following 
chapter as I seek to consider how responsibility could be a response employed by those in 
―internal‖ and ―external‖ exile (Hove, 2007).  In the final chapter, I will draw from what I 
have learnt from this reading, as well as what I have learnt from the previous chapters, to 













Will the swallows return? 
 
sometimes home is the only place that will have you 
 
Having returned from South African rehab, Dubai divorce, Texan jail, and anorexia they 
sat, old and new friends, eating Coimbra‘s peri-peri-chicken-and-chips (known to all who 
know to be the very best peri-peri-chicken-and-chips this side of Mozambique).   
―So this is freedom?‖ he asked.   
―No, this is just home.‖   
 
and sometimes home is no home at all 
 
And then these white people who have left say things like, ―You know, what I‘m amazed 
at is that every time I speak to someone who still lives at home and I ask them how it is, 
never once do they mention how the ‗ordinary people‘ are doing (read here: poor black 
people).‖  This coming from someone who‘s left!  How much did you care about the so-
called ‗ordinary people‘ when you packed your bags, dismissed your workers and moved 
to the first world with you degree under your arm.  The fucking hypocrisy makes me 
want to scream.  We, who live there, don‘t mention the ‗ordinary people‘?  No, we just 
live there and work there and pay our taxes (for whatever that‘s worth!) and pay the 





sometimes The Return returns its revenge 
  
The aunt, she has returned, in all her magnificence, after eight too-short years.  She 
immediately insisted on The Tour—to the old house, the even older house, and the house 
before that, the old school, the old shops, the old hairdresser, the old friends (in that 
order).  The Tour, you see, is not like the return to one‘s childhood home: bitter—because 
childhood is over and dreams didn‘t come true—sweet (hard boiled) because memories 
can be rolled around on your tongue and savored.  No, that tour is nothing like The Tour.  
The return of the native tour takes a lot longer, the ticket usually costs more, and no rose-
tinted glasses allowed.  Loss and drama and hurt are inscribed on all places especially as 
one imagines what would have happened if... wandering down the passage you did not, in 
the end, take and opening, just a crack, the door you didn‘t allow yourself to open, 
disturbing all that dust on a bowl of rose-leaves (Eliot, 1963).  That is a bitter house.  
Feeling that you‘ve been cheated out of your remembered future; shocked that life went 
on without you.  And sometimes that is too much to forgive.  Is that why those who have 
left hold home to higher, more exacting standards?  Private schools at home are ―more 
exclusive‖ than private schools elsewhere; the fact that new bars and restaurants have 
opened up is ―wrong‖ in some way, capitalism is more reprehensible here.  Are they not 
really saying: How dare things go on without me?  How dare life be lived and lived well 
when I have left and am living exiled in a foreign land.  Auden knew it: how life goes on 




For those who did not leave but are subject to participate in The Tour by familial 
obligation or proximity, there is much eye-rolling exasperation because the events as 
they‘ve played themselves out have created a divide between those who‘ve left and those 
who‘ve stayed.  And this divide is represented by the contrasting stories that we tell of 
‗the Crisis.‘ To those who have left it is a story of loss and despair but to those who 
stayed it is a story of survival.   Those who left go into therapy; those who stayed go 
home.  I, of little-patience for such bitter nostalgia, abandoned my Mother to take the 
aunt on The Tour.  They returned to the house hours later, my aunt‘s speech painfully 
(exaggeratedly) slow, my mother, with the look of murder in her eye, reached for the 
PainStop to hold the migraine at bay.                
 
and sometimes The Return can never be returned 
 
With her near-dead child clutched to her chest, she came screaming out of the bush, onto 
the road, where my parents had stopped having just witnessed the accident.  She ran 
directly to my father, placed the boy in his arms as if he could save him.  
Later in the hospital, she said, her voice full of the horror, ―I should never have 
come back.‖  She turned to look directly at my mother, ―Why did I come back?‖   
 
 
On caps of wind the migrant swallows soar: 
will they return? 









 ―I am trying to keep a soul alive in times not hospitable to the soul.‖  
(Coetzee, 1990, p. 130) 
 
Toward the end of J. M. Coetzee‘s novel Age of Iron (1990), Mrs. Curren, having 
witnessed, first-hand for the first time, the true horror of the apartheid regime in the state-
sponsored deaths of two young boys that she knew, has an epiphany and makes a 
―confession‖ (p. 165).  She starts by acknowledging what she always knew: that a 
―‗crime was committed long ago... So long ago that I was born into it‘‖ (Coetzee, 1990, 
p, 164).  She also says that she knew that ―‗Like every crime it had its price‖ (p. 164).  
She had thought, drawing deeply from the Western tradition (she is a Classics professor 
by profession), that the price ―‗would have to be paid in shame‘‖ as a means to retain 
personal honour even ―‗though it was not a crime I asked to be committed, it was 
committed in my name.‘‖ (Coetzee, 1990, p. 164).  What she has come to realise, though, 
is that ―‗the price was even higher‘‖ (p. 165).  She admits to having miscalculated: 
―‗Where did the mistake come in?  It had something to do with honour, with the notion I 
clung to through thick and thin, from my education, from my reading‘‖ (Coetzee, 1990, 
p. 165); and this leads to the confession: ―‗I have been a good person, I freely confess to 
it.  I am a good person still.  What times these are when to be a good person is not 




―heroism‖ but she admits that it is ―a word that sounds foreign to [her] lips‘‖ (Coetzee, 
1990, p. 165).     
What is Coetzee saying here?  That a troubled conscience is not sufficient a 
response to times of profound crisis?  That it is not enough to live ‗feeling badly‘ about a 
situation?  Mrs. Curren retroactively assesses her actions and realises that she is worthy 
of blame for not doing more than being a good person.  She feels that if she were held to 
account for her actions in the context of apartheid South Africa, she would be found 
wanting.  More was needed of her than personal goodwill; something larger and more 
heroic was required.  Originally, she had assessed how she would respond to her context 
by drawing on the norms and standards that were available to her, such as honour and 
shame.  In this, she is acknowledging that she feels a sense of individual responsibility 
for the history she has inherited.  But what she finds out through the course of events in 
the last few months of her life is that those taken-for-granted codes of good conduct were 
not appropriable to the current context in which she lives.  Her sense of moral outrage 
toward the regime inspired her sense of individual responsibility, which she articulated 
through codes of honour and shame and acts of kindness.  But how can one take 
responsibility for something that is much larger and older than oneself?  If one feels 
responsible but is unable to act for legitimate reasons, must one still be held attributable 
and accountable?  What is it to live in vexed political and social conditions, knowing that 
goodwill, expressed through acts of kindness and feelings of benevolence, is not good 
enough?  How should we respond to times of dire political crisis?     
   In light of the quandary that Mrs. Curren expresses, I offer an overview of 




possible response to times of crisis.  I will also propose five possible kinds of responsible 
stances could be taken by those living in conditions of ―internal‖ and ―external‖ exile 
(Hove, 2007) in relation the ‗the Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe.  (Responsibility is not as 




Gayatri Spivak (1998), in the essay, ―Cultural Talks in the Hot Peace‖, positions 
her interests as being ―in the crease between global postcoloniality and postcolonial 
migrancy‖ (p. 334).  She begins by wondering, ―In what interest, to regulate what sort of 
relationships, is the globe evoked?‖ (p. 329) and goes on to describe how ―unexamined‖ 
cultural politics, when it is used to ―provide crucial ideological support‖ for ―crude 
cultural relativism‖ is an ―abdication of responsibility‖ (p. 336).  It is in the context of 
this argument about cultural politics and ―globality‖ that she writes, ―History is larger 
than personal goodwill, and we must learn to be responsible as we must study to be 
political‖ (Spivak, 1998, p. 337).  What might it entail to take a stance of responsibility as 
a response to history and politics?  And how might we ―learn to be responsible‖ (Spivak, 
1998, p. 337)? 
The word ―responsible‖ is always followed by to or for because one is always 
responsible to someone or for something.  Even when we say, ―She is a responsible 
child‖, we mean that she is responsible for herself.  In this way the word implies a 
transaction of sorts, it is an action, a type of conduct and so it is about doing something.  




means precisely that one is not just suddenly responsible but rather that one is responsible 
in response to something (context) or someone (the context of an other).  In this way, 
when a person performs or conversely fails to perform an action that would be expected 
of them in a particular context it is thought of to be a question of individual moral 
responsibility or irresponsibility in the case of failing to perform an action.   
Questions of moral responsibility occur on a temporal plane in that such questions 
are usually backward looking, or retroactive, as in when we ask after an event or 
situation, ―Who is responsible for this?‖  This can be either a positive assessment, as 
when we want to attribute praise, or a negative assessment, as when we want to blame 
someone or something.  What would be the purpose in assessing an action as 
praiseworthy or blameworthy, especially as the action or lack thereof is in response to a 
past event or situation?  When someone fails to perform what we assume to be a 
reasonable and expected action which would meet the standards of a moral community, 
what might be the point of retroactively attributing blame or praise?  Aristotle identified 
two conditions under which it would be appropriate to attribute blame or praise: 1) the 
merit-based view, by which praise or blame is an appropriate reaction if it is merited and 
deserved, and 2) the consequentialist view, by which praise or blame is appropriate if 
such a reaction would lead to a desired change in the agent and/or his or her behaviour 
(Eshleman, 2011).  I wonder what the point would be in apportioning praise or blame if 
not to influence future behaviour.  Is this not to take a teaching and learning stance 
toward responsibility?  Would this not be a means of learning to be responsible (Spivak, 




Distinctions can be made between responsibility which is understood as 
attributability and responsibility which can be understood as accountability. 
Responsibility as attributability assesses whether the action elucidates something about 
the nature of the agent‘s self (Eshleman, 2011).  A judgment of responsibility in the sense 
of attributability entails an assessment of the agent‘s self as measured against some 
standard, in that ―the action discloses something about the agent‘s evaluative 
commitments‖ (Eshleman, 2011).  For example, if someone fails to perform a responsible 
action in relation to a particular event or situation, we assume that this failure tells us 
something about their priorities, assessment process, and/or commitment and we judge 
them accordingly.   
The second notion of responsibility, that of accountability, goes further in that it 
presupposes responsibility as attributability but also judges whether an agent‘s behaviour 
is governed by ―an interpersonal normative standard of conduct that creates expectations 
between members of a shared community‖ (Eshleman, 2011).  This is a social notion of 
moral responsibility.  In this sense, to hold someone responsible is to address a fellow 
member of the moral community and expect them to give an account of their conduct.  
One must, of course, be warranted or justified in holding someone responsible, in that the 
action that is expected of them is within their power or control.  Therefore, if someone 
fails to achieve such an action we assume that they chose not to and the assessment that 
follows is to try and work out why they chose not to.  This is where the agent is called 
upon to give an account of his or her actions.  ―To hold someone responsible is thus to be 
one to whom an explanation is owed‖ (Eshleman, 2011).  This sense of responsibility 




The concepts of responsibility as attributability and accountability establish 
responsibility as an assessment of action or inaction after the fact but can assessment of 
responsibility be attributed and accounted for proactively, by which I mean, can questions 
of responsibility be forward looking too?  Can we assign responsibility for the future?   It 
can also be forward looking, or proactive, as in when we find ourselves in a situation or 
context and must decide on a future course in relation to that context, for example, when 
we ask: ―Who will take responsibility for this situation?‖  This is where proactive 
expectations can be acknowledged.  As time passes, responsibility will once again be 
retroactively assessed, and so in this way, responsibility does not merely work in a 
backwards and forwards motion but rather it is recursive.   
 
Judith Butler (2005) and responsibility as accountability 
 
Judith Butler is persuaded by the view of responsibility as accountability and in 
Giving an Account of Oneself (2005), she articulates an understanding of how being 
addressed and asked to account for one‘s actions could provide the opportunity to learn 
about responsibility.  Butler (2005) begins by establishing that moral philosophy has to 
do with a question of ―conduct and, hence, with doing, within a contemporary social 
frame‖ (p. 1).  Ethics as such is active; therefore responsibility as an ethical stance is a 
response in action, not just in thought and feeling.  The prior thesis from which Butler 
(2005) works establishes that moral questions emerge in the context of social relations 
and the form these questions take changes according to context.  Our conduct (how we 




Hegelian notion of relational recognition, which stresses our fundamental dependency on 
the other.  To deny such dependence would be to deny ―something fundamental about the 
social conditions of our very formation‖ (Butler, 2004, p. 23).   
Butler (2005) quotes Theodore Adorno‘s stance from his 1963 lectures entitled 
Problems of Moral Philosophy that all ideas of morality or ethical behaviour must relate 
to an ―I‖ that acts.  Butler‘s concern though is that there is ―no ―I‖ that can fully stand 
apart from the social conditions of its emergence‖ (2005, p. 7) for the reason that ―when 
the ―I‖ seeks to give an account of itself, it can start with itself, but it will find that this 
self is already implicated in a social temporality that exceeds its own capacities for 
narration; indeed, when the ―I‖ seeks to give an account of itself, an account that must 
include the conditions of its own emergence, it must, as a matter of necessity, become a 
social theorist‖ (p. 7-8).  The subject in Butler‘s view is constructed in relation to a pre-
existing set of norms and various discourses that are available at the time of its 
emergence.  In this way, the ―I‖ in trying to give an account of itself also has to account 
for how it came to be and that is through the social conditions of its emergence; and so it 
is in that way that the ―I‖ also becomes a ―social theorist‖ (Butler, 2005, p. 8).  The ―I‖ 
does not simply come into existence independently; it is born into and constantly 
mediated by pre-existing relations and discourses that precede and exceed its attempt to 
give an account of itself.  To account for itself, the ―I‖ would have to tell of many other 
things that it cannot know or control or even necessarily explain.       
The opposition to this understanding that could be raised, Butler explains, is that 
if this is the case then the ―I‖ is dispossessed of its subjective ground for ethics.  This line 




of the creation of its own subjectivities, then how can it possibly create its own set of 
ethics.  Butler believes, in response to this opposition, that it is precisely this state of 
coming into being that provides the modes and circumstances for moral inquiry and so a 
formation of a set of ethical responses.  She believes that this is done through the creation 
of such circumstances, which not only encourage critique but require it if the ―I‖ is to 
come to understand itself.  ―If the ―I‖ is not at one with moral norms, this means only that 
the subject must deliberate upon these norms, and that part of that deliberation will entail 
a critical understanding of their social genesis and meaning.  In this sense, ethical 
deliberation is bound up with the operation of critique‖ (Butler, 2005, p. 8).  In being 
addressed and asked to account for our actions, we are forced, because we cannot account 
for them in whole, to assess the larger social context in which we find ourselves.  It is this 
very situation that provides us with the opportunity to assess ourselves and our 
interdependency within the social and ethical context provided for us.  Through this, the 
―I‖ comes to ‗see‘ itself, not clearly or fully, but opaquely in relation to others and 
through the recognition of others, while also offering recognition in return.  It is through 
this awakening to our interdependence that would, in Butler‘s view, allow us to create a 
conception of an ethical stance.   
Could this inability to ‗self-ground‘ inhibit the possibility of giving an account of 
ourselves and learning to be responsible?  Butler argues that in fact it is the subject‘s very 
opacity that furnishes it with the conditions by which it becomes responsible to/for 
others.  ―A theory of subject formation that acknowledges the limits of self-knowledge 
can serve a conception of ethics and, indeed, responsibility‖ because ―Moments of 




suggesting that these relations call upon primary forms of relationality that are not always 
available to explicit and reflective thematization‖ (Butler, 2005, p. 20).  She goes on to 
explain that ―primary opacity to the self" as a result of formative relations ―has a specific 
implication for an ethical bearing toward the other‖ as it is ―precisely by virtue of one‘s 
relations to others that one is opaque to oneself, and if those relations to others are the 
venue for one‘s ethical responsibility, then it may well follow that it is precisely by virtue 
of the subject‘s opacity to itself that it incurs and sustains some of its most important 
ethical bonds‖ (Butler, 2005, p. 20).  If one learns of one‘s opacity while being asked to 
give an account of oneself, this ―venue‖ (Butler, 2005, p. 20), the site of relational 
address, is also the site of learning about one‘s dependence on and so responsibility for 
the other.  In other words, we learn to be responsible while learning that we can never 
give a whole and clear account of ourselves because we are constituted socially and 
relationally. 
I am persuaded by Butler‘s articulation of our relational and social constitution 
and find convincing the notion that this could be a venue for learning to be responsible.  
If we are relationally constituted, which is a continual process, then we are forever 
relationally tied, and my well-being is dependent on your well-being.  As Butler explains 
in Precarious Life (2004) ―If my fate is not originally or finally separable from yours, 
then the ―we‖ is traversed by a relationality that we cannot easily argue against‖ (p. 22-
23).   
In Zimbabwe, the Shona language has a linguistic blueprint for everyday 
greetings which follows this pattern:  




B: ―Mangwanani, marara sei?‖ (Good morning, did you sleep well?) 
A: ―Ndarara kano mararawo.‖ (I slept well if you slept well.) 
B: ―Ndarara.‖ (I slept well.) 
Greetings for all times of the day follow this pattern.  For example, in the afternoon, 
when you are asked if you have had a good day, you respond by saying that you had a 
good if the person who addressed you has also had a good day.  This greeting structure 
emphasizes and stresses a belief in the relational ties that bind people to each other.  The 
idea, as Chenjerai Hove explains, is that ―I am because I am acknowledged by others‖ 
(2008).  Acknowledgement of our relationality is also an acknowledgement of how we 
are constituted through the recognition given to us by the other.  But the greeting 
structure also stresses that we are responsible for each other‘s well-being.  If my well-
being is dependent upon the well-being of another, and vice versa then through that scene 
of address we are made aware of our interdependence and should learn to feel responsible 
for each other.            
I wonder if this concept could also be collective.  If my well-being is dependent 
on another‘s well-being and so on another‘s and another‘s, connected as if by a web, then 
are we not collectively responsible for the well-being of the collective?  Butler (2004) 
would argue that because of our relationality we are collectively responsible.  She 
establishes in Precarious Life (2004) that it is our experiences of loss and grief that 
makes us conscious of our relational ties by which we are constituted.  And this 
constitution is personal as well as political ―in part by virtue of the social vulnerability of 
our bodies‖ (Butler, 2004, p. 20).  When we lose someone or something we are undone 




relation.  These ties and bonds thus ―compose us‖ (Butler, 2004, p. 22).  Butler (2004) 
wonders if it is through this learned sense of our human vulnerability, and if we tarry 
with grief rather than fearing it (as fearing it could cause us to resort to violence or 
fantasy) that we achieve a sense of ―collective responsibility for the physical lives of one 




What is the difference between individual moral responsibility and collective 
responsibility?  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes collective 
responsibility as referring to the ―causal responsibility of moral agents for harm in the 
world and the blameworthiness that we ascribe to them for having caused such harm‖ 
(Smiley, 2010).  Unlike individual responsibility, however, which locates the source of 
moral responsibility in the free will of individual moral agents, collective responsibility 
associates both causal responsibility and blameworthiness with groups and locates the 
source of moral responsibility in the collective actions taken by these groups (Smiley, 
2010).  Briefly, the objections to this idea stem from two contentions.  The first 
contention stresses that groups cannot be held responsible because groups unlike 
individuals cannot have intentions and without intent there cannot be group action 
(Smiley, 2010).  The second contention stresses that groups, which cannot be thought of 
as distinct from their individual members, cannot be morally blameworthy in the way that 




These debates are worthwhile in that they force us to try and articulate the scope 
and realm of notions of collective responsibility, especially important as the scope and 
realm seems fluid.  As we contemplate notions of collective responsibility, there seems to 
be a slide between the collective and the individual and vice versa.  The fact that we do 
hold collectives responsible is because we do see collectives taking morally blameworthy 
or praiseworthy actions in the world.  For example, many Zimbabweans would hold 
Zanu-PF, as the collective, responsible for ‗the Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe although we often 
focus on Mugabe as being individually responsible and the representative of that 
collective.  It cannot be denied though that Zanu-PF, as the collective political party is 
complicit and so blameworthy, but that party is made up of individuals who are (also?) 
each individually responsible.  Similarly, do we Zimbabweans, as a collective rather than 
as individuals, have a responsibility to our nation?  I stress, this is not just individual 
responsibility to the collective, but is there a group responsibility to the collective?  When 
Tsvangirai calls the diaspora home, he is appealing to a sense of collective responsibility 
directly, saying that the diaspora as the collective grouping of those individuals in exile 
are responsible to the nation, but he is also indirectly appealing to the individual within 
the collective.  There is certainly the assumption that Zimbabweans as a community are 
in part responsible for the continuation of ‗the Crisis‘.  Non-Zimbabweans have been 
known to wonder why Zimbabweans, as a collective, don‘t take responsibility for the 
situation.  Petina Gappah in reflecting on her sense of guilt for having left Zimbabwe 
recounts what she has often heard while living in Europe: ―'Oh, those Zimbabweans, why 
aren't they getting rid of their tyrant?  They should just go out on to the streets'‖ (2009b).  




is articulated within a public assessment of the larger failure of the collective 
responsibility because of inaction.      
 In October 2008, I attended a lecture given by Jacob Zuma, the President of South 
Africa, hosted by New York University‘s Africa House.  After Zuma finished talking and 
the floor was opened to questions, I leapt up out of my seat and was the first person at the 
microphone.  My question was: ―Mr. Zuma, we often hear Africa's leaders state that there 
must only be African solutions to African problems but in the case of Zimbabwe's 
worsening crisis, those solutions have been largely ineffectual.  What do you say to the 
accusation that the South African government and SADC (Southern African 
Development Community) leadership have continually enabled the Mugabe regime and 
so are in part responsible for the crisis?"  Many members of the audience broke into 
applause.  As I walked back to my seat, a Zimbabwean man a few places behind me in 
the question queue said that I had asked what he wanted to ask.  I told him to ask his 
question anyway.  When the other Zimbabwean got to the front of the queue, he said, 
"How could... I mean...how could... how could you guys let this happen?"   
I wasn‘t expecting an engaged response from Zuma and I certainly didn‘t receive 
one.  Instead, he meandered around the point and complained that ‗the Zimbabwe 
question‘ was the first thing he got asked whenever he visited the West.  It is not his 
response, or lack thereof, that I am interested in now, but rather I am interested in why I 
asked him that particular question and what that says about individual and collective 
responsibility.  I asked the question, and I write this in all seriousness, because I felt I had 
to.  I felt that I was responsible to myself and to my conceptions of my fellow 




of 600 people and television cameras (my parents saw me on the South African news the 
following night!), I felt that it would be wrong not to ask; that it would be an abdication 
of personal responsibility.  My sense of individual moral responsibility dictated that I ask 
but what did I expect would happen in return?  I was appealing to Jacob Zuma as the 
representative of the South African government so I was appealing to his sense of 
individual responsibility but also in referencing the South African government and SADC 
leadership I was appealing to the sense of responsibility of whatever regional collectives I 
could think of.  I was hoping to draw his attention to what I see as the collective 
responsibility of the bodies and organizations that he is in charge of or has influence with.  
 But to what purpose?  What was I hoping to gain by calling attention to the 
collective responsibility of the South African government and SADC leadership?  Smiley 
(2010) explains the difference between being responsible, which is an assessment of what 
has been done, while our holding someone responsible is a matter of what we do with the 
knowledge of what has or has not been done.  Asking Zuma to account for what I 
perceive to be his government‘s irresponsibility because of inaction (their approach to 
‗the Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe has followed a so-called policy of ―quiet diplomacy‖) is a 
means to stirring his conscience so that he will ‗stir the conscience‘ of the collective.  But 
obviously, in an ideal world, I wanted more from him; I wanted an assurance of action, 
something more like loud diplomacy!  I wanted to let him know that I hold him and his 
government responsible, and to be held responsible, Smiley (2010) explains, is to ―make 
the agents‘ responsibility known both to them and to the rest of the community‖.  My 
assessment of asking Zuma to account for his actions does sound rather self-aggrandizing 




responsibility insisted that I say something.  And where else could a collective sense of 
responsibility start and grow but from the sense of personal moral responsibility of a 
number of individuals with shared intent? 
 
Suggestive claims of responsibility 
 
In light of this brief articulation of how responsibility can arise as a response to 
particular social contexts and through the relation of the self to others, and the dynamics 
of collective versus individual responsibility, I propose and interrogate five possible 
claims of responsibility in relation to those in ―internal‖ and ―external‖ exile and living in 
the diaspora as a result of ‗the Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe.  These claims are drawn directly in 
relation to my situated interpretations of ‗the Crisis‘ and so are not meant to be seen as 
normative but rather suggestive of avenues that could be used to open up considerations 
of how one could respond to such formative experiences.   
 
The first claim I propose is:  
 
Return as responsibility 
 
Morgan Tsvangirai‘s call to return, such as the one he made in Southwark 
Cathedral in June 2009, and has made since in other locations, deserves a response.  What 
should the response be to Tsvangirai‘s call to return?  He would like to see the physical 




certainly the implication that the diaspora have an obligation to return.  Considering this, 
what is the difference between obligation and responsibility?  In an attempt to investigate 
this question I draw on two examples from the Zimbabwean context.   
Eric Worby in ―Address Unknown: The Temporality of Displacement and the 
Ethics of Disconnection among Zimbabwean Migrants in Johannesburg‖ (2010) 
investigates the strategies of ―social disconnection‖ (p. 417) of Zimbabwean migrants in 
Johannesburg considering that they are beset by ―a complex set of material demands and 
ethical constraints‖ (p. 419).  These demands include the obligation to send money and 
supplies back home as well as hosting, in already inhospitable conditions, the stream of 
incoming migrants while they settle and look for work.  Of this situation, Worby asks, 
―What are the perceived ethical implications and consequences of not forwarding one‘s 
address or cell phone number, or of not replying to calls and letters?‖ (2001, p. 421).  The 
vast majority of those who have left have lived with ―the eternally prolonged expectation 
that an end to the political and economic ‗crisis‘ was imminent.  The inevitability of a 
return home, while still a central pillar of most migrants‘ life plans, seems to be 
continuously and indefinitely deferred‖ (Worby, 2001, p. 421).  For how long is one 
obligated to support one‘s home, family and friends?  It is this ―open-ended condition of 
displacement‖ that ―lends itself to a particularly vexing moral economy for Zimbabweans 
abroad—one in which the temporal horizon for reconciling credits and debts, present 
capacities and future dependencies, is unknowable‖ (2010, p. 417).  Migrants interviewed 
by Worby listed a variety of reasons why they would ‗disconnect‘ (i.e. change their cell 
phone number, move home, and in extreme cases, change their name) so as to try and 




financial support, as well as feelings of shame and indignity because of where one lives 
and/or works—Worby summarises as a ―condition of abjection‖ which is a condition 
whereby ―appropriate or desirable morality is impossible to maintain, and therefore, one 
in which the possibility of realising one‘s full and proper personhood is indefinitely 
suspended‖ (2010, p. 430).  In this situation, responsibility becomes a ―continuing 
burden‖ and attempts to maintain ―dignity and social reputation within a context of 
sometimes extreme stigmatization and socio-legal exclusion‖ (Worby, 2010, p. 431) is 
too great a pressure.  In these types of situations, the thought of ‗dodging‘ one‘s 
responsibilities comes up against one‘s sense of morality, and Worby surmises that the 
only viable solution in the face of such a dilemma would be to ―disconnect‖ (p. 431).  In 
disconnecting one is attempting to deny one‘s relationality so failing to receive 
recognition, which would have implications, as Worby points out, for one‘s ability to 
attain ―full and proper personhood‖ (2010, p. 430).     
Considering this, what is the difference between responsibility and obligation or 
duty?  For legitimate reasons (poverty and indignity), one feels that one must deny one‘s 
obligations and disconnect.  It could be argued that disconnection is done out of a sense 
of responsibility to oneself.  If the taken-for-granted modes of conduct, such as being 
obliged to help one‘s family and community, are not appropriable in one‘s current 
situation, is one not obliged to take care of oneself?  The consequences of such an action, 
as already illustrated, would be dire.    
Another example, which highlights this quandary, is the departure of skilled 
professionals from Zimbabwe to the diaspora, which has had drastic effects on certain 




especially damaged by the large-scale loss of doctors and especially nurses.
23
  While it 
can be appreciated why these professionals left, considering the abysmal working 
conditions and shockingly poor salaries, their leaving has not only aggravated aspects of 
‗the Crisis‘, but has also induced others to leave too for the reason that their leaving has 
put more pressure on those who were left behind.  ―While out-migration is a common 
response to socioeconomic disintegration, it can also accelerate that process, leading, in 
turn, to further migration.‖ (Crush & Tevera, 2010, p. 2).  It can be surmised that they left 
because they had to as they had no means of supporting their families while working in 
Zimbabwe; they were obliged to leave as it were; they left out of a sense of individual 
responsibility to themselves and their families.  But in leaving, are they not ignoring their 
collective responsibilities to their communities at home and even their colleagues?  Is 
there a debt of obligation to the country that schooled and skilled you?  Here is the clash 
because one can be responsible to oneself and one‘s family while being irresponsible to 
one‘s community or nation.  And how can one reconcile this position?  If one is able to 
make the very difficult decision to ignore one‘s sense of obligation to one‘s friends and 
relatives, I doubt that one would take into account any sense of obligation to one‘s 
country.  If anything, I imagine that people who have left feel that their government has 
reneged on its obligation to them, in terms of not being able to provide adequate health 
care, job opportunities, security, and the rule of law.   
While the word responsibility carries with it a connotation of obligation, they are 
not the same thing.  Responsibility as a ―two way response structure‖ (Spivak, 1998, p. 
343) is in a sense much more open for interpretation.  Decisions regarding responsible 
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action are made in relation to specific social contexts, whereas obligation is more rule-
bound and dependent on cemented notions of duty, custom or law.  And while they do 
not mean the same thing, responsibility and obligation are often two sides of the same 
coin—the obligation to leave or to ―disconnect‖ (Worby, 2010, p. 431) is out of a sense 
of responsibility to themselves or to their immediate families.  Without the government 
fulfilling its obligations to its citizens still at home, it is unlikely its citizens living outside 
the country would feel any obligation to return.  The government‘s collective 
irresponsibility creates the conditions for its citizens‘ collective irresponsibility.      
There is a further complication though to the possibility of return besides the fact 
that the country is not in a state to be returned to.  As I discussed earlier in Chapter V, 
part of the reason that those in the cathedral reacted so vehemently against Tsvangirai‘s 
call to return was because he spoke without acknowledging, or at least certainly not to a 
sufficient degree, the contexts in which the diaspora find themselves.  People will make 
the decision to return after weighing up a number of contextual issues, which 
predominantly would be the state of the political, economic and social situation back 
home, as well as their ―embeddedness‖ in their host country.24  Knowing that while ‗the 
Crisis‘, in its current articulation, may someday be resolved, the state of the country, its 
political structures and economy, and the social relations have all been profoundly 
changed by events of the last decade.  In this sense, there will be no ‗going home‘ to what 
‗home‘ was; it will be going home to some radically different, or ―new place‖ (p. 468) as 
Butler (2003) would describe it.  In this way, the return will not be, can never be, about 
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‗going back‘ but can only be about ‗going forward‘.  As Leon and Rebecca Grinberg 
epilogue their book, Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Migration and Exile (1989), ―One 
never goes back, one always goes toward‖ (p. 216).   
The problem of return, however, is not simply about political and bureaucratic 
logistics; it is also about the personal and psycho-social changes that those who have 
‗been away‘ have experienced.  It is also a more existential problem in that ―Between the 
idea / And the reality/ Falls the shadow‖ (p. 61) as Eliot (1936) articulated in ―The 
Hollow Men‖.  Very often the act of return disturbs the fantasy of return, especially as 
our imaginations have been put to good use fanaticizing about a glorious homecoming, 
which will bring completion and closure to our time of struggle (Eng, 2003).  It is in this 
way that to return is to lose something (Hartman, 2007).    
Saidiya Hartman, in Lose Your Mother (2007), her book about the African slave 
trade and her journey to Ghana tracing the routes and roots of the trade, writes 
evocatively about what it would be to the return.  She writes that ―Return is the hunger 
for all the things you once enjoyed or the yearning for all the things you never enjoyed.  
It bears the impress of everything that has been taken from you‖ (2007, p. 99-100).  The 
hope at the heart of thoughts of return is very powerful and would be a hard thing to give 
up, especially when one reckons with the reality of the disappointment that ―there is no 
going back to a former condition.  Loss remakes you.  Return is as much about the world 
to which you no longer belong as it is about the one in which you have yet to make a 
home‖ (2007, p. 100). 
Andre Aciman (2000) playing with the word ―nostalgia‖ calls writing about return 




of his return to Alexandria, the city that he and his family were cast out of by the Nasser 
regime when he was a teenager.  He tells us that he went back ―to touch and breathe the 
past again, to walk in shoes I hadn‘t worn in years‖ (Aciman, 2000, p. 3).  The return 
took him down a predictable path: ―the tears, the final reckoning, the big themes: the 
return of the native, the romance of the past, the redemption of time.  All of it followed 
by predictable letdowns: the streets always much narrower than before, buildings grown 
smaller with time, everything in tatters, the city dirty, in ruins‖ (Aciman, 2000, p. 3).  In 
truth, knowing that it can never stand up to what he has made it in his mind, Aciman 
admits to returning in the hope of getting over it.  ―I had come not to recover memories, 
nor even to recognize those I‘d disfigured, nor toy with the thought that I‘d ever live here 
again; I had come to bury the whole thing, to get it out of my system‖ (2000, p. 5).  By 
the end of his visit though, he admits, ―I had hoped to finally let go of this city, knowing 
all the while that the longing would start up soon enough, that one never washes anything 
away, and that this marooned and spectral city, which is no longer home for me…would 
eventually find newer, ever more beguiling ways to remind me that here is where my 
mind always turns‖ (Aciman, 2000, p. 21).25 
These are cautionary tales: there can be no going back ―to touch and breathe the 
past again‖ (Aciman, 2001, p. 3) because as David Eng explains in ―Transnational 
Adoption and Queer Diasporas‖ (2003) ―confronting the past challenges any sense of 
recoupable stability‖ (Eng, 2003, p. 29).  Instead, Eng (2003) says that we can return ―not 
by going back but by moving forward‖, by bringing ―the past into the present‖, not ―the 
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present into the past‖ (p. 32).  The individual responsibility of those returning then is not 
to try and recreate what has been lost by bringing the present into the past and dwelling 
on ―restorative‖ (Boym, 2001, p. vxiii) nostalgic tales, but rather one returns responsibly 
by bringing the past to one‘s present.  This is an act of looking forward rather than 
craning back over your shoulder hankering after something that is no longer there.  This 
act of looking and moving forward and bringing the past to the present, I would argue, is 
not just for those who do literally return.  As has been established, a literal return for 
most of those who have left is still impossible, and some will never return.   
For my own part, I will be returning permanently this year.  I left Zimbabwe in 
August 2006 to come to New York to attend graduate school.  The dire situation in 
Zimbabwe certainly helped to influence my decision to take up the position offered to me 
by Teachers College, but I never considered it a permanent departure, and I always 
intended to return once I was done, by which time ―things would surely be better!‖  I 
suppose it is for this reason that I never really considered myself to be a diasporan but I 
would allow that I lived in the diaspora, if one can even make such a distinction.  I went 
home regularly, spending the academic year in the States and the rest of year in ―Zim‖.  I 
do feel, and have always felt, a sense of responsibility to my country, and I return in part 
because of that sentiment.  I return in part because I feel a sense of individual 
responsibility but also because I can return.  My situation, class, resources, education and 
familial support mean that a return is a viable, possibly even easy, option, logistically that 
is.  Considering that I can return, is it not then my responsibility to do so?  (Primarily, 
though, I return because I miss my family and because I miss my home.  I return because 





In light of the impossibility of a literal return for many of those living in the 
diaspora, is there another way to enact a return?  Can one return not physically but in 
other ways?  Here I am thinking of a ‗return‘ as an act of coming home not in a literal 
sense but rather psychically.  Can one be responsible to one‘s country while living 
elsewhere?  It is a turn of one‘s thoughts and feelings away from ―so many wounds on 
the heart‖ as Chenjerai Hove (2007) explained it, to an enacted return that is about 
learning to ―cherish hearing the voices of my country more intensely‖ (Hove, 2007).  
Hove describes it as being in geographic but not emotional exile.  To ‗return‘ in this way 
is to be able to think and feel and remember in more positive and creative ways, rather 
than in reactionary and regressive ways.  It is to be able to narrate one‘s role in the story 
of ‗the Crisis‘ and its aftermath, not denying the losses but using them as sites of renewal, 
as in being able to create something new out of them.  Patti Lather (2001) believes that 
―Accepting loss becomes the very force of learning and what one loves when lovely 
knowledge is lost is the promise of thinking and doing otherwise‖ (Lather, 2001, p. 161).  
What could this ―lovely knowledge‖ have been?  Lather draws the term ―lovely 
knowledge‖ from Deborah Britzman‘s and Alice Pitt‘s (2003) conceptualisation, whereby 
―lovely knowledge‖ is ―knowledge that one loves‖ (p. 766), meaning it is what we think 
we know or want to know and find difficult to give up.  (And ―difficult knowledge is 
what one makes from the ruins of one‘s lovely knowledge‖ (Britzman & Pitt, 2003, p. 
766).)     
Butler articulates, in ―After Loss, What Then?‖ (2003), that loss teaches us to live 




learning as we are trying to become responsible and give an account of ourselves.  We 
learn this as we are unable to give ―a final or adequate narrative reconstruction of the 
prehistory of the speaking ―I‖‖ (2005, p. 78) other than one that is speculative.  In giving 
an account of ourselves, we have to preface that account with an articulation of how we 
‗found‘ ourselves in that situation in the first place but as we are trying to do this, the 
prehistory ―interrupts‖ (2005, p. 79) our narrative.  ―Narrative capacity constitutes a 
precondition for giving an account of oneself and assuming responsibility for one‘s 
actions through that means‖ (2005, p. 12).  This is of importance because it suggests that 
how we relate the story of what has happened to us will dictate how we respond to that 
situation.  So even though we arrive in a situation that we had no hand in creating and 
over which we have no control, we are implicated in and by our relations to that situation 
by the very fact of being there and being socially constituted beings.  Therefore when we 
are addressed with regard to this situation, we must respond, and how we choose to 
respond will result in the kind of stance we take up.  The narrative available to us 
however will be ―partial‖ and the discourses conflicting so that ―my efforts at narrative 
reconstruction are always undergoing revision‖ (Butler, 2005, p. 40).  
Acceptance of the fact that I am implicated in the lives of others and that I am 
created in part out of historical, political and social conditions and discourses not of my 
making and over which I have no control becomes the fecund site for my articulations not 
only of myself and my situation but also of my sense of responsibility.  In giving an 
account of myself I become accountable for that narration; how I tell that story will 




I articulate and interrogate the possibility of such a fecund site in the following 
two claims of responsibility: the claim of melancholia and reflective nostalgia as 
responsibility and the claim of art (specifically literature) as responsibility.   
 
Melancholia and reflective nostalgia as responsibility 
 
David Eng and David Kazanjian, in the introduction, ―Mourning Remains‖, to 
their edited collection of essays, Loss: The Politics of Mourning (2003), see Freud‘s 
concept of melancholia as a means of ―interpreting loss as a creative process‖ (p. 3).  
They describe melancholia ―as a confrontation with loss through the adamant refusal of 
closure‖; it is a ―mourning without end‖ as a result the ―inability to resolve the grief‖ 
(Eng & Kazanjian, 2003, p. 3).  Melancholia therefore is something which offers a 
―formal relation‖, a ―structure of feeling‖, and ―a capaciousness of meaning‖ which can 
―encompass the individual and the collective, the spiritual and the material, the psychic 
and the social, the aesthetic and the political‖ (Eng & Kazanjian, 2003, p. 3).  In their 
articulation, melancholia can be creative because of its ambivalent relation to the past.  
Whereas Freud felt that mourning would come to an end eventually allowing the mourner 
to ‗move on‘, with melancholia, the past is ―steadfastly alive in the present‖ (Eng & 
Kazanjian, 2003, p. 4).  
One might wonder how this could be a good thing.  As established in Chapter IV, 
the kinds of losses suffered as a result of ‗the Crisis‘ in Zimbabwe means that psychic, 
material and historical debris remains after the catastrophe; ―the past has not yet passed‖ 




Nakba‖.  Considering this, Eng and Kazanjian‘s (2003) conception of melancholia as an 
―ongoing and open relationship with the past‖ (p. 4) means that we take stock of and 
engage with the debris, thus allowing ourselves to reckon with loss and its remains.  This 
kind of engagement, Eng and Kazanjian believe, ―generates sites for memory and history, 
for rewriting the past as well as reimagining the future‖ (2003, p. 4).  In this way, 
―Melancholia raises the question of what makes a world of new objects, places and ideals 
possible‖ (2003, p. 4).  If part of the struggle, after dramatic ruptures of historical 
proportions, is concerned with how one lives on afterwards, now knowing what has and 
can be done and that one has very little control over any of it, it seems that any way of 
actively and creatively engaging with those losses would help to structure the present and 
future in proactively responsible ways.  By this I refer to the idea that responsibility can 
be retroactive, in looking back so as to apportion blame and demand reparation, but also 
being proactive and assessing responsible action for the present and future.  There is 
nowhere else to go from a position that ‗harks on‘ about the past, clings to fantastical 
notions of better times (so called ―hey days‖), and bemoans the bad luck of your times; it 
is a culs de sac (Lewis, 1961, p. 41).  Rather, one needs to assess and engage with the 
past in a manner that is informed by ―reflective nostalgia‖ rather than ―restorative 
nostalgia‖ (Boym, 2001).       
As explained in Chapter IV, Svetlana Boym (2001) articulates two types of 
nostalgia: restorative and reflective.  Briefly, restorative nostalgia desires a return to the 
past by attempting a ―transhistorical reconstruction of the lost home‖ (Boym, 2001, p. 
vxiii), whereas reflective nostalgia ―delays homecoming—wistfully, ironically, 




―recovery‖ (Boym, 2001, p. 49) of what has been lost but rather a ―meditation on history 
and the passage of time‖ (Boym, 2001, p. 49).  There is a ―flexibility‖ in its relation to the 
past and its narration of the past, which Boym (2001) describes as ―ironic, inconclusive 
and fragmentary‖ (p. 50).  In this way, reflective nostalgia does not dwell on set pieces 
from the past or thoughts of glorious better days; it does not return endlessly to stories 
which begin with the expression, ―When we lived in Zimbabwe...‖, and seek to denigrate 
the lifestyle and choices of those who still live at home.  Reflective nostalgia can create 
―a new kind of space that plays with the past and the present‖, or as Eng (2003) would 
encourage, brings the past to the present, so that ―a modern nostalgic can be homesick 
and sick of home at once‖ (Boym, 2001, p. 50). 
Reflective nostalgia is a claim of responsibility precisely because nostalgia can be 
prospective as well as retrospective (Boym, 2001, p. xvi).  ―Fantasies of the past 
determined by needs of the present have a direct impact on realities of the future‖ (Boym, 
2001, p. xvi) and so considerations of the future must make us take responsibility for our 
nostalgic tales: ―Unlike melancholia, which confines itself to the planes of individual 
consciousness, nostalgia is about the relationship between individual biography and the 
biography of groups or nations, between personal and collective memory‖ (p. xvi).  It is 
not just the personal and individual stories that one is trying to narrate but rather the 
stories of others too who are implicated in the telling by the relational ties between us.   
I need only think of the veritable flood of white Zimbabwean memoirs that have 
been published in the last ten years as a prime example of irresponsible restorative 
nostalgia.
26
  Ranka Primorac writes in her essay, ―Rhodesians Never Die? The 
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Zimbabwean Crisis and the Revival of Rhodesian Discourse‖ (2010), that even as the 
recent white writing ―strives to adapt its sense of home and belonging to conditions of 
crisis and multiple exile in the twenty-first century, a certain formation of white writing 
that identifies itself as ‗Zimbabwean‘ continues to reproduce a deep and colonial-rooted 
ambivalence towards notions of Africa, home and belonging‖ (p. 202-203).  Much has 
been written in critique of the two most well-known white memoirs to have been 
published in the last fifteen years: Alexandra Fuller‘s Don’t Let’s Go to the Dogs 
Tonight: An African Childhood (2003) and Peter Godwin‘s Mukiwa: A White Boy in 
Africa (1996).  Both memoirs recount experiences of growing up in Zimbabwe from the 
mid 1960s till the end of the Liberation War and Independence in 1980.  Both authors 
insert themselves into ―colonial-era ideologies by writing about ‗African‘ childhoods 
with a mixture of nostalgia and anxiety‖ (Primorac, 2010, p. 211), hence there is an 
awkwardness in their depictions in calling themselves ‗African‘ (that sweeping 
descriptor) while depicting colonial childhoods.  Their nostalgia is irresponsible because 
nostalgia ―is about the relationship between individual biography and the biography of 
groups or nations‖ (Boym, 2001, p. xvi).  Their renderings implicate others in ways that 
they wouldn‘t want to be rendered but also in ways that are uncritical and ahistorical.   
Conversely, reflective nostalgic recollections can be seen in the use of humour 
and irony in Petina Gappah‘s short stories from her collection An Elegy for Easterly 
(2009).  Better past times in Zimbabwe are brought to the reader‘s attention not through 
stories of idealised childhoods but through amusing anecdotes inserted into the stories, 
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such as an anecdote about a group of children who hear a woman ask for six cents and 
think she asks for ‗sense‘ as they‘ve never seen coins before (they ceased to exist in 2000 
when hyper-inflation eroded the worth of the currency) (Gappah, 2009, p. 42).  Zanu-
PF‘s ―patriotic history‖ (Ranger, 2004), which would definitely be characterized as 
restoratively nostalgic in its idealisation of a glorious past, is satirized by Gappah‘s 
characters who amuse each other with jokes about the state of the country: ―Before the 
President was elected, the Zimbabwe ruins were a pre-historic monument in Masvingo 
province. Now the Zimbabwe ruins extend to the whole country‖ (2009, p. 33).  
Gappah‘s stance towards the past is ―ironic, inconclusive and fragmentary‖ (Boym, 2001, 
p. 50); it shows a reflective nostalgia, which forces the reader to similarly reflect and 
question the stories we choose to tell of the past. 
 I return to Gappah‘s writing to elucidate the third claim of responsibility:  
 
Art as responsibility 
 
Edward Said (2000) believes that if the ―exile refuses to sit on the sidelines 
nursing a wound, there are things to be learned [from the experience]: he or she must 
cultivate a scrupulous (not indulgent or sulky) subjectivity‖ (p. 184).  Referencing 
Theodor Adorno‘s Minima Moralia as an example of such a ―scrupulous subjectivity‖, 
Said explains that Adorno‘s reflections were ―informed by the belief that the only home 
truly available now (after the advent of an ‗administered‘ world), though fragile and 
vulnerable, is in writing‖ (p. 184).   




Petina Gappah, in an interview with the Guardian newspaper, after winning the Guardian 
First Book award, says that though she doesn‘t ―live [in Zimbabwe] physically‖, she is 
―there mentally‖ (Guardian, 2009), which for me exemplifies a kind of imaginative and 
even psychic return.  ―Despite the psychic disorders of exile, it ironically offers 
opportunities for creativity‖ (Muchemwa, 2010, p. 135).  The stories in her book are 
humorous and ironic renderings of lives lived in and through various aspects of ‗the 
Crisis‘.  Kizito Muchemwa (2010) writes that Gappah‘s stories, which ―return to 
diasporic creativity to re-imagine identity in the Zimbabwean context‖ (p. 135), are a 
response to the current crisis in that they ―mediate the experience of a population that has 
been externalised by the state‖ (p. 135).  The space that such writers occupy is a ―liminal‖ 
one that ―mediates the melancholia of those who find themselves in strange lands and the 
anomie of those left at home, who experience many types of deprivation‖ (Muchemwa, 
2010, p. 135).   
Gappah mediates the ruptures and losses experienced as a result of ‗the Crisis‘ 
through satire and irony.  For example: her brilliantly comic short story, ―The 
Mupandwana Dancing Champion‖ (2009), begins with the arresting sentence: ―When the 
prices of everything went up ninety-seven times in one year, M‘dhara Vitalis Mukaro 
came out of retirement to make the coffins in which we buried our dead‖ (p. 91).  The 
narrator, who teaches geography at the local secondary school in Mupandawana, which is 
described as ―not even a townlet, a townling, or half a fraction of a town,‖ but a so-called 
―Growth Point,‖ a term used by the government as a diversion ―from the reality of [their] 
present squalor‖ (Gappah, 2009, p. 91), observes that his students‘ only interest in his 




and Johannesburg, and Gaborone, and Harare.  M‘dhara Vitalis returns to Mupandawana 
from Harare, where he worked for thirty years for a furniture manufacturer before being 
forced into early retirement because his employer was shutting down the company due to 
the impossible economic conditions.  Inflation ―zoomed and soared and spun the roof off 
the country‖ (Gappah, 2009, p. 95) and Vitalis‘s pension, resulting in a retirement 
package made up of his work overalls, some of his tools and three pairs of shoes.   
The story is about, as the title suggests, a dancing champion, who turns out to be 
M‘dara Vitalis.  The owner of the local tavern, ―Why Leave Guest House and Disco-
Bar‖, decides to host a dancing competition, to which the ―Growth Pointers‖ (Gappah, 
2009, p. 92) respond most favourably.  During the championships, it becomes apparent 
that old Vitalis has picked up some very impressive dance moves while in Harare and 
wows the crowd, winning the competition.  In his final victory dance, what looked like 
ecstatic and emphatic dance moves, are in fact the moves induced by a fatal heart attack.   
This story, I believe, its point of view and representation, show a positive and creative 
engagement with the country‘s past and present.  After ‗the Crisis‘, and during it too, 
there is still hope and humour and dancing and community.  And even though M‘dhara 
Vitalis was ―not dancing, but dying‖ (Gappah, 2009, p. 129), he got his story on the front 
page of the national paper (―‗Man Dances Self to Death‘‖ (Gappah, 2009, p. 130)), right 
under the daily picture of the President!  Gappah uses certain events and aspects of ‗the 
Crisis‘ only as a backdrop to show how Zimbabweans explore and trouble life lived in 
post-colonial Zimbabwe.  She uses ―the motifs of connection and reconnection to 




The wreckage is fecund if these are the kinds of stories we come to tell of it.  Art, 
and literature in this specific example, can offer a positive and renewed engagement with 
‗the Crisis‘ and the country.  This is where I see the claim of responsibility.  I am not 
advocating that only positive or happy and humorous stories be told but rather that there 
is an ironic and open assessment that ordinary life is lived there.  ―The country that she 
writes about is a country where life goes on in the face of political oppression and 
economic collapse‖ (Guardian, 2009).  Gappah‘s secret to writing: ―You don‘t focus on 
the big moments, you focus on the people, the tiny little moments‖ (Guardian, 2009).  For 
this reason, Gappah says in the interview with the Guardian that she dislikes the label 
‗the voice of Zimbabwe‘, something her publisher first tried to pin on her, because 
―writing of a place is not the same as writing for a place‖ (Guardian, 2009). 
There is in fact a plethora of new literature coming out of Zimbabwe.  Where it 
had for a time gone quiet as many of Zimbabwe‘s prominent writers were silenced either 
by the AIDS epidemic, collusion and bribery (Hove, 2001), or exile and disillusionment, 
a new younger vibrant crop of writers is emerging and writing of about the place, not for 
the place (Guardian, 2009).  Literature, in its broadest articulation is working positively 
as an archive.   
There has been no shortage of documentation of the suffering of 
Zimbabweans at home and across borders over the last decade.  One of the 
‗positive‘ dimensions of the crisis is the record created by the extensive 
media coverage and an extraordinary body of human rights reporting.  
There has also been a flourishing of literary representations, from personal 




fiction, and plays, that provide greater intimacy with the questions and 
experiences generated by the crisis. (Hammar, McGregor, Landau, 2010, 
p. 280) 
There is hope to be found in this productivity as it shows the effort of continual 
engagement with the country‘s past and present and future, even if those representations 
are contested.  This productivity is also a result of so many people having left though and 
not just because access to the necessary resources are more readily available outside of 
the country and because you don‘t have to write under the threat of incarceration.  It is 
also because exile offers a kind of nourishment (Hove, 2007) and can also be 
motivational factor.  It is also, I believe, because of the ―practice of dwelling differently‖ 
(Clifford, 1993, p. 321) in that one is afforded a perspective that only leaving and being 
forced to reflect and give an account of yourself can provide.      
 The next claim that I wish to propose is the claim of: 
 
Learning as responsibility 
 
Thomas Keenan (1997) sees responsibility arising precisely when we don‘t know 
how we ought to act, and believes that responsibility should be ―an interruption between 
the orders of cognition and action‖ (p. 1).  This he believes takes place at a ―frontier‖ (p. 
12).  He writes that ―Something other than knowledge comes into play at the frontier, 
something that exceeds or cannot be reduced to cognition and the application of a rule—
otherwise the decision at the border would make no difference‖ (Keenan, 1997, p. 12).  




happens beyond ―knowledge‖ in the borderland?  I would argue that learning happens at 
this frontier: we are learning about responsibility and about making one‘s way as spectral 
agency (Butler, 2003, p. 467), and about the perils of self-narration, and we are also 
learning to learn (Spivak, 1998, p. 343).     
Spivak (1998) speaks of love in relation to learning.  She describes the 
engagement of ―ethical singularity‖, love, as an engagement of ―singularity and 
responsibility and accountability‖ (Spivak, 1998, p. 340).  Such an engagement is 
approached when ―responses flow from both sides‖ (Spivak, 1998, p. 340), which is 
prerequisite because the responses cannot be out of balance, ―otherwise, the idea that if 
the person I am doing good to resembles me and has my rights, he or she will be better 
off, does not begin to approach an ethical relation (nor, does an attitude of unqualified 
admiration for the person as an example of his or her culture)‖ (Spivak, 1998, p. 340).  
To inhabit such a relation one must not see the other as a person who must adopt your 
values nor as a person for whom one has ―unqualified admiration‖ (Spivak, 1998, p. 340).  
While encouraging us to ―learn to learn‖27, Spivak explains that  
learning can only be attempted, through the supplementation of collective 
effort by love.  What deserves the name love is an effort—over which one 
has no control yet at which one must not strain—that is slow, attentive on 
both sides, mind changing on both sides, at the possibility of the 
unascertainable ethical singularity that is not ever a sustainable condition.  
The necessary collective efforts are to change laws, relations of 
production, systems of education, and health care.  But without the mind-
                                                 
27
 In the context of the essay, Spivak encourages us ―to learn to learn‖ from the ―original ecological 




changing one-on-one responsible contact, nothing will stick. (1998, p. 
340) 
Spivak sees responsible action as being grounded in singular engagements of love and it 
is from this experience that collective action learns.  Learning to be responsible is to learn 
from the ―two way responses of love‖ (Spivak, 1998, p. 340).  It certainly seems true that 
political, historical and collective responsibility begins with personal and intimate 
responsibility, because as Spivak says without that ―nothing will stick‖ (1998, p. 340).     
 Collective responses take place with/in the community.  But how does this 
community of responsibility come about?  Who are its members?  And it what ways do 
they position themselves to act responsibly?   
 
Community as responsibility 
 
I have spent time in this study articulating notions of community.  I use this 
opportunity to re-cap Butler‘s convincing position on community as a place of fecundity 
and responsibility.   
In Precarious Life (2004) Butler considers ―a dimension of political life that has 
to do with our exposure to violence and our complicity in it, with our vulnerability to loss 
and the task of mourning that follows, and with finding a basis for community in these 
conditions‖ (p. 19).  As discussed in Chapter V, Butler believes that grief, instead of 
being ―privatizing‖, ―furnishes a sense of political community of a complex order‖ (2004, 
p. 22).  This it does by ―bringing to the fore the relational ties that have implications for 




In Frames of War (2010), Butler continues to elaborate upon the precarity of life 
and what that means for ―the ontology of individualism‖ (p. 33), as well as thinking about 
ways to ―assume responsibility for the minimization of precarity‖ (Butler, 2010, p. 33).  
Butler establishes that the body is ―a social phenomenon‖ in that ―it is exposed to others, 
vulnerable by definition‖, and so ―it must rely on what is outside itself‖ (2010, p. 33).   
Butler writes that ―precariousness as a generalized condition relies on a conception of the 
body as fundamentally dependent on, and conditioned  by, a sustained and sustainable 
world; responsiveness—and thus, ultimately, responsibility—is located in the affective 
responses to a sustaining and impinging world‖ (p. 34).   
How we respond—and so are responsible—to this world depends on certain 
critical question:  ―Am I responsible only to myself? Are there others for whom I am 
responsible?  And how do I, in general, determine the scope of my responsibility?  Am I 
responsible for all others, or only to some, and on what basis would I draw that line?‖ 
(Butler, 2010, p. 35)  These critical questions must be further troubled: ―Is it only as an 
―I‖, that is, as an individual, that I am responsible?  Could it be that when I assume 
responsibility what becomes clear is that who ―I‖ am is bound up with others in necessary 
ways?  Am I even thinkable without the world of others?  In effect, could it be that 
through the process of assuming responsibility the ―I‖ shows itself to be, at least partially, 
a ―we‖? (Butler, 2010, p. 35).  Emphasizing the relational ties through which we are 
constituted, brings Butler from the singular to the collective, because if the ―I‖ exists in 
relation to others, then surely we cannot only be responsible to ourselves, if we were that 
would be a denial of our relationality.  This conception of myself as ―invariably in 




upon by others ―in ways that are not fully in my control or clearly predictable‖ (Butler, 
2004, p. 27).   
Butler asks, ―But who then is included in the ―we‖ that I seem to be, or to be part 
of?  And for which ―we‖ am I finally responsible‖ (Butler, 2010, p. 35-36).  She does not 
see this ―we‖ as being a question of belonging to a particular community bound by 
nationality, or territory, or language because ―If I identify a community of belonging on 
the basis of nation, territory, language, or culture, and if I then base my sense of 
responsibility on that community, I implicitly hold to the view that I am responsible only 
for those who are recognizably like me in some way‖ (Butler, 2010, p. 36).  And as 
Spivak argues, relations of ethical singularity, or love as responsibility, cannot take place 
―if the person I am doing good to resembles me and has my rights‖ (1998, p. 340).  
Butler‘s question is much broader; instead she asks provocatively, ―What is our 
responsibility towards someone we do not know?‖ (Butler, 2010, p. 36).   
The relational ties by which we are recognised and constituted insist upon a sense 
of community.  But we cannot expect that community to be homogenous.  It can only be 
a place of accepted differences.  Using our sense of loss to see and feel what connects us 
as a community seems to be most hopeful.  And I wonder too if this new sense of 
community could also be a place of reconciliation, not between political parties, but 
rather reconciliation between the past and the present and the future.  Could we use this 
new sense of community to realise our sense of individual, collective and even historical 








This work for me has always been a question of ‗so what‘, and not necessarily the 
‗so what‘ of research and theoretical stances and methodology but rather a more urgent 
and topical ‗so what‘.  So what can this situation be made to mean?  So what do we do 
with this situation?  Or rather, (I must stop deflecting by using the plural pronoun) what 
can I do with this situation?  To attempt to find answers to this question (accepting that 
the answers may just be the arrival at more questions) I had to start with the naming and 
articulating of the events and the experiences of the events.  What is it?  What has 
happened?  Through this work, I have learnt to appreciate, articulate and mediate my 
conceptions of the ―different kinds of losses‖ (Butler, 2003, p. 467) that have been 
experienced as a result of ‗the Crisis‘.  I felt it before when I was living at home and in 
my first years in New York but it is through this academic work that I have found the 
words to say it!  But what implications might these words have?   
From here, again I asked, ―So what?‖  So I can name it for myself but what 
happens next?  I feel (as a way of coping?) that I must always keep trying to do 
something with this experience; tarrying with grief, as Butler (2004) encourages.  As 
such, it was working with conceptions of mourning, melancholia and nostalgia that 
provided me with a theoretical framework with which to meditate on my conceptions of 
the psycho-social experiences of ―internal‖ and ―external‖ exile (Hove, 2007).  Needing 
to think more practically and politically as well as theoretically, I started to wonder about 




be made of the three million strong Zimbabwean diaspora?  Leading me finally to ponder 
responsibility as the next (and, perhaps to my mind, inevitable) ‗so what?‘   
Through this work, I have learnt to think more deeply on questions of 
responsibility.  I have come to understand that there are more, sometimes less obvious 
ways, to take a responsible stance towards times of crisis.  I suspect that this work which 
has only just scratched the surface of how responsibility could be a possible response to 
times of crisis, could and should go much deeper into the ethical nature of such a stance.  
(And I hope to go further and wider and deeper in my future journeys into research.)  But 
I must also ask, ‗Why did I choose or why was I drawn to conceptions of responsibility?‘  
I think it would be fair to say that I am drawn to notions of responsibility because I see it 
as an active response and engagement (I have an innate fear of passivity) but also I think 
that I am drawn to it as a response because of the implication of being held to account, 
with its attendant connotations of reparation and ‗righting of wrongs‘.   
My education and upbringing in a fairly traditional, Western enlightenment-
informed setting means that I cannot help but desire and long for justice, the righting of 
wrongs, a world where people are held to account.  (I use Judith Butler because she offers 
ways of thinking about agency and taking action in the world from poststructuralist and 
psychoanalytic perspectives.)  And desiring ‗justice‘ is probably why I am drawn to 
notions of responsibility.  (In my more cynical moments, surveying the destruction 
wrought by the regime on the country‘s institutions, I do not think there will ever be 
justice for Zimbabwe because perhaps justice is a fairy tale.)  And from this confession, I 
must also acknowledge the sneaky presence of the normative voice in my work.  This is 




While I did not intend for the personal voice to be normative, it is there none-the-less.  I 
think that it might come from a place of self-consciousness about my (white) place in the 
history of my country but also I think that it is a reaction to the niggling child-like 
humanistic fear that ‗the Crisis‘ will never be over, despite having theorized that there is 
no after or over, I, of course, still dream of an after and an over.     
In owning the normative voice, I must also own the five claims.  These claims are 
drawn directly in relation to my situated interpretations of ‗the Crisis‘ and so are not 
meant to be seen as normative but rather suggestive of avenues that could be used to open 
up considerations of how one could respond to such formative experiences.  It is through 
the work of attempting to engage with my interpretations of the psycho-social 
experiences of ‗the Crisis‘, which are all informed by my white, middle class 
background, my education in literature, literary studies and education, as well as my 
experiences having taught in literature in Zimbabwe that the five possible claims are 
drawn.  This fact—that the proposed claims are drawn from my very particular 
conceptions, education, interests and passions and are not meant to be normative—is in 
fact a source of hope for me.  Hope in the realization that there are a myriad of other 
ways that myself and others could think about responsibility as a stance in response to 
our own experiences and interpretations of crisis.   
I believe that my use of autobiography stresses my situatedness.  Using 
autobiography I wish to challenge ―the normative, the ordinary, the taken-for-granted‖ 
(Miller, 2005, p. 54) as I attempt to contextualize, mediate and trouble my interpretations 
of my experiences of certain aspects of ‗the Crisis‘, which has been a formative 




a method, provides me with skills to help me think through and on and around the 
experiences of crisis and exile.  In this way, I believe that this hybridized method could 
be used in curriculum in Zimbabwean schools to find the words to articulate the losses 
and confusion caused by ‗the Crisis‘, which could possibly lead students and teachers 
alike to ―learn to be responsible while studying to be political‖ ((Spivak, 1998, p. 337).    
If ―Home is where one starts from‖ (Eliot, 1963, p. 203) then where do we finish?   
My journeys to the States, through graduate school and the years of thinking and reading 
that have lead me to and through this paper have helped to clarify what I always knew: 
that I must return.  I return home to return to the classroom where I am most happy.  I had 
thought that my explorations out of Zimbabwe would open up the desire to take on other 
opportunities (academia? NGO work?) but what I have learnt is that what I was doing is 
what I should be doing.  I return to teaching, anticipating the pressure and the penury, 
because I love teaching and I love teaching English but also I return because I feel 
compelled to.  It turns out that this was a long and circuitous route ―to arrive where [I] 
started‖ but hopefully my journeys have taught me to ―know the place for the first time‖ 
(Eliot, 1963, p. 212)!   
Finally, I wish to acknowledge that I did worry that you would find the following 
and final Afterword depressing.  I suppose I doubted it because I felt a sense of 
responsibility to give my reader (and myself) a more hopeful ending.  I wondered if I 
should write you something else but then decided to stick with my original decision 
because I want to stress, as I did in the Introduction, that ‗the Crisis‘ is ongoing and I feel 
a sense of urgency in this work.  What overcame my sense of responsibility to provide 




teachers at that forgotten school.  I feel a sense of individual responsibility to use this 
opportunity to tell you about my interpretations of their situation.  To acknowledge that I 
am not, and cannot, be well unless they are well.  I write it to remind myself: La lotta 






The drive to the Omay Communal Area in the north-west of Zimbabwe takes us seven 
hours; three of those hours are spent navigating corrugated and eroded dirt roads.  
Chidygamugamu Primary School is our destination.  And the reason for our trip?  The 
NGO funded project that we are running intends to construct nutrition gardens at rural 
schools in the Omay – one of the least developed and poorest areas in Zimbabwe.  The 
majority of the Omay‘s residents are Tonga.  Famous for their craftsmanship, especially 
their traditional doors, which we in the cities buy up as ‗art‘, they are also famously 
forgotten.  Living so far away from any major urban area and holding no political power 
being neither Shona nor Ndebele it is almost as if they are not there at all.   
This region is beautiful but oh so very hot, and usually very dry.  But we have 
come at the end of the rainy season so it is green and lush but that means that the chances 
of contracting malaria is high.  This is not a good area for farming; the land is stubborn 
and does not provide a good yield.  A nutrition survey carried out in the district by the 




wasting level of 5.8% and a chronic malnutrition or stunting level of 34.1%.  Due to 
economic collapse, these figures must be so much worse.  We will build a nutrition 
garden, we think.  That will help.  We will encourage the school children to grow 
anything other than mealies (corn).  We bring with us seedlings of the Maringa tree – the 
leaves can be cooked and eaten and are an excellent source of protein.   
―Ah, we have heard of this Maringa,‖ members of the School Council tell us, ―It 
can cure The Disease.‖   
―No, no it cannot cure The Disease‖, we say over and over again, ―But it will 
make you feel strong and healthy.‖  
So armed with spades and seedlings, shade cloth and plenty of mosquito repellent, 
as well as unwanted library books that I‘ve collected from the private school I teach at in 
Harare, we arrive at the school.  The school is situated atop a hill, with a view of the 
Matusadona National Park.  The classrooms are shaded by aged Msasa trees, and there is 
plenty of space for the children to run around and play soccer.  But there must be 
something I‘m missing, I think, once I‘ve stretched my legs.  I thought this school catered 
to seven hundred children and yet there are only six classrooms.  I wander inside one of 
them.  There are no window panes or ceilings.  There are no desks and only twenty or so 
chairs per classroom.  ―Hot seating‖, says the headmaster.  I look at him blankly.  ―Half 
the children come to school in the morning, the other half come in the afternoon.  But, 
you know, some of these children must walk 5 kilometres to get to school and then when 
they get home they must help with the farming, so they are very tired.‖  While we walk 
the school grounds, he tells me, ―Resources are few.  We haven‘t heard from the ministry 




of parents, teachers, and children had gathered and built makeshift classrooms out of 
thick branches and thatch.  They have no walls but at least they are cool in the stifling 
summer months.   
Chidygamugamu Primary School does not have electricity or running water.  The 
teachers and the pupils have to walk to a well that is situated at the bottom of the hill and 
walk back up with 5 litre containers of water balancing on their heads.  Most of the 
teachers are not locals but are recent school leavers from other parts of the country.  They 
have had no teacher training but are promised some form of government support if they 
first do a couple years of teaching in places like the Omay.  They are unbearably 
isolated.  Because of chronic fuel shortages, the bus service no longer runs regularly 
through these parts.  For months on end they live at the school, several teachers to a 
room, each waiting for the holidays when they can make the long trek out of the Omay to 
catch a bus to their homes to see their families.  
But what really makes me want to weep is the hand-drawn calendar on the wall in 
the headmaster‘s office that outlines the events and activities of the students‘ 
extracurricular activities.  I don‘t want to ask but for the life of me I can‘t figure out 
where they hold the ―swimming gala‖.  The extracurricular activities of these children 
surely just entail walking home five miles and then helping their parents in their small 
plots of land, fetching and carrying water, ploughing, weeding, and herding if they were 
so lucky as to have cows and goats.   
Sustainable nutrition gardens in the face of all this?  How would I account for 





You don‘t know what to do with this experience.  You don‘t know where to file it 
away.  On some level you knew that many of your fellow Zimbabweans lived in such 
abject poverty, you knew that for many of them, their options were limited to eking out a 
living on some barren piece of land, you knew that they made sacrifices for the survival 
of their families that you could never really contemplate…but you never really knew 
until you saw, and now that you‘ve seen, you don‘t know how to read it, or understand it, 
or who to get angry at or if there‘s even a place for anger.  You don‘t know what to do 




I know now that, in part, this dissertation has been a way for me to do something with 
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